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MORALITY, POLITICS, AND MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY US WRITING
Scholars over the past two decades (Denning, Szalay, Edmunds, Robbins) have
theorized the different ways literature of the Mid-Twentieth Century reflects the
dawn of the US's so-called welfare state, brought about by the liberal ascendancy
occasioned by the Great Depression. While these studies elaborate on the effect
rapidly expanding public aid had on literary production of the period, many have
tended to undervalue the lingering influence on midcentury storytelling of private
charity and philanthropy, those traditional aid institutions fundamentally challenged
by the Great Depression and historically championed by conservatives. If the welfare
state had an indelible impact on US literatures, so did the moral complexity of the
systems of charity and philanthropy it purportedly replaced. In my dissertation, I
theorize modern charity as a cultural narrative that found expression in a number of
different writers from the start of the Great Depression and into the early 1960s,
including Harold Gray, Ralph Ellison, W.E.B. Du Bois, Flannery O'Connor, and
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
But when this old Adam of resentment rose in me and tempted me concerning Bartleby, I
grappled him and threw him. How? Why, simply by recalling the divine injunction:"A
new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another." Yes, this it was that saved
me. Aside from higher considerations, charity often operates as a vastly wise and prudent
principle—a great safeguard to its possessor. Men have committed murder for jealousy's
sake, and anger's sake, and hatred's sake, and selfishness' sake, and spiritual pride's
sake; but no man that ever I heard of, ever committed a diabolical murder for sweet
charity's sake. Mere self-interest, then, if no better motive can be enlisted, should,
especially with high-tempered men, prompt all beings to charity and philanthropy. At any
rate, upon the occasion in question, I strove to drown my exasperated feelings towards
the scrivener by benevolently construing his conduct. “Poor fellow, poor fellow!” thought
I, “he don't mean any thing [sic]; and besides, he has seen hard times, and ought to be
indulged.”
-Melville. “Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall-Street”
All this will fail and none of it will happen unless our vision of America as a world power
includes a passionate devotion to great American ideals. We have some things in this
country which are infinitely precious and especially American – a love of freedom, a
feeling for the equality of opportunity, a tradition of self-reliance and independence and
also of co-operation. In addition to ideals and notions which are especially American, we
are the inheritors of all the great principles of Western civilization – above all Justice,
the love of Truth, the ideal of Charity.
-Henry Luce, “The American Century”
It is not surprising that the word which was once the most general expression of love and
care for others has become (except in special contexts, following the surviving legal
definition of benevolent institutions) so compromised that modern governments have to
advertise welfare benefits (and with a wealth of social history in the distinction) as “not a
charity but a right.”
-Raymond Williams, Keywords for Cultural Study
“Stopgap” Charity and Midcentury Writing
In a 1931 essay entitled “The Jobless—A Job for All of Us,” John Dewey issues a
warning to his American readers:
Although public charity is a recognition of social responsibility it is a belated
recognition. It comes after the catastrophe. Prevention is always better than a
cure, and charity is rarely even a cure. It is at best a stopgap. And when the
suffering and the catastrophe are constantly recurring, the recourse to charity, as
an afterthought, is criminal. (153)
1

Writing two years after Black Tuesday and two years before FDR would push the
Emergency Banking Bill through Congress and begin the New Deal in earnest, Dewey’s
brief polemic articulates the crossroads among dominant discourses of public relief in the
US at midcentury. The first of these discourses concern what historian Jeremy Beer has
called The American Philanthropic Revolution, the aristocratic mode of capital
investment into private foundations embodied early on by Andrew Carnegie and John D.
Rockefeller from the 1870s onward and which emphasized the large-scale investment of
private capital toward solving, rather than alleviating, social problems. The second mode
of public relief—informed most notably by American pragmatic liberalism and the
economic theories of John Maynard Keynes—focused on the shift from private
philanthropy to publicly-funded structural investment. In the process of avoiding the
“criminal” and “belated recognition” of charity, the focus on alleviating human suffering,
for Dewey, goes from addressing current need to preventing some future “catastrophe.”
The Great Depression, exactly the sort of catastrophe to which Dewey refers, found him
writing the words above for a magazine called The Unemployed. The League for
Industrial Democracy (formerly the Intercollegiate Socialist Society) distributed the
publication and, like the contemporary “street papers” sold by homeless men and women
in many cities today, offered The Unemployed to jobless men at a price of 5 cents so the
paper may be sold for 10 cents to help feed their families as they looked for work (Dewey
523).
Dewey’s essay poignantly demonstrates that charity’s “belatedness” as a recourse
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and a stopgap makes it no less necessary. By referring to charity as “criminal,”1 Dewey
offers less an indictment of charitable individuals and more a lamentation for the
shortsightedness of those who did not see the Depression bust coming. President Herbert
Hoover had in 1931 tried to stave off the Depression’s full force through the President’s
Unemployment Relief Fund, a fundraising campaign wherein he had hoped families, such
as the Duponts of Delaware or one of the large general-purpose foundations, might fill
their respective community chests with a “stopgap” influx of funds (Bremner 146). The
New Deal, just the kind of endeavor championed by Dewey and the League for Industrial
Democracy, came about partly because the Depression called into serious question the
legitimacy of American charitable institutions. However, this critique did not seek to
obliterate American charitableness. Instead, the LID’s efforts with Unemployed
demonstrate a compromise between a felt need to privately ameliorate unemployment’s
ill- effects through giving while doing so in such a way as to reflect the organization’s
belief in a shared economy. By deploying its private goods toward the public good, the
LID’s members participated in private charity even while recognizing how such a
practice held the potential to contribute to or indict their own political ends. Dewey
critiques charity on democratic socialist grounds while simultaneously doing charity in
such a way as to spread socialist ideals. As he laments charity’s inability to “cure” the
disease of unemployment, conversely, Dewey helps make the League for Industrial
Society seem more charitable.
1

While Dewey qualifies his statement—“charity, as an afterthought, is criminal.”—the remainder of “The
Jobless— A Job For All Of Us” makes evident his critique of charity more broadly: “Social
Responsibility, through charity, for unemployment is a back-handed, clumsy, inhuman, way of admitting
society’s responsibility for furnishing men and women security through steady employment at a living
way” (154); “Only a change in the system will ensure the right of every person to work and enable every
one to live in security” (155).
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In Modern Charity: Morality, Politics, and Mid-Twentieth Century American
Writing; I trace writers’ use of private charity narratives to engage with the moral
dimensions of American political life in the three decades following the beginning of The
Great Depression. The Depression’s damning indictment of private charity and
philanthropy forced a campaign by conservatives to show that Americans’ inherent
charitableness proved that the New Deal’s policies were overly coercive. This political
climate eventually resulted in the official establishment of the US Nonprofit Sector
through the 501(c) exemption codes in 1953, signed into law by Dwight Eisenhower. In a
time of competing political and institutional solutions, authors often, and perhaps
surprisingly, found individual charitable relationships helpful in dramatizing this larger
dilemma.
Repeatedly, the texts in Modern Charity take subject matter formerly seen as the
terrain of sentimentalists (racial violence, poverty, orphan adoption, religious charity,
feeding the hungry) and draw on the various incommensurable political discourses of aid
policy through relationships between and among characters: private altruism versus a
public safety net, demonstrated need of a recipient versus moral desert, the decision to
direct aid based on poverty statistics or one’s individual feeling of compassion. Instead of
offering ideological critiques of problematic charity practices, Modern Charity focuses
on how writers negotiate between the moral dilemmas of charitable action and scientific
understandings of human disadvantage, which affirm that a cure for any social problem is
possible by investing in enough research. For Harold Gray’s Little Orphan Annie comic
strip, this meant depicting the constant danger of an adopted orphan and the economic
ruin of her charitable capitalist father, “Daddy” Warbucks, at the hands of political
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demagogues and uncharitable misers. For W.E.B. Du Bois and Ralph Ellison, this meant
a sustained critique against the funneling of Northern philanthropic dollars through the
Tuskegee Institute during the haunting veneration of Booker T. Washington’s memory at
midcentury. For Flannery O’Connor, this meant seeking out an unsentimental vision of
Christian charity that was always suspicious of bureaucratized, impersonal forms of aid.
Philanthropy and the Depression Crisis
The Great Depression proved that reliance on private philanthropy had not
maintained the welfare of Americans, bringing an end to an era of ascendant private
philanthropic enterprise. With the heyday of scientific philanthropy in the Progressive
Era, exemplified by the rise of the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations, also came a
new emphasis on investing philanthropic funds where they might garner the greatest
return. Scientific philanthropy, as Andrew Carnegie explained it in “The Gospel of
Wealth,” held that in order to invest funds properly toward curing a social problem, the
problem must first be researched and understood to the best of the benefactor’s effort.
Researchers must identify the “problem” and report back to the foundation board how to
best direct funding. Only then, as Carnegie argued, does one give “wisely” and avoid the
“indiscriminate coddling” of what he defined as wasteful charity, too associated with
feelings of pity or compassion. This meant that prior to giving, an investment must be
made to research a social problem to determine what amount would bring about the
“most beneficial results for the community” (“The Gospel of Wealth” 11). Interestingly,
this distinction between research-based bequests and pledge-drive-style charitable
fundraising cropped up at various points in the early Depression. In 1931 Herbert Hoover
promoted the Presidents’ Organization for Unemployment Relief drives in order to shore
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up local community chests, a last ditch effort to show private giving’s force, its ability to
fight disadvantage without help from the taxpayer. Franklin Roosevelt, at the same time,
was the first US governor to leverage tax funds toward local unemployment relief
programs (Bremner 152). Many conservative supporters of private charitable interest
worried FDR was more interested in building a government bureaucracy driven by public
spending than allowing the continuance of widespread private benevolence.
A belief in Americans’ inherent sense of charity has been a key fixture in the
myth of American Exceptionalism2 at least since John Winthrop’s “A Modell of
Christian Charity” in 1630. Some 200 years after Winthrop, Alexis de Tocqueville
observed that Americans carried a “disposition” to form “voluntary associations,” and he
perceived this propensity for voluntarism and charity as making American democracy
unique, what Francesca Sawaya has called the “de Tocquevillian origins myth of
philanthropy” (40). As this exceptionalist narrative reasons, one is not compelled by the
state to work toward

2

At various points in the dissertation, I refer to American Exceptionalism as the widelybelieved myth that the United States is somehow, for a variety of reasons, uniquely superior to
other nations throughout history. I say “myth” in the same sense put forth by Donald Pease in
The New American Exceptionalism (U of Minnesota P 2009), wherein he argues that American
Exceptionalism, as it had been understood until after the Cold War, was an “encompassing
state fantasy…that had regulated U.S. citizens’ relationship to the political order for the
preceding half century” (1). He goes on to define “state fantasy” saying “state fantasy does not
refer to a mystification but to the dominant structure of desire out of which U.S. citizens
imagined their national identity” (2). My thinking on the topic, particularly as it was
understood in the Mid-twentieth century, has also been informed by W.E.B. Du Bois’s Black
Reconstruction (Simon & Schuster 1935), Henry Luce’s “The American Century” (Life
Magazine February, 1941), Alfred Kazin’s On Native Grounds (Harcourt Brace 1942), Gunnar
Myrdal’s An American Dilemma (Harper 1944), Arthur Schlesinger’s The Vital Center (Houghton
Mifflin 1949), Reinhold Niebuhr’s The Irony of American History (Scribner 1952), and especially
Robert Bremner’s American Philanthropy (U Chicago Press 1960). See also Henry Nash Smith’s Virgin
Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (Harvard 1956), Sacvan Vercovitch’s The Puritan
Origin of the American Self (Yale 1979), Deborah Madsen’s American Exceptionalism (Edinburgh UP
1998), and Godfrey Hodgson’s The Myth of American Exceptionalism (Yale 2010).
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social betterment; one does so because one is American (particularly Protestant, white,
male, and American) and is free to be as charitable as one pleases. This narrative of
national morality and benevolence, Susan Ryan writes, was also a crucible for national
cohesion in the early US: “The mapping of moral onto national identities was a feature of
various appeals and controversies, as commentators emphasized that the United States
was, in effect, on stage, with God, the rest of the world, Americans themselves, or some
combination of the three arrayed to judge its performance” (The Grammar of Good
Intentions 6). In early America then, gestures of benevolence evidenced a benefactor’s
freedom and, even further, the belief that the nation had surpassed all others in incubating
charitable dispositions.
The first substantial challenge to benevolent giving came later with the work of
philanthropists such as Andrew Carnegie and Nelson Rockefeller, for whom charity did
not go far enough toward proving the nation’s moral fiber. As Carnegie writes in 1889’s
“The Gospel of Wealth,” “These who would administer wisely must, indeed, be wise, for
one of the serious obstacles to the improvement of our [human] race is indiscriminate
charity” (68). A marriage of these two ideals appears in the Twentieth Century in the
platform of Herbert Hoover, a noted hunger relief humanitarian during WWI and, later,
Woodrow Wilson’s director of the US Food Administration prior to running for
President. Hoover argued that “our great traditions of charity and philanthropy,” are the
United States’ greatest moral expression of our “rugged individualism.” For example,
Hoover ends a 1928 Presidential campaign speech in New York by connecting human
welfare and individual enterprise along these lines:
The greatness of America has grown out of a political and social system and a
method of control of economic forces distinctly its own—our American system—
which has carried this great experiment in human welfare further than ever before
7

in all history. We are nearer today to the ideal of the abolition of poverty and fear
from the lives of men and women than ever before in any land. (“Principles and
Ideals of the United States Covenant”)
Rugged individualism brought the US nowhere close to the “ideal of the abolition of
poverty,” and political historians have often cited this speech for its sharp historical irony
given the stock market crash one year later and the ensuing Great Depression, but few
would argue that such a connection between individual enterprise and charity has not
continued, even into the Twenty- First Century.
Fused as it is with the “city on a hill” rhetoric of John Winthrop’s “Modell of
Christian Charity,” charity emerged as an originary “cultural narrative” of American
society which in turn fueled the rhetoric of American Exceptionalism proclaimed by antiliberal Republicans in the 30s and 40s but also by liberals during the Cold War, who saw
private giving and philanthropy as evidence of the American system’s superiority to that
of its Soviet enemies. Alan Nadel has described cultural narratives in this way:
In any culture or subculture or social unit, some stories are taken for granted, such
that they acquire referential cogency; people refer to them without supporting
evidence...Thus we can define a culture, or describe a moment in cultural history,
by sorting those narratives tacitly accepted from those universally denied,
isolating those that have possible cogency—that is, that exist among the array of
plausible explanations for phenomena. This is basically an ideological
understanding of culture, one that situates a culture in regard to the ways it tells
itself what is true and the elements it treats as axiomatic to such “truth telling.”
(Demographic Angst 13)
From this perspective, Modern Charity traces how writers dramatized shifting cultural
narratives of moral obligation after the Depression occasioned a crisis in the “truth
telling” mechanism of American generosity. Puritan and, later, Tocquevillian views of
US Democracy gave rise to a cultural narrative that Americans are inherently charitable,
that just by being born within the United States a person is instinctively compelled

8

toward altruistic giving. However, as Donald Pease writes, “Myths normally do the work
of incorporating events into recognizable national narratives. But traumatic events
precipitate states of emergency that become inaugural moments for a different symbolic
order on a scale that exceeds the grasp of the available representations from national
mythology” (The New American Exceptionalism 5). Here, Pease is talking about events
occurring after the conclusion of the Cold War3 that brought about a series of national
fantasies which, in turn, legitimized the US’s ongoing quest for global economic and
military superiority. The same could be said of the Great Depression, a traumatic national
event which brought about a new grafting of American Exceptionalism with, first, the
New Deal’s promise to engineer America out of poverty4 and, later, conservatives’
rebuttal that the New Deal had gone too far afield from the “model of Christian charity”
that, in their view, had made America great in the first place.5
Statistical analyses of charitable donations in the 1930s reveal that, in fact, worries
about the New Deal’s stifling private giving bore out in the upper class, but the growing
middle class, by contrast, donated at a higher clip than it had prior to the Depression
(Gruber and Hungerman). In this way, we can see the difference between cultural
narratives and the data around private giving during the Depression. Conservatives’
anxiety surrounding the “end of charity” actually later helped, under the leadership of
3

He cites The Persian Gulf War, the raid on the Branch Davidian Compound in Waco (TX), The
Oklahoma City Bombing, and, later, the events of September 11, 2001.
4

See William J. Barber’s Designs within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the
Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933-1945; Kirstin Downey’s The Woman Behind the New
Deal: The Life of Frances Perkins, FDR’s Secretary of Labor and His Moral Conscience (Anchor
2009); Wendey Wall’s Inventing the “American Way”: The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal
to the Civil Rights Movement (Oxford 2009); and especially Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s The Age of
Roosevelt series (Riverside/Houghton Mifflin 1957-1960).
5

See Kim Phillips-Fein’s Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s Crusade Against the New Deal (Norton
2010) and Ira Katznelson’s Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of our Times (Liveright 2013).
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Dwight Eisenhower, the largest proliferation of charitable enterprise in US history: the
establishment of the US Nonprofit sector. As Johnathan Levy writes, “The number of taxexempt organizations…climbed from 12,500 in 1940 to 50,000 in 1950, and then rose to
309,000 in 1977 and to 1 million in 1989” (215). While several aspects of the New Deal
continued to prevail even into the Eisenhower Administration, for a large portion of
American society an anxiety persisted surrounding an individual citizen’s ability to
choose how to contribute to social betterment. This debate would eventually result in a
Cold War compromise to establish the Nonprofit (or Exempt) Sector, an institution in the
US Tax Code intended to curb both the full Keynesian vision of the New Deal but also
the plutocracy (most emblematized by Herbert Hoover) Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.6 and other
public intellectuals blamed for causing the Great Depression.
By the Fifties and early Sixties, reforming social welfare programs became a
staple discussion in the Republican Party’s move further to the right of center. This was
revealed most forcefully by the 1964 presidential election and Barry Goldwater, who
wrote in The Conscience of a Conservative, “[collectivists] understand that the individual
can be put at the mercy of the State—not only by making the State his employer—but by
divesting him of the means to provide for his personal needs and by giving the State the
responsibility of caring for those needs from cradle to grave” (47). In the years leading up
to Goldwater’s candidacy, a post-Depression conservative
movement came about with the popularization of F.A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom
(1944), the emergence of William F. Buckley and National Review in American cultural
criticism as well as the periodicals Commentary, The New Leader, Irving Kristol’s
6

See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom. New York: Transaction,
2004. I do not mean to imply that this is not a fair accusation, that plutocracy played a key role in
causing The Great Depression. That sort of argument is above my pay grade.
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Encounter and later The Public Interest.7 As these periodicals came to prominence, the
neoconservative külturkampf, partly motivated by National Review and Buckley’s
repeated accusations of the “liberal takeover” within higher education, was
simultaneously attempting to establish a conservative literary culture in answer to Lionel
Trilling’s claim in 1949 that “In the United States at this time liberalism is not only the
dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition” (xv).
Although, while this emergent conservative cultural movement came about in the
Fifties and Sixties as a reaction to the felt dominance of liberalism in the period,
disagreement among conservatives emerged particularly surrounding issues of public aid.
These debates centered both on the suspicion of communistic tendencies in aid
organizations and a disdain for the moderate Republican establishment of the Eisenhower
administration. Conservative intellectuals, including Irving Kristol in his 1963 Harper’s
article “Is the Welfare State Obsolete?”, for example, even argued that the Welfare State,
given certain checks and balances, might be able to exist alongside a conservative vision
of American society. Rejecting the private/public binary opposition popularized by John
Kenneth Galbraith’s The Affluent Society (1958), Kristol writes that a number of factors,
“have made it inevitable that a modern democratic state will be a strong state, not a weak
one. There is not much point in lamenting this development; and, so far as I can see, no
reason to do so” (39). While Kristol claims it is fallacious to assume that government can
administer welfare better than private institutions, he recognizes that charity, in the
context of a “strong state,” inevitably places welfare within the realm of public goods.
7

For an extended discussion of these developments and their influence on literary culture, see
especially Kim Phillips-Fein’s Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s Crusade Against the New Deal
(Norton, 2010), Greg Barnhisel’s Cold War Modernism: Art, Literature, and American Cultural
Diplomacy (Columbia UP, 2015) and Andrew Hartman’s A War for the Soul of America: A History of
the Culture Wars (UP of Chicago, 2015).
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For Republican intellectuals of this period, a unified view of charity and philanthropy
were not part and parcel of conservative identity. In this context, charitable foundations,
often para-corporate entities used as tax shelters prior to the Depression, emerged under
Eisenhower as a hybrid private/public institution which merged the logic of New Deal
public aid and private philanthropy.8
The mid-twentieth century also brought about an epochal shift in US tax policy
surrounding nonprofit corporations. The newly established 501(c) tax code allowed many
different corporations and organizations to claim tax exemption, but exemption itself was
not the only reason for the change in charitable corporations. Exemption had been in
effect in one form or another since the founding of the large general-purpose
philanthropies of the Progressive Era (especially Carnegie and Rockefeller), but the 1953
revision of the tax code was unique because it started in earnest the undoing of what the
historian Jonathan Levy has called the “fiscal triangle” of the early twentieth century: the
federal government, the for-profit corporation, and the nonprofit corporation (214).
Rejecting the “policing” of “ideological invocations of a distinct nonprofit sector,” Levy
explains how New Deal politics fundamentally altered the relationship between state,
economy, and civil society:
The New Deal state attempted to separate public welfare from private charity. In
1954, Congress prohibited nonprofits from political campaigning. Ultimately,
however, the geometry did not hold. And it is here that one can speak of the rise
of the nonprofit corporation, and for three interrelated reasons. Significant
changes in the nonprofit corporation, from the late 1960s onward, both expressed
and contributed to the undoing of the fiscal triangle. (215)
8

See Rob Reich’s Just Giving: Why Philanthropy is Failing Democracy and Why We Can Do Better
(Princeton 2018), Olivier Zunz’s Philanthropy in America: A History (Princeton 2012), and
Lawrence Friedman’s “Philanthropy in America: Historicism and Its Discontents” in Charity,
Philanthropy, and Civility in American History (eds. Lawrence Friedman and Mark McGarvie,
Cambridge 2002).
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Levy’s three “interrelated reasons” include the proliferation of nonprofit corporations, the
nonprofit corporation’s change in character where “both states and for-profits began to
ask nonprofits to do more work on their behalves” (216), and the proliferation of political
advocacy nonprofits in place of direct charitable aid organizations. Thus the midcentury
US brought about a reassessment of charity and philanthropy within the fantasy of
American Exceptionalism while the official policies and structures which managed
charitable enterprise fundamentally changed over the course of thirty years.
Which “Modern,” Whose “Charity”?
The “Modern” in “Modern Charity” refers to an anxiety that the US’s cultural
narratives of exceptional charitableness (whether based in religion or in capitalist
benevolence or elsewhere) had, after the Depression, been inundated with what Charles
Taylor called the three “malaises of modernity”: instrumental reasoning, individualism,
and the loss of political freedom (The Ethics of Authenticity). Modern charity recognizes
the public stakes of private altruism, it engages with many Americans’ felt loss of
cultural unity surrounding a belief in their country’s inherent benevolence, it rejects the
inherent validity of scientific accounts of human suffering as opposed to those of
personal conscience and compassion. Taylor invokes a great champion of American
voluntarism, Alexis de Tocqueville, in elaborating on the loss of freedom in modernity:
But there is another kind of loss of freedom, which has also been widely
discussed, most memorably by Alexis de Tocqueville. A society in which people
end up as the kind of individuals who are "enclosed in their own hearts" is one
where few will want to participate actively in self-government. They will prefer to
stay at home and enjoy the satisfactions of private life, as long as the government
of the day produces the means to these satisfactions and distributes them widely.
(The Ethics of Authenticity 12)
As such, the loss of freedom amounts to a loss of one’s drive for association, the ability
13

to reach beyond private satiety and toward the public good. That, as Taylor writes,
“Modern freedom was won by our breaking loose from older moral horizons” (13) does
not mean a freedom from all moral constraints but a freedom from those moral
constraints which predate what he later enumerated with painstaking detail in A Secular
Age (2007), namely those of Christianity.
However, as Peter Coviello and Jared Hickman have argued, and I agree, “The
secularization thesis is dead” (645). To claim an anxiety over secularization is not to
claim that, for example, charity somehow magically lost all religious resonance by virtue
of its modernization and, more specifically, the inculcation of Taylor’s malaises of
modernity. My readings in Modern Charity repeatedly draw attention to this connection,
because so often midcentury writers depict their charitable engagements through religious
iconography and allusion. Harold Gray, in Little Orphan Annie, emphasizes Christmas as
an opportunity to reinforce a national belief in Jesus’s call to care for “the least of these.”
In Invisible Man, Ralph Ellison’s “State College for Negroes” philanthropist trustees
preside over a chapel service that asserts their own divinity. In The Violent Bear it Away,
Flannery O’Connor fashions her backwoods teenage prophet in the image of the
voluntarily impoverished Saint Francis of Assisi. I ascribe to modern charity what
Coviello and Hickman have called “postsecular 3,” “quite literally postsecular in the
sense that it dares to suggest that we might do our thinking about modernity—including
our thinking about what in fact instigates modernity—under a sign other than ‘the
secular’” (649).
I do not suggest modern charity’s association with religion, and in particular
Christianity, as a way to belittle the influence of other faiths and philosophies in
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American history, nor do I wish to obscure the profoundly violent legacy American
Exceptionalism (tied as it is to a sense of shared “Judeo-Christian values”) helped to
fuel.9 I oppose the secularization thesis simply in order to underscore the idea that there
are gradations between full-scale religiosity and other engagements with human suffering
in the US. Political leaders seeking solutions for the Depression had to grapple with this
felt loss in order to provide a political solution viable to as many Americans as possible.
The writers in Modern Charity, I argue, directly engage with conservatives’ attempts to
protect private charity and philanthropy within the context of larger policy changes
during the midcentury surrounding charity practices, especially concerning taxation. It is
not secularization that fundamentally altered a cultural understanding of charity in the US
at midcentury but, rather, the politicization and institutionalization of American
charitableness in the political sphere following the onset of the Depression.
Defining “Charity” and “Philanthropy”
I have labeled my topic “modern charity”—not benevolence, philanthropy,
9

Certainly, the fusion of Christian rhetoric with the belief in American Exceptionalism helped undergird
the logic behind many atrocities: the genocide and removal of American Indians, Southern Baptists’
Biblical defenses of slavery and (later) racial segregation, widespread anti-Semitic policies and practices in
a number of industries and civic organizations, the forced sterilization of disabled people and gay men,
laws meant to suppress LGBTQIA Americans’ legal protections under the US constitution, and even the
US government’s current justifications for separating children from their parents and detaining them in
internment camp facilities at the southern border. More often than not, a group of professing Christians
have been at the forefront of these atrocities, mixing nationalism and faithfulness not unlike other
international examples of religious and ethnic cleansing during, long ago, the Crusades and the Spanish
Inquisition and, later, the Roman Catholic Church’s cooperation with Nazi Germany under Pope Pius XII.
It is, however, just as true that in each of these cases there were Christians and other people of faith
opposing these actions and actively protesting against them. Quakers and Mennonites hid escaped slaves
and worked with organizers along the underground railroad. Lutheran theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer died
in a Nazi concentration camp after a failed attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler. Baptist Minister Martin
Luther King Jr., in addition to his public shaming of liberal and moderate white ministers opposed to the
Civil Rights Movement in the “Letter from the Birmingham City Jail,” built alliances with Jewish leaders
such as Abraham Joshua Heschel to work against anti-Semitism among African Americans in the south.
Today, many different denominations and faith groups actively support Gay Rights organizations such as
the Human Rights Campaign. More recently, when an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Raid
detained 97 of my Latinx neighbors in Hamblen County, Tennessee last year, a coalition of faith groups,
led by the local Catholic Diocese, provided sanctuary, daily childcare, food, and legal services for affected
families.
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altruism, social welfare, giving, do-gooderism—precisely because of charity’s presence
in each of these alternative monikers. Charity has been described as a virtue (“caritas” or
“agape”), emotion (“feeling charity for another”), institution (“raising money for
charity”), identity (“charity case”), and a gift (“She wouldn’t accept her aunt’s charity,
preferring instead to find her own place to live.”). To study an offshoot of charity such as
philanthropy, for example, is to try to understand how charity is deployed toward solving
a social problem through financial investment. By underscoring charity’s uniqueness, I
do not mean to imply that there are not conceptual overlaps with, for example,
benevolence or altruism.
More specifically, I refer to “charity” as any use of private goods to alleviate
human suffering (or meet an immediate need) without an outward attempt to directly
influence or reform public policy or end structural causes of inequality and disadvantage.
Charity, in this sense, will be used in two more specific forms in the dissertation:
private/individual charitable acts on the one hand, and the workings of foundations and
organizations with charitable goals on the other. Charity becomes philanthropy when the
attempt to address human need is focused in either of two ways: 1. Utilizing an
accumulation of wealth; or 2. Using consequentialist or instrumental evaluation to drive
the amount and direction of financial gifts toward solving a discernible “social problem.”
In The Philanthropic Revolution, Jeremy Beer has recently complicated this definition,
making a harder distinction between philanthropy and charity:
Today, most people, if asked to reflect on the difference between philanthropy
and charity, would likely answer that philanthropy is charity writ large--charity as
it is practiced by the wealthy and/or by professionals. But...philanthropy is not
simply charity brought to scale...The most important difference between
philanthropy and charity--the truly revolutionary difference--is that the logic of
philanthropy invites us to see voluntary giving with a primarily technological and
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global, rather than theological or local, framework. (8)
However, simply because charity is often connected with a motivation (or condition) of
love or altruism does not mean that charitable acts must be limited to a “theological or
local framework. To limit charity as exclusively a “theological or local” enterprise is to
suggest that all larger- scale forms of direct relief are philanthropic when they are, in fact,
charitable.10
While this distinction between charity and philanthropy might make sense
theoretically, admittedly their interrelatedness as activities and concepts has made
scholarship on the subject want for consistent terminology. Rob Reich and Olivier
Zunz11, for example, choose in their respective studies of American philanthropy to either
use the terms charity and philanthropy interchangeably or, in Zunz’s case, categorize
many if not most altruistic constructions in the US as “American Philanthropy,” from a
nickel in a Salvation Army bucket to mass University endowments. I, rather, take as
operational a comparison that Robert A. Gross12 puts forth, that charity and philanthropy
“need not be at odds. As dual impulses, they are the equivalent of the two commitments
taken by physicians in the Hippocratic oath: One vow is to relieve pain and suffering, the
other is to cure disease” (31). However, while charity and philanthropy are not inherently
at odds with one another, charity more directly contradicts the logic of tax-funded aid.
10

See, for example, a company like Tom’s Shoes, who is neither theologically focused nor tied to
any specific place. They simply give free shoes to people in poverty.
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See Reich’s Just Giving: How Philanthropy is Failing Democracy and How it Can Do Better
(Princeton UP, 2018) and Zunz’s Philanthropy in America: A History (Princeton UP, 2011).
12
For a counterpoint to Gross’s distinction between charity and philanthropy, see Chapter 1 (“American
Generosity: Philanthropy in Henry James”) in Francesca Sawaya’s The Difficult Art of Giving: Patronage,
Philanthropy, and the American Literary Market (U of Penn Press, 2014). While rejecting the
charity/philanthropy dichotomy, Sawaya does agree with Gross’s historical explanation of philanthropy as
an “innovation of the market revolution’s joint stock company of the 17 Century” (37 qtd. in Sawaya 39).
t
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The New Deal, as Robert Gross and Ira Katznelson have argued, ultimately emerged
from philanthropy’s emphasis on seeing poverty as a problem to be solved but combined
that logic with the aid of tax funds and government agencies. One was now no longer
compelled to contribute to philanthropy by one’s own choosing nor by upper class social
expectations of “giving back” but, instead, simply by virtue of being an American
taxpayer.
Literature, Welfare, Charity
The writers in Modern Charity were also keenly aware that suspicion often
accompanied philanthropic and charitable practice, and they were even mindful of the
repercussions such an epochal shift would have on charity’s legitimating operation in
American Exceptionalism. However, rather than dive into a critique of charitable
practices, these writers seek a space somewhere between, on the one hand, a sociallyconscious sentimentalism and, on the other, a politicized historical realism or naturalism
in their treatments of charitable relationships. The midcentury’s great theorist of this
dynamic was James Baldwin, who in “Everybody’s Protest Novel” states the conflict this
way: “Sentimentality, the ostentatious parading of excessive and spurious emotion, is the
mark of dishonesty, the inability to feel; the wet eyes of the sentimentalist betray his
aversion to experience, his fear of life, his arid heart; and it is always, therefore, the
signal of secret and violent inhumanity, the mask of cruelty” (Notes of a Native Son 14).
On the other end of Baldwin’s spectrum is “The failure of the protest novel” which “lies
in its rejection of life, the human being, the denial of his beauty, dread, power, in its
insistence that it is his categorization alone which is real and which cannot be
transcended” (Notes of a Native Son 24). Baldwin mentions early in his essay the idea of
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Stowe’s George and Eliza dancing to the “clatter of condescending coins” (16), a scene
which shows sentimentalism’s “mask of cruelty” taking the shape of benevolence. For
Baldwin, both Harriet Beecher Stowe and Richard Wright’s attempts to bring about
social good instrumentalized human experience, which worked against a unifying truth
which implies “a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment” (Notes of a
Native Son 15).
Baldwin’s essay demonstrates how the different strands in Modern Charity work
together. Expressing anxiety over instrumental reasoning and the loss of human freedom,
“Everybody’s Protest Novel” echoes Taylor’s malaises of modernity as it gestures to an
artistic solution to these anxieties. By underscoring the importance of “revelation” in
literary texts as oppositional to both sentimental and protest novels, Baldwin sees the
work of art as potentially lighting a path to better understanding human freedom. Baldwin
locates sentimentalism’s cruelty in the condescending forms of Victorian benevolence
that birthed its equal and opposite, scientific philanthropy, a practice reliant on
instrumental reason. The scientific reason of social protest novels stands in opposition to,
for Baldwin, the didactic practical manipulation of “theological terror” found in
sentimentalism.
Scholarship on charity and philanthropy in US literature has almost entirely
focused on the Nineteenth Century and the Progressive Era. Susan Ryan’s The Grammar
of Good Intentions and William Morgan’s Questionable Charity helpfully present a
literary history of benevolence and humanitarianism that spans the Long Nineteenth
Century in America. Where Ryan pays attention to benevolence as a legitimating
American cultural narrative in the antebellum period, Morgan draws connections between
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literary realism and understandings of moral complicity in humanitarian rhetoric at the
turn of the Twentieth Century. The most influential study of philanthropy and American
Literature has been Francesca Sawaya’s The Difficult Art of Giving, which focuses on the
intersections of philanthropy, free market capitalism, liberalism, and artistic patronage:
Rethinking the modern literary field in terms of the continuation of patronage and
the emergence of philanthropy challenges this economic history that relies
unconsciously on the fiction of the free and self-regulating market borrowed from
liberal economics. I argue that in the expanding literary market social practices
like patronage do not disappear from the literary field, even as new social
practices with residual characteristics—like philanthropy—are emerging. (3)
Sawaya demonstrates that the cultural production of a “putatively free” literary market
helped shape Twentieth Century understandings of economic intervention. The work of
art, for Sawaya, shapes and is shaped by market forces, including philanthropic exchange,
which is less concerned with the text’s content and more with the conditions of its
production. Of all scholarship on the topic, The Difficult Art of Giving provides the most
theoretically nuanced understanding of philanthropy’s relationship to the American
literary market I have found. I also agree with Sawaya that charity and philanthropy
should be seen as social practices that, following Pierre Bourdieu, involve the exchange
of symbolic capital in its various forms. Unlike Sawaya, I work under the premise that a
story’s content offers valuable insights into this exchange of symbolic capital that are
obscured by the more context-driven practice of literary sociology, which does not
concern itself with a close reading of texts themselves. While Sawaya’s work is
ultimately unhelpful to my readings in this dissertation, I mention The Difficult Art of
Giving in order to present why none of the extant secondary material on literature and
charity appear to treat the literature of the Mid-Twentieth Century US. My only
conclusion can be that scholars have thus far not found such a discussion relevant or
20

useful, and it is my hope that this dissertation can help provide the seed for a more
generative discussion of charity and US literature from the Thirties to the Sixties.
Literary studies of the New Deal Era and/or the US Welfare State, such as
Michael Szalay’s New Deal Modernism or Susan Edmunds’ Grotesque Relations, have
tended to overlook the continued prevalence of conservative discourse in literary writing
of the Mid- Twentieth Century. In part, this is because to focus on the New Deal or
America’s attempt at a Welfare State somewhat obscures the widely-held belief among
Americans that the United States harbored a propensity for individual acts of charity.
Szalay writes, for example, that “actuarial models of governance [revolving] around the
statistical construction of populations” inevitably “led to a literature of liberal
interdependence, as writers looked to reconcile at times conflicting impulses toward
individual agency and collective affiliation” (2-3). Charity and philanthropy, I believe,
operated as two such “conflicting impulses” in midcentury writing. However, while I
agree with Szalay that the New Deal occasioned a new sense of collective impersonality
that pervades much American modernist literature, conservative individualist rhetoric
played a much larger role in midcentury US literature than he gives it credit for.
Furthermore, at a time when the US marginal tax rate was anywhere from 20% to 91%,
and much of it went to support the infrastructure of federal aid (US Tax Foundation),
many Americans were still preoccupied with the question of who, precisely, was
receiving a portion of their wages through public aid and whether these individuals, in
fact, deserved it.
Throughout the dissertation, when I refer to the “welfare state” or, even, the
“American welfare state,” I have in mind Michael B. Katz’s theory of “four major
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structures in American welfare practice” (In the Shadow of the Poorhouse ix): 1. “The
division between public assistance and social insurance,”13 2. “Local variations” on aid
like tax-subsidized community chests or county aid offices, 3. The accomplishment of
“public purposes using private agents” through federal grantee programs such as
Americorps or Medicaid-approved private hospitals, and 4. The “incompleteness of the
American Welfare state,” which refers to the United States’ lack of “national health
insurance or family allowances” (ibid.). As a result of the fourth structure, Katz often
refers to the US welfare system as a “semiwelfare state,” because its lack of more
encompassing programs falls short of the example of more established Western European
systems. One reason for the persistence of a semiwelfare state in America is what John
Rawls calls “welfare-state capitalism” in A Theory of Justice and, later, in Justice as
Fairness: A Restatement. Welfare-state capitalism, in Rawls’ philosophy, does not allow
for the flourishing of “justice as fairness,” because in a “well-ordered democratic regime
that recognizes the principles [of justice as fairness] in its basic institutions,” a fair form
of democracy would exist as an “alternative to capitalism” (Justice as Fairness 135).
Even though, to return to the Mid- Twentieth century US, I agree that “Eisenhower's
expansion of Social Security was proof positive for many mid-century political observers
that basic elements of the New Deal had achieved a durable place in postwar America,
and evidence of a rough consensus that the federal government had some sort of
obligation to insure against economic insecurity” (324), the reforms to the US tax code
and social welfare apparatus under Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, George
W. Bush, and now Donald Trump have persistently reinforced the Rawlsian label of
13

When most people say “welfare” they have in mind “public assistance,” a “means-tested” form of
relief available to everyone, whereas social insurance programs, like US Social Security, are not
available to everyone. (Katz ix)
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“welfare-state capitalism” or, according to Katz, a “semiwelfare state” (ibid.).
Among midcentury political commentators and philosophers, however, the
“welfare state” was often discussed as if it were an established fact of American life,
particularly by those in the midcentury on either sides of support for tax-funded public
relief programs. Arthur Schlesinger argued in 1949 that “The New Deal government of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, for all its confusions and defects, kept its eye more steadily on the
ball than any other government in our time, conservative, socialist, Communist, or
fascist” but later admitted that “The state must not place its main reliance on a state
program of welfare subsidies” but instead focus on finding the right balance of economic
regulation and incubation (The Vital Center 36, 185). He later said in 1961, during a
debate with William F. Buckley, that "The welfare state does not intrude on freedom and
dignity but makes them possible. Hungry men are not free men" (qtd. in Churchill (n.
pag.). Irving Kristol, writing 30 years after the start of the New Deal in 1963,
summarized the status of the concept of the US welfare state in this way:
Beneath this rhetorical controversy [of the welfare state] is a rather crude struggle
for political and social power. The liberal community—i.e., the teachers, the
journalists, the civil servants, the trade unionists, the leaders of minority groups,
etc.—envisages the welfare state as the one institution through which it can
exercise a power and authority over the national affairs which it does not
otherwise possess. The conservative community—i.e., businessmen and their
associates—sees the welfare state as a parvenu authority that usurps its traditional
power and prerogatives, obstructs its habitual freedom of action. Each party,
doubles, sincerely believes that its sovereignty is most conducive to the common
good. Whom the gods would make power-hungry, they first. make sincere. (“Is
the Welfare State Obsolete?” 39)
Kristol’s conservative orientation to the topic is made clear both by his clear suspicion of
the liberals community’s desire to “exercise a power and authority…it does not otherwise
possess” as well as his characterization of “businessmen and their associates” somehow
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as an outmatched minority against liberalism’s more varied constituents.
The welfare state, in Kristol’s definition, accounts for any public good that is
reasoned into existence by government bureaucracy using the American taxpayer’s
money to fund it. Such a practice, for Kristol, replaces what he calls the “voluntary…area
of American Life” made up of “individual, rational self-interest” with a “coercive…area
of American life” consisting of “public folly” (39). From Kristol’s perspective, one he
spread to conservative intellectuals of his time and one which persists today in
contemporary critiques of tax-funded aid packages as “welfare state encroachment,” any
perceived threat to voluntary and individualized forms of giving crept America closer and
closer to an all-encompassing welfare state, a condition which would maroon the US to
the whims of “public folly.” Whether the US has ever been a Welfare State, therefore,
does not preclude many Americans’ belief that it is or ever has been, a belief that
certainly has bearing on any discussion of charity and philanthropy in the midcentury US.
As Nadel writes in his definition of cultural narratives, “In any culture or subculture or
social unit, some stories are taken for granted, such that they acquire referential cogency”
(Demographic Angst 13). One such influential “subculture or social unit” at midcentury
consisted of anti-liberal Republicans who bemoaned public aid always already as an
attack on the American exceptionalist ideology that fueled their belief in the power of
private charity as a powerful originary myth of the United States.
In the absence of evidence for anything beyond a US “semiwelfare” state, a study
of charity and philanthropy in the mid-twentieth century United States literature must
acknowledge the rhetorical terrain that claimed the welfare state’s ascendancy. It is with
this in mind that I agree with Bruce Robbins that the concept of the welfare state “is the
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closest thing we have had to an ideological synthesis, a defensible common program in
which glaringly different interests of the poor and needy, on the one hand, and elite
experts, on the other, can even appear to be resolved” (Upward Mobility and the Common
Good 10). Studies of US literature and the welfare state have focused on the development
of new democratic institutions (social security, direct family aid), but they have also
tended to overlook the implications of this transition for previously dominant modes of
aid, namely private charity and philanthropy, as a result of the Great Depression. The
stories in Modern Charity continue to demonstrate an awareness that although a complex
public aid bureaucracy had taken shape in the US for the first time with the New Deal,
the individual moral decision of whether or not to help someone through direct aid or
invest one’s money in philanthropy remained a complex problem which justified
complex literary representation. If the New Deal and liberal-led democratic movements
had an indelible impact on US storytelling, as these critics have emphasized, so did the
moral complexity of the systems of charity and philanthropy it purportedly replaced.
Descriptive Morality & The Critique of Charity
The critique of charitable practices is a logical reaction to giving: one’s ability to
act charitably or do philanthropic work always expresses, to some extent, an individual or
corporation’s power and, conversely, the giver’s superiority to the recipient. To be able to
help someone in need or invest one’s finances into, for example, an anti-poverty
organization is to demonstrate that the giver is not themselves in poverty, or at least not
as impoverished as the recipient. As such, modern charity “triggers,” as Rob Reich,
Chiara Cordelli, and Lucy Bernholz contend; “important questions concerning its
typology, emergence, legitimacy, discretion, and distribution” (2). Because charitable
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acts involve an expression of power (in helping you I am able to do something that
perhaps you cannot do for yourself or, at any rate, are not doing for yourself), those acts
become fodder for critique. Why is that politician serving meals at the soup kitchen? Is
she just doing it for the Instagram story? Can’t we do better than giving Christmas gifts to
children in Appalachia once a year? Doesn’t charity allow capitalism to continue
flourishing by demonstrating that a tax-funded social safety net is not necessary? To give
a more specific example with far-reaching implications, as Kenneth Warren has argued,
did not Julius Rosenwald’s private funding for hundreds of schools in southern black
communities prove to local governments that they should not feel obligated to invest
further tax funds in these schools because students can thrive in segregated conditions?
(“Need for Better Schools in the Segregated South”) In the case of philanthropy, such as
Rosenwald’s, Rob Reich contends that charitable giving “is indeed voluntary, but in
many countries philanthropy is a tax-subsidized activity, partly paid for by all taxpayers.
Strictly speaking, then, donors are not exercising a liberty to give their money away; they
are subsidized to exercise a liberty they already possess” (Just Giving 7). For both private
and public reasons, then, charity and philanthropy understandably attract suspicion.
Given all of this, such practices would seem to indicate what Lauren Berlant has
called “cruel optimism,” that set of relations “when the object/scene that ignites a sense
of possibility actually makes it impossible to attain the expansive transformation for
which a person or a people risks striving” (9). Charity, in this regard, can be seen as cruel
because by its very nature it takes time and resources away from attempts to alleviate the
systemic causes of a charity recipient’s suffering. It can be seen as optimistic, in this
view, to imagine that a person enacting charity is doing anything good at all. My point in
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highlighting possible angles of suspicion against charity and philanthropy is to draw
attention to the stakes involved in paying attention to charity in American literature,
particularly the possibility that in discussing a moral concept often seen as politically
harmful, one’s critique runs the risk of reinforcing or endorsement such practices.
By definition, my project conceives of charity as ultimately uninterested in
addressing the structural causes of a recipient’s disadvantage. However, in upholding the
importance of morality to human freedom, alleviating individual suffering and
disadvantage may also increase the likelihood that a person might be able to participate in
social betterment projects, might be able to find a foothold for political advocacy and,
indeed, the energy to see it through. After all, at the end of Invisible Man, after the
narrator has suffered under the cruel optimism of so many different entities both private
and public, Ellison’s invisible man leaves his underground hideout to explore the
“possibility that even an invisible man has a socially responsible role to play” (581). At
the end of her 1952 memoir The Long Loneliness, following the recognition that none of
The Catholic Workers’ charitable efforts have brought an end to poverty or violence in
American society, Dorothy Day writes, “We have all known the long loneliness and we
have learned that the only solution is love and that love comes with community” (286).
After the memoir’s publication in 1952, Day would go on to be arrested and jailed dozens
of times for protesting American wars, the treatment of homeless men and women in
state-run facilities, the persecution of migrant farm workers, and so many other issues
and causes. A commitment to charity does not mean the disavowal of political
participation.
By making charity a subject for cultural critique, I hope to not make the mistake
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of implying neither a preference for charity over and against other concepts nor the
disdain for charity as unhelpfully apolitical. To do so would be, as I maintain in my
readings throughout the dissertation, to short change charity’s potential complexity in the
same way American literary scholarship appears to have done. The stories in my archive
all feature moments when charity failed to live up to the hype, when recipients were not
helped all that much or were even harmed, where social problems were left unsolved or
made worse. A critique of these problematics holds the potential to obscure charity and
philanthropy as social and private goods. However, charity can also be said to have been
genuinely helpful, to have made a person’s condition better than it would have otherwise
been. As will become evident, the stories in this dissertation refuse to imagine that the
moral politics of charitable action can be easily reduced to helpful or hurtful, cruel or
kind, good or bad.
Social problems became pathologized in the discourse of scientific philanthropy
taken up by social sciences and the emerging New Deal apparatus. One reason writers
felt so compelled to work with charity at midcentury, I argue, is precisely because
scientific philanthropy and social science had by that point rendered human suffering as a
measurable result of observable structural inequalities. This deterministic (because it
essentializes those experiencing disadvantage as logical conclusions of a social problem)
and instrumental (because those experiencing poverty only do so if the definitions of
poverty determined by social sciences applies to them) construction places the poor in
between two polar opposites, what we might call the Marxist victim of capitalism and the
moralistic victim of sin and vice. I will take up the question of victimhood more fully in
my discussion of Flannery O’Connor’s The Violent Bear it Away, but scientific
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philanthropy especially predominates Ralph Ellison’s and W.E.B. Du Bois’s work. To
provide one example, the story of John Trueblood, the incestuous sharecropper in
Invisible Man, certainly evokes the distinction between victimhood at the hands of
systemic white supremacy or, on the other, the moral degradation of a man who does not
deserve the financial help his family has already received after succumbing to sexual
desire for his daughter. The story forces the Northern philanthropist Norton into a state of
dysphoria that results in his handing a $100 bill to Trueblood, asking him to use it to buy
toys for his children. Norton, when faced with an account not easily ascribed to his preconceived understanding of African American poverty and disadvantage in the south,
resorts out of a sense of shame to an unprompted financial gift and, later, for him to be
overcome with the illness that prompts the invisible man to take Norton to the Golden
Day and, shortly after, lose the college scholarship he won at the Battle Royal.
Ultimately, the readings which follow this introduction work toward a recognition
that to critique charity and philanthropy is to inevitably engage with the relationship
between morality and politics. In place of a normative morality which critiques charity as
an unhelpful social practice, I offer a descriptive morality that seeks to better understand
how the fusion of morality and politics prefigures modern charity’s treatment in
midcentury storytelling. Certainly, as I have already discussed, charity and philanthropy’s
place in the myth of American Exceptionalism was in part due to the belief that America
had prospered as a result of its supposed adherence to a prescribed system of JudeoChristian morality. Morality, in the sense I use it, instead refers to a “narrow” pattern of
ethical reasoning that, as Bernard Williams argues in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy,
is particularly concerned with “a special notion of obligation” (7). Politics, as I use the
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term, refers to any attempt to seek a public or civic understanding of how a community
should address obligations considered pertinent to the thriving of the community as a
whole.
Modern charity prompts questions of this type: “How is one to respond to the
knowledge of widespread disadvantage or suffering in one’s community?” “What is the
boundary between moral obligations to directly help impoverished people and political
solutions to poverty as a systemic social problem?” Bernard Williams, for one, warns
against morality as a perfect guide for determining right social action because “morality
makes people think that, without its very special obligation, there is only inclination;
without its utter voluntariness, there is only force; without its ultimate pure justice, there
is no justice” (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 218).14 Williams’ either/or
constructions against moralism are all reflected in the anxieties surrounding charity and
philanthropy in the Mid-Twentieth Century as expressed in the cultural narrative of
modern charity.
Given all the harm that the fusion of morality and American Exceptionalism have
wrought, it is perhaps surprising that the writers in this dissertation did not spend their
stories excoriating morality but, instead, wrestling with the persistence of a particular
moral concept: charity. In fact, at one time or another, every author discussed below
expressed a belief in the myth of American Exceptionalism from the vantage point of
their different personal and political convictions. In many ways, the story of modern
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Williams attributes our difficulty in abandoning morality to the fact that it has brought about some
modicum of good to society: “The ideals of morality have without doubt, and contrary to a vulgar
Marxism that would see them only as an ideology of unworldliness, played a part in producing some
actual justice in the world and in mobilizing power and social opportunity to compensate for bad luck in
concrete terms. But the idea of value that lies beyond all luck is an illusion, and political aims cannot
continue to draw any conviction from it” (218).
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charity in the middle decades of the twentieth century is a story of how these writers tried
to reconcile their belief in the goodness of public morality with an ever-increasing
knowledge that such an orientation had at best allowed, or at worst contributed to, the
tragedies of the first half of the century. Still, despite these failures, the question of how
best to respond to the hardship of others in their midst persisted, just as it will continue to
persist for all of us, world without end.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In Chapter 2, “Little Orphan Annie’s Great Depression,” I argue that Harold
Gray’s Little Orphan Annie newspaper comic strip, often noted for its creator’s fervent
anti-liberal rhetoric, engages with conservatism primarily through its engagement with
the shifting cultural narratives surrounding charity and philanthropy occasioned by the
Depression. Although Gray’s conservatism has been perhaps the most discussed facet of
the comic’s history, most critics have somehow ignored that the strip’s most salient
engagement with conservatism is the charity relationship between Warbucks and Annie.
Little Orphan Annie is the urtext of what I have been calling modern charity, that moment
when cultural narratives surrounding Americans’ inherent charitable altruism were
challenged and reformed beginning with the Great Depression and moving throughout
the founding of the US Nonprofit Sector.
Culturally ubiquitous in daily newspapers, radio programming, licensed products,
and the (admittedly less successful) 1932 and 1938 films, Little Orphan Annie’s narrative
commitment to melodramatic charity, individual responsibility, and anti-bureaucratic
fervor refracted American audiences’ unease with the changes both in their government
and the previously reliable legitimizing cultural narratives of American charitableness.
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By dramatizing the legitimation crisis surrounding American charity in the Great
Depression, Gray’s serialized orphan adventurer became a conservative lament for the
malaises of modernity, whose ill effects for Annie’s creator became ever more apparent
during the Hoover presidency and were exacerbated by the coming of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s New Deal. In service of this larger discussion, I build on Marshall
McLuhan’s argument that Gray’s comic contributes to cultural narratives of charitable
worthiness and human initiative by introducing the possibility that Annie’s cultural
relevancy has more to do with luck and the imprinting of capitalism’s hopes and dreams
on Annie’s blank eyes. In other words, I argue, Annie’s identity as both charity giver and
charity recipient helps evoke a sense that American capitalism, given the right conditions,
holds the potential to make people more charitable.
In Chapter 3, “Tuskegee Machine Charity: Du Bois, Ellison, and Scientific
Philanthropy,” I suggest that two writers of different generations confront this context
through a sustained engagement with scientific philanthropy and “The Negro Problem” at
midcentury. Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952), in this way, builds on W.E.B. Du
Bois’s critique of philanthropy in Dusk of Dawn: An Autobiography of a Race Concept
(1940). Further, by populating their texts with the awkward interface between white
benefactors and their black recipients, Du Bois and Ellison both render the statistical
behemoth of “the Negro Problem” in humanistic terms which return philanthropy—a
modern bureaucratic practice thanks to the example of both scientific philanthropy and
the New Deal—to its moral, individualized rootedness in a larger tradition of charity and
voluntarism Alexis de Toqueville identified as unique to American democracy. A guiding
antagonist for both Du Bois and Ellison was, of course, Booker T. Washington.
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Washington’s legacy of partnering with northern philanthropists and using his institute as
a research hub to drive charitable investment had endured into the midcentury, even
though the Tuskegee founder had died in 1915.
Du Bois, in Dusk of Dawn, called this enduring figuration The Tuskegee
Machine, and this chapter will demonstrate how Ellison similarly chooses Washington’s
legacy as the fulcrum for his critique of philanthropy in Invisible Man. Further, by
discussing Dusk of Dawn and drawing connections between Ellison and Du Bois, I
argue that Ellison uses Du Bois’s critique of philanthropy in order to mediate the
conflict between white moral responsibility for black suffering and the US’s nationallyinfused acquiescence to the “great tradition” of private charity, particularly as morphed
into scientific philanthropy during the Progressive Era. Philanthropy, Ellison’s novel
suggests, simultaneously funds the invisible man’s betterment while also contributing to
his invisibility. In this way, private charity contributes to Ellison’s stated project in the
novel to deal with the complex moral consequences of the “Negro Problem.”
In Chapter 4, “Grotesque Charity and the Politics of Innocence: Flannery
O’Connor’s The Violent Bear it Away,” I argue that charity, the quality understandably
seen as lacking in Flannery O’Connor’s violent fiction, actually provides an important
fulcrum for understanding O’Conner’s later work. Fiction need not itself be charitable,
after all, in order to concern itself with the idea of charity, and in fact O’Connor’s most
sustained social critiques often come in the form of defending charity against the
encroachment of modernity. In this chapter, more specifically, I argue that Flannery
O’Connor’s later work critiques constructions of innocence and instrumental reasoning in
de-personalized forms of aid as engines for what she called the terror of “governing by
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tenderness.” Worthiness and unworthiness, in O’Connor’s economy, become part and
parcel with need-based aid in ways that worked against her Christian views of poverty. In
the first half of this chapter, I will focus on how O’Connor’s essays on writing fiction
anticipate anthropologist Miriam Ticktin’s recent interrogation of “innocence” as a
problematic moral and political category. In the second part of the chapter, I will explore
how O’Connor grafts this concern for innocence onto a critique of instrumental reason
that reveals the tension between private charity and state-based aid. O’Connor’s final
completed novel, The Violent Bear it Away (1960), provides her most sustained
engagement with charity, and read alongside her nonfictional writing from the period, the
novel’s charity politics manifest in more complicated ways than both theological and
anti-theological readings of O’Connor have previously suggested.
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CHAPTER 2
Little Orphan Annie’s Great Depression
Reflecting on the Great Depression, historian Robert Bremner writes that Herbert
Hoover’s attempts to spur giving from wealthy Americans evidenced the President’s belief
that “philanthropy was on trial.” “Actually,” Bremner writes, “the trial was over.
Philanthropy stood condemned, convicted not only of bankruptcy but of more heinous
offenses…Philanthropy, according to its critics, was a dodge of the rich to escape taxes
and hold on to power. This was an old charge that gained new force each time business
tycoons asked others to be their brothers’ keepers. ‘Riot insurance’ was the name scoffers
gave the businessmen’s and bankers’ relief efforts” (149). During Hoover’s Organization
for Unemployment Relief Drive, Americans had raised $100 million. It was an astounding
amount, especially considering that those individual donations were not tax deductible,
roughly equivalent to $1.5 Billion today (Bureau of Labor Statistics). But as it turned out,
this was nowhere near the amount of capital needed to support relief efforts or encourage
companies to begin hiring again:
Those who chose could take comfort from the fact that 200 community chests,
reached or slightly exceeded their quotas and 179 increased previous totals by 14 percent.
On the other hand, those who were so inclined, and they included the executive director of
the Association of Community Chests and Councils, could point out that one-fourth of the
chests had failed by 10 percent or more; that only 35% of the chest funds would be spent
for relief and that this represented only 30% of the total conservatively estimated need for
relief in the chest cities. (Bremner 147-148
While data now clearly shows that individual giving increased throughout the
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duration of the Great Depression, the form that giving took shifted away from the
traditional local structures that had emerged in the Progressive Era and plateaued during
the 1920s. Instead, Americans now more readily gave to direct relief efforts. Seeing the
apparently unsolvable problem of the Great Depression before them, Americans
recognized the need for stopgap charity as opposed to trusting the large general purpose
philanthropic foundations to do that work for them.
Certainly the Great Depression brought about a legitimation crisis not just for
charity and philanthropy but also the government itself. As Michael Szalay writes in New
Deal Modernism, “The modern American state had experienced a profound crisis in its
social legitimacy. Unable to safeguard the security of either the working or middle classes,
threatened at the polls and picket lines by elements of both, government set out to reinvent
itself” (2). Even though the New Deal would eventually make strides toward addressing
the US government’s Depression Era legitimation crisis, even before the New Deal the
early Depression itself had already occasioned a similar crisis for private philanthropy,
and more specifically its association with the Republican Party’s emphasis on the free
market embodied by the leadership of Herbert Hoover.
If liberals during the Depression sought to restore public trust in the government,
the New Deal prompted conservatives to double down on their belief in personal
responsibility, free market economy, and the protection of private philanthropic giving.
Organizations such as the American Liberty League, founded in 1934 by Irènèe du Pont
and other philanthropic magnates, emerged to counteract a belief that the Roosevelt
Administration had moved too far afield from traditional American charitable virtues. In
fact, it was this protection of private giving that provided a counterargument against the
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ALL saw as rampant anti-philanthropist fervor. As Kim Phillips-Fein writes, “The league
asserted that the federal government should keep out of the relief business, leaving it all to
the red cross” (289). Echoing Carnegie’s “Gospel of Wealth nearly” fifty year prior, The
American Liberty League complained, “You can’t recover prosperity by seizing the
accumulation of the thrifty and distributing it to the thriftless and unlucky” (qtd. in
Phillips-Fein 289). Phillips-Fein argues that such a combination of anti-New Deal politics
and support for private philanthropy helped form the beginnings of the modern
conservative movement, wherein business leaders strove to demonstrate that Americans
were so charitable that they did not need the government to provide enhanced relief. These
business leaders had help from one of their fictional counterparts, Oliver “Daddy”
Warbucks.
One conservative, steeped in the melodramatic machinations of 19th Century
literature and a commitment to rugged individualism, navigated this terrain on newspaper
pages across the country using an orphan as his guide. The most famous charity recipient
in America during the Great Depression was Harold Gray’s Little Orphan Annie, who
debuted in the New York Daily News in 1924 before migrating to the Chicago Tribune a
few weeks later. Annie draws on the Twain’s Huckleberry Finn and Dickensian
melodrama to reconfigure the orphaned street urchin archetype at the margins of the
Roaring Twenties. Within a few years, the comic strip was a hit, earning at its 1930s apex
syndication in over 500 newspapers throughout North America (Smith 26). By the end of
the 1920s, Little Orphan Annie settled into the core dramatis personae that would
predominate the strip until its discontinuation by the Tribune Comic Syndicate in 2010, 42
years after Harold Gray’s death in 1968. During the strip’s 86-year run, Annie, her dog
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Sandy, and her adoptive father Oliver “Daddy” Warbucks fought off criminals, helped
their neighbors, and went on adventures that charmed generations of Americans.
In the 1930s, Gray’s cartooning became increasingly political. As the decade wore
on, Harold Gray threw his comic strip into the realities of the Depression by having
Warbucks lose his fortune, forcing him and Annie (and Sandy the dog, of course) to go
from tenement to flophouse to Hooverville hoping to find some kind of shelter and gainful
employment. Gray, a devout Republican, politicized the strip more and more during the
first half of the thirties, later blaming The New Deal for Annie and Warbucks’s plight
rather than the Depression itself. Gray paints Warbucks’s inability to support Annie (she
often finds food or jobs when Warbucks cannot) as an end to charity as we know it. If
well-meaning benevolent men like Warbucks could not hang on to their wealth during the
Depression, Gray reasoned, then the Annies of the future would face certain peril.
However, it would be a mistake to view Gray’s conservatism as simplistic or, at
least, overly analogous to conservatism as practiced in the 21st Century. Jeet Heer, who
since 2004 has edited the Library of America’s Complete Little Orphan Annie for IDW,
has made Harold Gray the Shakespeare to his Hazlitt, the Johnson to his Boswell. Heer
describes Gray as a “conservative populist,” after the fashion of Wilmore Kendall, who
was probably most famous for his time as William F. Buckley’s formative professor at
Yale:
Long before the phrase “egg-head” was coined, cartoonists like Gray drew ovalfaced professors who lacked common sense and sneered at practical minded
business men. I don’t know whether Kendall read Annie or not (although some of
his colleagues at National Review clearly did since they wrote about her in their
magazine). But it seems to me incontestably true that Kendall and Gray shared an
overlapping worldview, and can usefully be compared. The fact that Gray’s
conservative populism preceded Kendall’s work by a decade also raises interesting
questions as to whether elite intellectuals are always at the vanguard of ideological
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change. (McLemee n. pag.)
Nobody can easily deny Gray’s conservatism, and the examples found in this chapter will
repeatedly illustrate this orientation. However, rather than argue that Annie’s conservatism
amounts to an interesting novelty in the history of American comics, Heer has gone even
further to say that Gray’s forty-year corpus influenced conservatism perhaps more than the
other way round, admittedly a difficult claim to substantiate. Heer considers Gray’s
impact on modern conservatism to be as important as that of Barry Goldwater, William F.
Buckley, or Ronald Reagan. In much the same way Gertrude Himmelfarb’s histories of
the Victorian Era15 helped convey those values to American conservatives, Harold Gray
earlier in the century deployed Dickensian melodrama as a means to critique the
bureaucratization of charity in the form of government aid. In Gray’s world, orphanages
are never as cozy as hearth and home; with enough grit, a child can survive the sometimes
mindless proclivities (or outright self-serving cruelty) of the adults in whose care she finds
herself.
I will argue in this chapter that Little Orphan Annie engages with conservatism
primarily through its coterminous development with the shifting cultural narratives
surrounding charity and philanthropy occasioned by the Depression. Although Gray’s
conservatism has been perhaps the most discussed facet of the strip’s history, most critics
have somehow ignored that the strip’s most salient engagement with conservatism is the
charity relationship between Warbucks and Annie. Little Orphan Annie is the urtext of
what I have been calling modern charity, that moment when cultural narratives
surrounding Americans’ inherent charitable altruism were challenged and reformed
15

See especially Lord Acton: A Study in Conscience in Politics (1952), Marriage and Morals Among the
Victorians (1975), and The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age (1984).
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beginning with the Great Depression and moving throughout the founding of the US
Nonprofit Sector. Culturally ubiquitous in daily newspapers, radio programming, licensed
products, and the (admittedly less successful) 1932 and 1938 films, Little Orphan Annie’s
narrative commitment to melodramatic charity, individual responsibility, and antibureaucratic fervor refracted American audiences’ unease with the changes both in their
government and the previously reliable legitimizing cultural narratives of American
charitableness. By dramatizing the legitimation crisis surrounding American charity in the
Great Depression, Gray’s serialized orphan adventurer became a conservative lament for
the malaises of modernity, whose ill effects for Annie’s creator became ever more
apparent during the Hoover presidency and were exacerbated by the coming of the US
Welfare State and Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.
Having worked under The Gumps creator Sidney Smith for several years at the
Chicago Tribune and garnered the praise of comic strip kingmaker Joseph Medill
Patterson, Harold Gray was really the first American cartoonist to fuse longform
melodramatic serial narratives (like his hero Charles Dickens) with the comic strip’s
famous proclivity for comedy. However, Gray’s innovations with Annie push things quite
a bit further than a mere adaptation of melodrama to the newspaper comic strip. Jared
Gardner argues that, as the strip gained popularity, “Gray began to move away from
domestic comedy systematically, focusing instead on extended adventure narratives of
kidnappings, travel, and international criminals” (247). Unlike his mentor Sidney Smith,
who “would interrupt even his most baroque melodrama for a day or two of physical
comedy,” Harold Gray “focused exclusively on crafting continuous extended narratives
that rarely if ever lost sight of the primary thread of the plot. The result was the emergence
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of the adventure strip as it would come to dominate the form in the late 1920s and 1930s”
(ibid). Umberto Eco has even argued that Little Orphan Annie’s seriality provides a source
text for early Superman16 comic books. Annie, Eco says, “prolonged her disaster-ridden
childhood for decades” in much the same way Clark Kent, also an orphan, endlessly
repeated the cycle of saving the day, facing certain peril, then finding his way out of that
peril just in time to begin anew in the next issue.
Gray’s audience appeal, however, had less to do with an artist’s stroke of brilliance
than the market demands of newspaper comic strips in the first quarter century. Joseph
Patterson, Harold Gray’s editor at the Tribune, told Gray “Kids don’t buy papers. Their
parents do” (qtd. in Harvey The Art of the Funnies 96). Stella Ress has noted that Annie’s
trans-medial success during the Depression was in part due to its ability to bridge the age
gap between children and adults:
By reading Little Orphan Annie on a regular basis, adults allowed themselves the
chance to integrate their fascination of youth (a remnant of the carefree days of a
bygone decade) with the reality of their dire Depression-era circumstances. The
radio program, on the other hand, helped children imagine a vaguely familiar
fantasy world in which they had the power and capabilities to foil the bad guy,
make money, and even have a little fun along the way. Little Orphan Annie
brought child and adult together, for different reasons, but united nonetheless.
(792)
This fact of Annie’s public expression had the effect of explaining the Great Depression to
children who many adults assumed had no idea what was going on. Even in Gray’s comic,
Warbucks waits to tell Annie the news of their imminent bankruptcy for nearly a month
after learning about it himself, and only then after the phone has shut off and all the
Warbucks mansion’s servants have either abandoned their posts or been laid off.17

16

Superman, created by Jerry Seigel and Joel Schuster, made his debut in 1938’s Action Comics #1.
“Daddy” first learns of his company’s troubles on January 12 , 1930. He does not tell Annie until February
10, 1930. (Complete Little Orphan Annie Volume 3: And a Blind Man Shall Lead Them 182-194)
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“Daddy” finally reveals that he has lost all of his money, and Annie simply says, “Well is
that all? I knew somethin’ was wrong, but I figgered it must be somethin’ real bad - Shux!
What’s losin yer dough? Lots o’folks go bust” (The Complete Little Orphan Annie Volume
3 194) While Gray spoke directly to adults with the daily newspaper strip, the Ovaltine
Corporation and the radio team at WGN spoke to the children.

Little Orphan Annie © 1930 Tribune Content Agency LLC. Used with permission.

Figure 2.1: Little Orphan Annie 14 February 1930
Gray liked to describe Annie as “Tougher than hell, with a heart of gold and a fast
left” (qtd. in Smith 3), and these attributes served her well as her creator dragged her out
of the orphanage and palatial mansion through rural middle America, Hollywood, and
eventually across oceans to parts unknown. Less an appeal toward sentiment or pity,
Annie’s resiliency and resourcefulness came to represent for many the overlapping ideals
of rugged individualism, the Protestant work ethic, and exceptionalist American
charitableness. Part of Gray’s narrative innovation with Annie was using the adventure
plotline to highlight both her toughness and her unwavering generosity wherever her and
Sandy the dog found themselves. In The Mechanical Bride, Marshall McLuhan notes this
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interwoven nature of Annie’s symbolic purchase: “Always on the move, brimful of Edeninnocence and goodness, she embodies the self-image of a knight in shining armor nursed
in the bosom of every tycoon as a picture of his true self. Girded only with her own
goodness, but menaced on every hand by human malice and stupidity, she wins through
by shrewdness, luck, and elusiveness” (66). Notably, McLuhan does not single out
Annie’s qualities as stemming from self-reliance or individualism. Instead, during the
Great Depression, McLuhan argues that Gray’s comic contributes to cultural narratives of
charitable worthiness and human initiative by introducing the possibility that Annie’s
cultural relevancy has more to do with luck and the imprinting of capitalism’s hopes and
dreams on Annie’s blank eyes. In other words, Annie’s identity as both charity giver and
charity recipient helps evoke a sense that American capitalism, given the right conditions,
holds the potential to make people more charitable. Perhaps nothing illustrates this belief
more than shopping at Christmas time.
The Business of Individual Giving
In the December 8th 1930 strip, Annie tells “Daddy” that instead of receiving
presents for Christmas she hopes that Santa will spend all his “time takin care o’ poor
kids” (Gray Vol. 3 166). In response, Warbucks gives Annie his checkbook and asks if
she’d like to help Santa, saying, “They won’t have to know it’s from you – everything can
say ‘From Santa’ – I’m sure he’d appreciate it” (ibid). In the last panel of the full-page
Sunday strip, “Daddy” sits in his study and reflects: “A lot of smug people claim that a
hard life makes one hard – huh – hard knocks have taught her to think of others – I guess
hard contacts do mar cheap stones or people, but only add luster to a Diamond” (ibid. 166,
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emphasis Gray’s).18 Warbucks’ appreciation for Annie often takes this form, where he
gives her something in his study then immediately reflects on why she deserves for him to
give it.
Though not at all a scientific philanthropist, Warbucks does not give always
indiscriminately either. Recipients of his largesse exist along a spectrum of worthiness for
the magnate, more often than not judged on the individual’s work ethic or evidence of
their kindness to others. This places “Daddy” Warbucks in a politically moderate space of
Depression givers. His eleemosynary efforts are far more charitable than philanthropic,
because he is never interested in solving social problems through his giving. Warbucks is
not in the newspaper, sending large donations to hospitals or universities to erect edifices
with his name on them. He is not one of the “riot insurance” givers Robert Bremner refers
to in his history of Depression Era giving. Warbucks prefers to follow Annie’s lead in his
bequests, trusting her judgment implicitly. However, this trust comes always already as a
result of Warbucks’ initial decision to adopt Annie, an originary act of his own charitable
discernment. Gray always reinforces Annie’s adoptive status by always referring to
“Daddy” with quotation marks around his name. He consistently reaffirms his decision
throughout the strip during armchair soliloquies of her worthiness, which the kid always
has a chance to prove just a few panels over. In so doing, Gray creates a strip that
fantasizes the symbiosis in charitable giving between giver a receiver. Such a symbiosis,
as the other two chapters will demonstrate, is fueled by a conservative fantasy that
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When quoting from Gray’s comic strip dialogue, I have tried to convey something close to a facsimile
of Gray’s emphatic, and usually inconsistent, typographical style. Sometimes, where the week before he
underlined, he will instead italicize a word or vice versa. A hyphen may maintain its length but, in the
context of the passage, serve the purpose of a line dash. As a result, there are times when I quote Gray
with lines that appear peppered with typos.
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charitable relationships do not involve power and, instead, flow from an assumed equality
between people that need not be enforced by the government because Americans are so
inherently charitable they do not need that kind of oversight.
After a week spent running around the city streets where she once lived, trying to
figure out what to buy the poor children for Christmas, Annie finds herself overwhelmed.
The week’s daily strips illustrate the stark contrasts of America within the first year of the
Great Depression, the juxtaposition of hunger and plenty while the financial losses had yet
to have a widespread effect on the middle class. Some people buy packages for Christmas
presents at a large department store while, within a few blocks, others stand in breadlines.
In a particularly harsh panel, children huddle with their homeless siblings around a trash
can looking for their next meal while an emaciated black cat lurks in the foreground
hoping for their scraps. Annie comes to the realization that, like Santa Claus, she will need
to make a list then decide how to allocate her funds, and she decides to ask a police man
for help. Gray often includes trustworthy law enforcement officers throughout his strips,
saving his harshest criticism for either crooked higher ups and politicians or outright street
criminals. Interestingly, this trust extends to Annie’s relief project. Rather than trust social
workers or other betterment officials, Annie sees the police as the only trustworthy
government employees equipped to help with her charitable discernment.
After seeing the children around the trashcan, Annie reflects, “Imagine for kids
poor and cold – Christmas doesn’t mean that much to kids like that, ‘less folks with dough
get busy” (ibid 168). This sequence illustrates two key points evident throughout Annie’s
charity politics in the Pre-New Deal Depression years. There are simply too many people
in need for everyone to be helped by individual direct giving, and everyone, particularly
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elites like “Daddy” Warbucks, has a responsibility to “get busy” and help out. These
insights, as it turns out, were not just reflections from Gray’s conservatism but also direct
narrative responses to the urgings of his President. The week prior to Annie embarking on
her own Operation Christmas Child, President Hoover had given his State of the Union
outlining hopes for a surprising government-funded emergency relief package among
other items (“Text of President Hoover’s Message to Congress” 3). In a roughly 100-word
segment, buried at the end of his New York Times front- page address, Hoover asks for
“temporary Federal aid of adequate State and local services for the health of children and
the further stamping out of communicable diseases, particularly in the rural sections”
(ibid). He reassures the 71st Congress that “the drain upon the Federal Treasury” will be
“comparatively small” but that “results both economic and moral are of the utmost
importance” (ibid). An adjacent Times report on the front page tells readers the amount
would be approximately $150,000,000.19
Having reassured the American people that, despite his ask, most estimates of the
Depression are blown out of proportion, the President also emphasizes (several paragraphs
prior to mentioning his relief package) each citizen’s individual responsibility to help
bring the nation out of this still young (apparently not as “Great” as everyone thinks)
Depression:
Every individual should sustain faith and courage; that each should maintain his
self- reliance; that each and every one should search for method of improving his
business or service; that the vast majority whose income is unimpaired should not
hoard out of fear, but should pursue their normal living and recreations; that each
should seek to assist his neighbors who may be less fortunate; that each industry
should assist its own employes [sic]; that each community and each State should
assume its full responsibilities for organization of employment and relief of
distress with that sturdiness and independence which built a great nation. (ibid)
19

Roughly $2,242,440,000 today (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
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Admitting that the government may have a financial role in directly aiding its troubled
citizens, Hoover here does so without projecting any philosophical shift or accepting the
real seriousness of the economic downturn. To many in Congress, the speech amounted to
an unheroic sidestep. Republican then-Congressman, later Mayor of New York City,
Fiorello La Guardia said the leader of his party had “certainly not done his best” (ibid.).
When Annie takes to the streets with “Daddy” Warbucks’ checkbook, then, she
does so at the request of both her adoptive father and her President. However, the strip’s
starkness in the weeks following the State of the Union paint a different picture of the
Depression than the President chooses to share in his statement. By giving Annie his
checkbook, Warbucks follows the instructions to not hoard out of fear, though he soon
learns he should absolutely have been afraid to spend. Instead of finding that the “vast
majority” of individuals whose “income is unimpaired” are doing just fine, Annie’s
experience reveals that her fur-lined parka and velvet hat are increasingly more out of
place as the week wears on. Though she begins the week in a busy market, overwhelmed
by choices, by Saturday Annie is overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of impoverished
people she sees before her. Eventually, she sheds her fancy clothes in order to pose as a
ragamuffin so that the most needy families will speak to her. In this way, the strip subtly
critiques the President’s encouraging the “vast majority” of “unimpaired” to pursue their
“normal living and recreations” by demonstrating just how out of touch such an act would
be.
Annie’s creator also “took issue with the self-celebratory smugness of Hoovertypes who were willing to relegate poverty to the status of a fast-diminishing problem”
(ibid 9). For the successful cartoonist from Kankakee, Illinois who had dug ditches to put

47

himself through college, Hoover’s 1930 State of the Union had perhaps been a bridge too
far.

Little Orphan Annie © 1930 Agency LLC. Used with permission.

Little Orphan Annie © 1930 Agency LLC. Used with permission.

Fig 2.2: Little Orphan Annie 10 December 1930

Fig 2.3: Little Orphan Annie 12 December 1930

Little Orphan Annie © 1930 Agency LLC. Used with permission.

Fig.2.4: Little Orphan Annie 13 December 1930
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Figure 2.5: Little Orphan Annie 14 December 1930

One eight-panel Sunday sequence perfectly illustrates the anxieties of modern
charity evident in the strip throughout the Depression, and it comes in response to Annie’s
difficulties in deciding who deserves the most help during the holidays. Sunday color
strips were usually intended to reach children and summarize Annie’s week of activity, so
the December 14th episode can be read as both a conclusion to and a distillation of the
week’s events. Annie returns to Warbucks and asks his advice on who he thinks she ought
to give the money: “Oh, ‘“Daddy”’—I’m stuck—I don’t know where to start – I thought
it’d be easy, with so much to spend – but there are so many poor folks – it’s not fair to
help some and miss others– but how can yuh help ‘em all?” (ibid. 169). Encouraging
Annie’s generosity, and trying to ease her anxiety, “Daddy” responds: “It’s too big a job
for any one person, Annie – If everyone who was able would give, this would be a much
happier world – but so few people realize how much fun it is to be generous – as long as
we do our best to help others, that’s all anyone can do” (ibid.169).
In the absence of a perfect metric by which to measure poverty, “Daddy”
emphasizes—in direct opposition to philanthropy as it had been practiced since the
Progressive Era—the importance of generosity over and above perfect charitable
judgment. Given the extent of the Depression as it was known up to that point, there was
no time to waste researching a solution to unemployment or hunger; families were hungry
right then and there. To focus too much on deliberations would be to miss out on “how
much fun it is to be generous” (ibid.).
After Annie has collected names of needy families, “Daddy” surprises her by
setting up a distribution center. On the way to the rented space, he says to Annie, “The
trouble with so much charity is that those who give are too lazy to really give intelligently-
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I see you’ve discovered cases that most people would miss – those too hopeless to
complain” (172). This interestingly places the greatest need above large-scale
philanthropic efforts geared toward “curing the disease” of Depression Era poverty and
instead toward giving some well-researched Christmas gifts to a few dozen families. Gray,
here, emphasizes need-based giving as opposed to foundation building or social
engineering. To reward Annie’s effort, Warbucks kicks it into gear, puts on a trench coat
over his tuxedo, and commences an operation whereby his money will be directed toward
the families with the highest need as efficiently as possible. He tells Annie that “Finding
who to give and knowing what to give was the big job.” In the span of a few weeks, then,
the comic strip’s seeming indictment of the Hoover State of the Union comes back around
to a belief that the Depression could be solved by enough wealthy men giving back.
Harold Gray, through this sequence, affixes the effort and deliberation more associated
with large-scale philanthropy onto acts of direct charity. Annie finds herself unable to
fathom the throngs of impoverished people in the city streets just as “Daddy” Warbucks
cannot fathom another form of giving other than a truckload of carefully chosen Christmas
presents.
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Figure 2.6: Little Orphan Annie 21 December, 1930

With A Little Help from My Friends
From January to June of 1931, Warbucks would lose his fortune, abandon Annie
out of embarrassment for his inability to support her, and lose his eyesight after crashing a
delivery truck during his first day on the job. This event lands him in the charity ward of a
hospital, to which he says to his doctor “I’ve never had to accept charity before and it
burns me up” (Gray Complete Little Orphan Annie Volume 3 254). As his time at the
hospital comes to a close, a doctor assures Warbucks, “Now days there are many
organizations teaching the blind…to read and write and almost any trade free of charge.”
Warbucks reflects to himself, “Free of charge – more charity – here I’ve been in this
hospital over a month and unable to pay a cent – yet I’ve been treated with every
consideration – no – once out of this place I’ll accept no more charity” (Complete Little
Orphan Annie Volume 3 254). Despite his best efforts, two weeks later Warbucks stands
on a street corner with a coffee cup hoping to find money to pay for his small tenement
room.

Little Orphan Annie © 1930 Agency LLC. Used with permission.

Figure 2.7: Little Orphan Annie 11 June 1931
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Philanthropy’s legitimation problem thus also occasions a prominent fear: the
former millionaires may also find themselves at the bottom rung of society, shaking a
metal cup on a street corner. But more than losing his fortune and resorting to begging on
the street, Gray’s fallen millionaire can no longer perform an important task. He can
literally no longer see who deserves charity. Rather than check in on Annie, his original
charity case, he must wonder aloud to himself how she is doing. In a turn of dramatic
irony, readers know that, just one panel to the right, Annie and Sandy are mostly taking
care of themselves. The orphan has busied herself building her neighbor Jake’s business
and keeping Mah Green, the tenement building’s landlady, company. At the end of 1930,
we saw how the huddled masses overwhelmed Annie to the point that she could not decide
who to help. By the middle of 1931, Annie has returned to the poor house happy as ever
while her adoptive father’s checkbook would now be best used as firestarter.

Little Orphan Annie © 1930 Agency LLC. Used with permission.

Figure 2.8: Little Orphan Annie 5 July 1931
In order to avoid being recognized, “Daddy” asks the hospital orderly not to shave
him. On the next day, despite Warbucks’ best efforts, he is recognized by a fellow patient
in the hospital. Significantly, Gray opens the strip with a shot of Jake’s booming store
business (due to Annie’s help). The top of the second panel reads: “While in the charity
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ward at the hospital.” Warbucks finds himself the necessary recipient of charity just as he
tries to escape what he sees as Annie’s demoralizing help and support. In Gray’s narrative
world, the Depression will eventually cause everyone to enter the charity ward, even
someone like Warbucks. Charity, as a meaning-making ideal, will have to change
significantly in the future if it is going to survive what Gray saw as the existential threat of
an encroaching welfare state. Just as with every other downturn in Warbucks’ 1930s
crises, he eventually bounces back, but noticeably only with help from someone else. In
the case of his blindness, Warbucks bounces back with help from charity doctors, initially,
but also later from Flophouse Bill, the dwarf flophouse proprietor who has idolized
Warbucks’ business acumen for years. With Bill’s help, Warbucks outsmarts his business
rival and is able to regain his fortune. However, while he is blind he still does not wish for
Annie to see him as he is.
Annie’s situation is rather straightforward, but the extended shift in emphasis
toward Warbucks throughout Little Orphan Annie in the years leading up to the Roosevelt
administration also brings attention to what Bruce Robbins has identified as the tendency
in upward mobility narratives of the emerging Welfare State to project a dialectic of
dependence and independence. Counter to many readings of poverty in literature—such as
Audrey Jaffe’s Scenes of Sympathy or Daniel Siegel’s Charity and Condescension, both
about the Victorian Era—Robbins argues that the welfare state, by contrast, marks a shift
in focus away from the charity recipient toward those altruistic individuals around them:
the emotional center of an upward mobility story lies not in its protagonist but in
the protagonist’s relation with a patron, mentor, or benefactor, a figure who stands
between two worlds, who can both help and obstruct the passage between them,
and who therefore elicits an emotional complexity… This reverse ostentation
insists that, whatever the official ideology of individualism may say, this has not
been a story of heroic self- reliance alone. In still another sense, it says that one
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person’s upward mobility is really someone else’s story. (xv)
We see this time and again in Little Orphan Annie, because even though she fulfills the
trope of the orphan girl, during the Depression it is often Annie helping Warbucks rather
than the other way around. In fact, part of the impetus for “Daddy” hiding from Annie in
the sequence above is for him to avoid the work Annie has done to support him. Harold
Gray’s noted commitment to individualism acquires an important proviso as the
Depression wears on; a rugged individual may eventually require help so long as it does
not come from the government. The Warbucks/Annie relationship’s “reverse ostentation”
repeatedly reveals the ways in which the modern malaise of individualism complicates the
relationship between “rugged” individualism and private charity.
I have noted the important connection between individualism and charity’s
legitimacy as an American cultural narrative, and certainly this finds voice in Gray’s
comic storytelling. According to Jeet Heer, it also fueled Little Orphan Annie’s popularity:
In the last analysis, self-reliance was an American value so firmly enthroned that
no welfare program could unseat it entirely. And Gray knew this…His characters
preached a gospel that Gray knew many of his readers wanted to hear: They
needed to know that the old values of self-reliance and hard work had not been
bankrupted by the economic catastrophes of the time. And Gray put his preachers
in the context that his readers could recognize as being an authentic reflection of
the world they lived in. (Heer “Fantasy and Reality in Harold Gray’s Masterpiece”
iv)
But is it possible to be an individualist who needs help from time to time? After all,
despite her famed self-reliance and her consistent praise from “Daddy” for it, Annie
repeatedly needs help from others in order to survive. Rather than an upward mobility
narrative, Annie’s age stagnation and constant cycle from precarity to safety reveals that
her self-reliance constantly bends and flexes to whatever crisis (personal or social) in
which she finds herself caught. Evident in the 1931 sequence but also in the more
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sensationalist post-FDR storylines, Warbucks needs help from others as well, especially if
he is going to survive the Depression. Folklorist Ellen Rhoads, in 1974, made a
structuralist observation that Gray’s strip, following Levi-Strauss, attempts to reconcile
two opposites:
The reluctance to be dependent on others is shown repeatedly by these strip
characters…The basic contradiction of the strip is therefore Self-reliance versus
Dependence…If, as Levi Strauss believes, the purpose of myth is to mediate life’s
contradictions, and if we assume that comics are a myth form, then it seems
reasonable to conclude…that the comic strip Little Orphan Annie is an attempt to
mediate this contradiction. It does so by repeatedly emphasizing that one can strive
for the ideal of self-reliance, but that, in the final analysis, positive results and
progress are attained by cooperating with and assisting or being assisted by others.
(356)
Through systematic analysis, Rhoads confirms Robbins’ claim that upward mobility in
cultural production of the emerging welfare state tends to emphasize the giver just as
much, if not more, than the recipient. Little Orphan Annie, then, champions individualism
while it demonstrates that belief’s increasing untenability in the unfolding Great
Depression years.
Discriminate Charity, Instrumental Reason, and the 1932 Election
Harold Gray’s early 1930s storylines demonstrate how both philanthropy’s
legitimacy and individualism hung in the balance with the new overwhelming spectacle of
the Depression. The Annie storylines of 1932, by contrast, turn their attention to those
givers who, unlike Warbucks, always see their charitable giving as a means to an end.
Two storylines illustrate the second of Charles Taylor’s malaises of modernity,
instrumental reasoning, as detrimental to the legitimacy of individual charity: Grandma
Stewart’s visit to the orphanage in the 1932 Little Orphan Annie film (RKO) and Annie’s
arch nemesis during her time in Cosmic City, the miserly Phineas Pinchpenny. The charity
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versus philanthropy distinction I make in the introduction is important to Little Orphan
Annie in particular because rather than make Warbucks a calculating social engineer Gray
instead creates a charitable philanthropist. “Daddy”, in many ways, even goes against
Carnegie’s mandate against indiscriminate giving by over-trusting certain members of his
own organization. Although his trust is often misplaced in other “serious men” or golddigging wives and girlfriends, “Daddy” always seems to trust Annie implicitly and
without question. In the years leading up to the New Deal’s implementation, Gray
attempts to answer philanthropy’s legitimation crisis by creating a magnate with a keen
eye for business but increasingly aloof when it comes to his charity investments. It is only
Annie, with her street smarts and experience receiving charity from others, who can make
those judgments for him.
Annie’s primary engagement with instrumental reasoning comes with her
interactions with prominent wealthy donors who are not her adoptive father. Beginning in
1924 onward, Annie stories often lambast wealthy individuals’ charitable discernment
only later to reveal their self-serving motives. In the 1932 film, Annie (played by Mitzi
Green) once again finds herself forced into an orphanage for social welfare workers.
Warbucks (played by Edgar Kennedy), as is often the case in the comic strip, is off on
some mission, this time hoping to find day laborer work outside the city. The film opens
with he and Annie’s farewell at a railyard in view of taunting hobos. The filmmakers feel
no obligation to explain why “Daddy” Warbucks is neither wearing a tuxedo nor living in
a mansion. The comic and radio programs were so ubiquitous that by 1932 everyone knew
that Warbucks had lost his fortune and moved himself, Annie, and Sandy out of the
mansion and the gutter. In the weeks leading up to her incarceration in an orphanage,
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Annie has taken in a much younger orphan boy named Mickey (Buster Phelps) sobbing in
the street during a rain storm. When Mickey develops an upset stomach, which is
unabated by Annie’s prescribed cod liver oil treatment, the duo visit a local doctor. During
the visit, a social worker learns of their lack of adult supervision and places them in the
hospital’s adjacent home for orphaned children.

Figure 2.9: Grandma Stewart Examines Orphans
After some time passes in the orphanage, an elderly woman enters the orphanage
with clear intentions: “I would like to adopt a child immediately.” Grandma Stewart, as
we later learn she is called, demands that the eligible children be brought before her so
that she can discern the most worthy choice. She tells the orphans to about face so they
“won’t stand there gawking at her.” Peering through a tightly gripped pince nez, Stewart
(played by May Robson) carefully examines each child as they pass her by, apparently
agitated that a perfect specimen has not yet found its way to her gaze.
When the line gets to Annie and Mickey, the proposed adopter sees that Mickey’s
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face has been blackened with shoe polish by a rival so that he will not be chosen. Annie
makes up a lie that she did it, and the redhead’s feigned meanness drives Mickey into
Grandma Stewart’s arms. She consoles Mickey then subsequently lifts and carries him out
of the orphanage to her palatial mansion. Later, Annie sneaks into the mansion to hang out
with Mickey, who is supposed to be asleep in his room. The kids (and Sandy) play
upstairs while downstairs Grandma Stewart receives praise from her friends at a dinner
party in honor of Mickey’s adoption. Accepting the praise of her dinner party guests,
Stewart basks in the light of her own generosity. Tragedy strikes when Sandy playfully
barks upstairs, thus alerting the adults downstairs of Annie’s presence. Soon after, as
officials from the orphanage carry Annie away from the Stewart mansion, Mickey jumps
from the upstairs window trying to reach the tree that Annie had climbed to reach his
bedroom earlier. He is hospitalized after falling two stories. Sitting together, Annie and
Mrs. Stewart both worry that Mickey will be okay, and Mrs. Stewart apologizes to Annie
for overlooking her at the orphanage when she took Mickey home. The doctor comes out
to announce that Mickey will be okay; Annie and Grandma Stewart embrace. Eventually,
Stewart opens her home for a party for all of the orphans, saying she now has 10 gallons
of ice cream. Toward the end of the party, it is revealed that “Daddy” Warbucks is in
disguise as Santa Claus, returned from his sojourn just in time for Christmas. The film
ends with Mickey saying, “Leapin lizards!” and “Daddy” Warbucks at the end of the table
presiding over the event, just as he would in the comic strip.
Notably, here Mrs. Stewart shifts from being a discerning, scrupulous investor of
her charity into an overly generous woman, buying too much ice cream and having the
children over for a Christmas party. Contrasted with Annie’s own initial adoption of
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Mickey, where she reluctantly takes him in so he will avoid the orphanage, Stewart’s
process mirrors the instrumental process of scientific philanthropy we tend to see absent in
“Daddy” Warbucks.
Closely observing the orphans, her nebulous search criteria are trumped by the pity
she feels when Annie’s apparent cruelty causes Mickey to sob uncontrollably. The scene
also calls back to Annie’s initial adoption from Mrs. Asthma’s orphanage by Mrs.
Warbucks in 1925, where she similarly asks the children to line-up for her to choose.
However, the Christmas party’s unbridled generosity runs counter to this discernmentdriven charity. Not unlike Warbucks’ decision to hand Annie his checkbook during the
1930 Christmas season, the party at Grandma Stewart’s mansion presents this form of
giving as far preferable to the scrupulous judgment of Mrs. Stewart’s pince-nez and the
approval of her dinner party guests. Much like philanthropy’s newfound illegitimacy in
the early Depression, the film presents Stewart’s Carnegie-like “discriminate charity” as
tone deaf in the face of such profound suffering. A happy ending can only come for these
children in a warm mansion with a belly full of ice cream, thus reinforcing modern charity
as a cultural narrative which pitted largescale social engineering against the impulse
toward direct acts of charity. Being overly discriminate, as Stewart is initially, prevents
the type of charitable encounter Gray and the films scriptwriters reward.
Meanwhile, in the comic strip, Annie has again been abandoned by “Daddy”
Warbucks while he travels to Europe. After weeks of hitchhiking and avoiding dangers on
the American highway, Annie and Sandy find themselves in Cosmic City, a sort of cross
between what television audiences would eventually see in Andy Griffith’s Mayberry and
Beaver Cleaver’s Mayfield, assumed to exist somewhere in Middle America. In Cosmic
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City, Annie and Sandy meet a wealthy local banker named Phineas Pinchpenny. Leaning
on a fence and people- watching, she sees Pinchpenny walking with a group of church
ladies. He says, “Yes, Indeed – ‘tis more blessed to give than to receive- I have always
regarded charity as a duty- think of the suffering millions across the seas. / It behooves us
to bring light to those whose lives are made dark by poverty- Ah, I’m never happier than
when I’m doing a good deed” (141). Sizing up Pinchpenny, for both herself and the
audience, Annie judges the man a miser and a hypocrite. After helping him catch his fallen
hat in the wind, Pinchpenny even urges Annie to go live at the county orphanage instead
of with her voluntary hosts The Futiles, whom he also reveals owe him money. If they
cannot pay the interest on their mortgage, the miser reasons, then how can they afford to
take care of Annie and Sandy?
Despite Pinchpenny’s declarations of effusive generosity to his fellow
congregants, repeatedly Gray underscores the man’s hypocrisy and cognitive dissonance.
Pinchpenny later says to Fred Futile, “Now I’m generous, but there’s a limit—I
understand you’ve taken in that orphan tramp and her dog—she’s a plain case for the
county farm—the dog should be shot” (142). He then threatens to foreclose on the Futiles’
house if they don’t get rid of the transient duo. Later, after Annie has set up her store in
downtown Cosmic City, she installs a donation bank, and Pinchpenny refuses to offer
even a penny (get it?) in support. Like some professional wrestling heel or Scooby Doo
villain, Pinchpenny haunts Cosmic City with his miserliness, determined to stop Annie
(even if it is the last thing he does!). Such an example from Pinchpenny would seem to
play into the criticism directed toward wealthy Americans during the Early Great
Depression. Unlike “Daddy” Warbucks, Pinchpenny represents the worst of the “riot
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insurance” style of philanthropy, in which many Americans severely questioned
philanthropists’ motives.
Pinchpenny’s stinginess seems rather straightforward and personal until his
enthusiasm for the possibility of Annie living in the tax-funded orphanage finds a political
expression. On Election day, Pinchpenny hangs around the polling station, trying to drum
up support for a large- scale solution to the Depression. He says to his fellow Cosmic City
voters, “I tell you it’s disgraceful that millions of our fellow men are destitute—many are
hungry—I say something must be done about it!” (166).

Little Orphan Annie © 1932 Agency LLC. Used with permission.

Figure 2.10: Pinchpenny on Election Day
Mr. Agate, Annie’s boss from the Cosmic Courier, confronts Pinchpenny for deferring his
personal responsibility in the face of the Depression. Agate, the no-nonsense newsman,
prefers “direct action” to help Cosmic City’s “not over a dozen” impoverished residents
over a larger political solution. Unlike the streets of New York, where Annie was
overwhelmed by poverty as she tried to spend Warbucks’ money wisely a year earlier,
Cosmic City’s scale is far more manageable. What sort of logic compels Pinchpenny to be
so concerned with a large-scale solution on election day while he is so personally
indifferent to the condition of residents like the Futiles, or even Annie herself? Why does
Annie pose such a threat to him? Pinchpenny is not only a miserly hypocrite when it
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comes to charity; he is also Harold Gray’s first straw-man New Dealer. In Little Orphan
Annie’s conservative imaginary, Pinchpenny’s journey from cruel philanthropist to
Rooseveltian soap-boxer communicated to Gray’s audience that they ought to be
suspicious of “large-scale solutions” and political posturing that was not backed up by
evidence of private, personalized commitment to “the destitute.” In other words,
Roosevelt’s promise of a “new deal for the American people” throughout the 1932
election fundamentally challenged the practices of real-life “Daddy” Warbucks types
while, in Gray’s reckoning, rewarding the Phineas Pinchpenny types who Herbert Hoover
had accused of making the Depression worse with their unwillingness to give. Annie’s
feud with Pinchpenny throughout 1932 is further suffused with anti-public aid sentiment
in the ensuing months, a fact allegorized by his ongoing conflict with Annie. Several
weeks prior to the election, Pinchpenny loses a pocketknife that would implicate him in
running over and permanently disabling a local boy, a crime for which he has so far
evaded arrest.
Despite his best efforts, Pinchpenny has been unable to recover the knife, but one
day after the election he notices that Annie has found the knife when he sees her, leaning
on the same fence where they first met, twirling the knife. Annie calls it her “lucky knife”
for reasons entirely innocent to the girl—she finds a dollar on the ground after finding it,
Mr. Agate lets her leave her shift from the newspaper early—but to Pinchpenny seems like
manipulative innuendo. Believing she is holding the knife hostage as leverage against him,
Phineas tries to stay in Annie’s good graces in hopes that he may persuade her to give it to
him. In the weeks after acquiring the knife, Annie persuades Pinchpenny to pay off the
Muddle family’s debt, as well as pay for a new roof, paint job, and pipe organ at the local
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church. Pinchpenny is not happy with this development, saying “That infernal brat has
nearly ruined me, with her constant demands for idiotic charities – no man was ever so
hounded-and there will be no end to it, till I recover that knife from her” (250). In his
largest planned bequest to date, Annie convinces Pinchpenny to accept bids for the
building of a new community relief center in Cosmic City that will exist right in the
middle of town so folks do not have to drive so far to the county relief office. Eventually,
his involuntary giving spree comes to an end when, having run out of money, Phineas’s
creditors arrive in Cosmic City from New York, where they proceed to foreclose on his
assets. In a last-ditch effort to avoid jail, Pinchpenny attempts to push Annie off a cliff,
only to be foiled by Sandy coming to her rescue. Eventually, the knife proves
Pinchpenny’s guilt, just as he’d feared, and he ends up where all the other future New
Dealers end up in Gray’s comic, either dead or in jail.
Annie’s coercion of Pinchpenny plays into the belief that public relief-minded
liberals had to be coerced into giving through their taxes rather than voluntarily. In Gray’s
economy, Pinchpenny is so naturally stingy that it takes Annie’s coercion to loosen his
wallet. Even further, the Pinchpenny saga not only suggests that liberals are not charitable
but also that advocacy for more government-based assistance itself made people less
charitable and would, in time, continue to do so. Modern charity, in this manifestation,
fuels the anxiety that with the rise of Rooseveltian politics, more people like Pinchpenny
would begin to crop up and threaten the ideal and localized giving practices that fuel the
comic strip’s folksy exceptionalist rhetoric. Harold Gray’s fears, stretched across
thousands of Depression-Era panels and on hundreds of papers every single day, helped
engender a belief for many conservatives that America would be much better off with

65

more kids like Annie and fewer people like Pinchpenny. After Warbucks returned from
his mysterious trip to Europe, of course, he and Annie flew on a private plane to Cosmic
City, where Warbucks proceeded to pay for all of the philanthropic projects left undone by
Pinchpenny’s treachery.
The Loss of Political Freedom
For comics scholars, many of whom have focused more on Gray’s writing from
1934 onward than the Early Depression years, none of this would seem particularly
surprising. The strip’s conservatism was not lost on cultural critics of the time either.
Former New York Daily News Editor Worth Gatewood writes, “Imbued with a Calvinist
morality and a political conservatism slightly to the right of Ivan the Terrible, [Gray]
injected both into his story line and fiercely rejected criticism from the liberal quarter”
(ix). In 1934, Richard Neuberger accused Gray of attempting to revive “Hooverism in the
Funnies” after Warbucks was jailed by Phil O. Bluster for tax fraud. A year later, when
Warbucks’ newly built factory is burned down by out-of-control labor unionists at the
behest of a Huey Long-like politician named Claude Claptrap, New Republic increased
Little Orphan Annie’s propagandistic threat level to “Fascism in the Funnies.” For Annie’s
writer, Warbucks was always an honorable, if affable, victim of political circumstance.
Faced with the possibility that he could revive his business by risking a large sale
of stock, Warbucks worries about the honor in such a maneuver: “A check-up shows that,
if I retire at once, I can pay all my debts and quit even, with just enough left to yield me a
very frugal living - / But financiers want to reorganize my business and sell billions in
stock – I’d make a fortune – and if the business crashed the public would hold the bag –“
Once Bleek (a man posing as Annie’s birth father), advises Warbucks to sell the stock so
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that he may best support Annie financially, Warbucks goes on a walk and says to himself,
“They believe in me – think I could pull through – but, as things stand, I’d be swindling
the public - / I’d be selling stock in a busted business – if things went wrong, I’d rob
widows and orphans – I mustn’t let billions blind me to the path of honor--” (42).
Rather than manipulate the frail market for his own gain, Warbucks worries that to
do so would be dishonorable because it “robs widows and orphans.” Presumably, the
implication here is that the laws are set up to buttress immoral people and that if people
like him are mindful and care for the needy, people would not go hungry. In the context of
the still-young New Deal, Warbucks’ sense of tax responsibility comes after 16 months of
sweeping recovery measures, including the banking act of 1933 and the establishment of
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). Warbucks’s choice not to reinvest
is driven by a worry that he will take relief tax dollars from those really struggling just
because the government has allowed escape hatches for struggling businesses. This evokes
a different angle on Gray’s conservatism, because rather than deride public money’s
ability to help those in need it instead opposes the banking incentives seen as taking
money directly from those who actually need it. To a group of financiers in top hats,
Warbucks says, “I prefer to be an honest idiot with a clear conscience to being a smart
billionaire at the expense of widows and orphans – good day, gentlemen” (45). As the
financiers depart, they lament the loss of business saying, “and no one could have touched
him – the deal would have been air tight, legally.”
After Warbucks is arrested on trumped-up charges of tax fraud, Gray publishes a
strip that chronicles the opinions of the common man reading about it in the paper. One
unshaven man on the street says to his friends, “No honest man could make a million –
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look at me – I work hard as him, but I can’t git nowhere.” Another man on the commuter
train, defending Warbucks to his friend, says, “I don’t believe it – he’s no crook – he’ll
never let it be known he gave millions for hospitals and charity – he was the biggest
hearted guy and the most modest…” His skeptical friend replies, “Well – he had it to give
– why should he not have been generous?” to which Warbucks’ defender says, “Yeah –
and he made it honestly – I happen to know he could have made a billion but turned it
down just because he wouldn’t risk robbing the public – he’s a square shooter” (50). The
Sunday strip from that same week features Warbucks’ three political antagonists
describing precisely why putting him in jail benefits them. Phil O. Bluster, Ward Heely,
and Bill McBribe dream of the political advantages of Warbucks’ incarceration: “We must
convict Warbucks – think how the voters will eat that up – why, the publicity will be
priceless” (51). After McBribe asks Bluster whether he thinks an indictment is likely,
Bluster responds, “Sure – Pick a jury of poor birds, who never saw more’n six dollars at
once in their lives – to guys like that, a man who’s made as much as Warbucks will be
guilty of everything in the book –“ (51).
R.C. Harvey points out that Warbucks’ framing at the hands of Phil O. Bluster
somewhat mirrors the trial of Chicago utilities magnate Samual Insull, who had been
arrested (like Warbucks) in 1934. “Daddy,” however, avoided many of the pitfalls that
landed Insull in such trouble. Harvey writes, “Warbucks refuses to save himself by
participating in a scheme that would bilk the public by selling them stock in his nowworthless company. And he carefully sets aside funds enough to pay income taxes on the
money earned before he went broke. In other words, Warbucks expects to pay taxes just
like everyone else does. He wants no special favors. He’s a regular guy. It’s a portrait
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clearly meant to refurbish the image of hard-working capitalists everywhere” (“Gray
Takes on the New Deal” iii). Here, Gray not only makes the New Deal seem as if it is run
by corrupt politicians but also that it makes unfair assumptions about the rich. If someone
like Warbucks can be honest with his tax money and generous when he has plenty, then
why would we trust politicians to give out aid instead of businessmen like him? Instead,
poor folks are often unreasonable and illogical in Gray’s economy, and as voters will
follow whichever leader fits their chosen narrative or plays into their own laziness.
If readers up to this point in the Depression had not been able to follow Gray’s
social commentary, which trades on well-worn narratives of laziness among the poor and
downtrodden, the story of the pygmies and the giants leaps from the page at the beginning
of September 1934. The story projects an assumption of the anti-wealthy masses in 1934
America, that they are merely pygmies with short memories and only hurt the rich because
they need to feel big themselves. Months and months after Warbucks’ incarceration, the
story brings readers up to allegorical speed as the story enters its resolving phase during
the four remaining months of the year. At times, Gray’s most biting critiques of the poor
come in the voice of Annie as she reads various books or newspapers while "Daddy" rots
in jail. Maw Green sends Annie a “Fairy Book” and Annie reads a marked story to an
attentive Sandy:
The bad giants made slaves of the pygmies and robbed the little people shamefully
– but there were many good giants who were kind to the pygmies – one good giant
was more kind and generous than all the rest - / But one day this kind giant tripped
and fell – now the pygmies should have remembered how good he was – but a
pygmy’s memory is as short as a pygmy – a very loud voiced pygmy leaped upon
the fallen giant and screamed that all giants were bad - / He screamed so loudly, all
the other pygmies decided he must be a great leader and they came in vast numbers
to hurt the giant – you see, it makes a pygmy feel very big to find he can hurt a
giant – but no matter how much he hurts a giant, he is still a pygmy. (104)
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Interestingly, the entire thrust of Gray’s critique relies on Warbucks’ innocence
and the ability of a small number of demagogues to ruin him. Because the saga is not
exactly based on any singular rich philanthropist, such as Samual Insull, going to jail, the
entire storyline points to what Warbucks represents being on trial. Gray is sure throughout
the 30s to fashion Warbucks as a hard worker, someone who makes his money by the
sweat of his brow rather than through the fortune of circumstance. He always works hard
and Annie’s thrift helps them save up to have nicer things. The Depression is bad enough
for the likes of Warbucks to weather, even without politicians making it increasingly
difficult. However while politicians certainly make it difficult for Oliver Warbucks, the
“pygmies” also appear to consist of leeches who do little work to take advantage of all
that’s offered. For example, the same day Warbucks finally finds a temporary job working
as a longshoreman (after his release from jail), a neighbor suggests that they could find a
way to not work and still live in their apartment. After throwing him out of the apartment,
Warbucks says, “I have no patience with a leech – I wish I could get a better job- but I’ll
not accept charity or aid while I have my two hands – I’ll take what I can get- I’ll not
cheat and I’ll not beg---yet-“ (141).
But of course, as readers know, Warbucks has begged before, and this rehashing of
the Warbucks boom and bust sequence seems to follow the magnate throughout the
Roosevelt years, reminding him that so long as “demagogues” are allowed to sway the socalled mass of leeches on society, his future only leads to the jail cell or destitution. The
Annie and Warbucks who conspired to help people throughout the city during the
Christmas of 1930, become, at the start of the New Deal, politicized symbolic heroes in
the perceived war against traditional American charity and philanthropy practices. After
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Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected to a third term in 1940, Gray killed Warbucks off
in the comic.
Conclusion: Modern Charity and Modern Conservatism
In an interview with CBS News commemorating the Chicago Tribune’s decision to
pull Little Orphan Annie indefinitely, Jeet Heer refers to Annie as “the original Tea
Partier.” More recently, Heer has reflected on the similarities between Donald Trump’s
public persona and “Daddy” Warbucks, a feat that would seem gimmicky if it were not so
well-reasoned:
the unmistakable [face] of right-wing populism in America. He was a billionaire with
the common touch, whose rough-hewn vocabulary was rich in slang and invective.
The fact that he was one of the richest men in America didn’t prevent him from
becoming the voice of the ordinary person. He liked steak and potatoes rather than
fancy French fare, and was more at ease with roughnecks than high-society types.
He’d gone bankrupt more than once, but that just reinforced his reputation as a
fighter, a tough guy who could handle himself in a world of sharks and killers. A
big, bulky mesomorph, this billionaire was also a he-man who didn’t have time for
the genteel euphemisms of politicians and bureaucrats. His slogan was “America
first”—which meant a muscular, unilateral foreign policy that included torturing
and killing the enemies of the United States. His greatest worry was that the
vigorous strength that made America great was waning…I am of course speaking of
Oliver ‘“Daddy”’ Warbucks” (“Donald Trump, Superhero” par. 1)
Just as Gray retained some of his populism from the 1920s, then combined that sentiment
with a fierce anti- liberalism throughout the Depression, so Donald Trump has made use
of that combination in order to fashion himself as a mythical paternal business tycoon.
This season of post-2016 US presidential politics, according to Heer’s reading of
American conservatism, is not particularly new.
The multifarious discussions of Gray’s conservatism (or Conservative Populism or
Progressive Republicanism or Libertarianism) would seem to characterize private
charity’s importance in the comic strip as part and parcel of his perhaps over-documented
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political beliefs. Of course Gray cared about charity; he abhorred most forms of public aid.
However, this would assume that conservatism determines a political orientation to private
charity rather than the opposite prospect, that charity as a legitimizing American cultural
narrative helped spur on conservatives’ anxiety over the Welfare State, an anxiety which
survives to this day.
Importantly, more recent iterations of the Annie narrative, especially 1977’s
Annie: The Musical, place the Depression front and center. In their musical distillation of
Annie’s oeuvre, Charles Strouse, Martin Charnin, and Thomas Meehan also dramatize the
relationship between politics and charitable action. However, Gray’s adapters do so by
fundamentally realigning Annie’s political axis. Rather than constantly finding himself at
the mercy of political demagogues during the Depression, “Daddy” Warbucks is now
running for Mayor of New York and reluctantly acquires Annie, at the insistence of his
staff, as a way to cultivate his image for voters. As we have seen, Gray attacked this kind
of instrumental shaping of public perception with extreme prejudice; these are the
workings of insincere demagogues like Phil O. Bluster and Claude Claptrap. Additionally,
instead of reinforcing Harold Gray’s belief in rugged individualism, the musical has a
group of Hooverville residents sing, “In ev’ry pot he said ‘a chicken’ / But Herbert
Hoover he forgot / Not only don’t we have the chicken / We ain’t got the pot” (Strouse
and Charnin “We’d Like to Thank you, Herbert Hoover”). And in perhaps the most
shocking reversal to Harold Gray’s vision, the musical ends with a visit to the Warbucks
mansion from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, where he and the cast sing “A New
Deal for Christmas” and “Tomorrow” in a grand finale. The President whose fourth
election in 1940 occasioned “Daddy” Warbucks’ untimely demise in Gray’s comic strip
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thus finds inspiration from young Annie to bring America out of its Great Depression with
a newly-minted Welfare State. Lyricist Martin Charnin explained, “We chose to make
Warbucks a patriot…Warbucks sacrificed everything for this little kid. And if that
sacrifice meant collaborating with his enemy—and his greatest enemy could only be
FDR—That is the grandest gesture that Warbucks would make. Politics and orphans make
strange bedfellows” (qtd. in Smith 96).
This hopefulness for bipartisan harmony between big business and liberal
Presidents actually made all the sense in the world at the musical’s opening in 1977, the
Carter Administration’s inaugural year and the first year after the US Bicentennial. Carter
had campaigned throughout 1976 promising to introduce welfare reform during his first
year in office, and his delivery on that promise, the Better Jobs and Income Act, was
defeated easily in Congress during Carter’s one-term, unpopular presidency. Whereas
Harold Gray’s Warbucks expressed his patriotism by encouraging his adoptive daughter to
give to the poor and fight political demagoguery, Charnin and Meehan’s “Daddy”
Warbucks believed Annie when she sang “The sun will come out tomorrow,” but only
after we get a “New Deal for Christmas.” This patriotic reversal is particularly ironic when
one considers that four years later, Ronald Reagan would win the American presidency in
part by appealing to John Winthrop’s “A Model of Christian Charity”:
I know I have told before of the moment in 1630 when the tiny ship Arabella
bearing settlers to the New World lay off the Massachusetts coast. To the little
bank of settlers gathered on the deck John Winthrop said: we shall be a city upon a
hill…We celebrated our 200th anniversary as a nation a short time ago. Fireworks
exploded over Boston harbor, Arthur Fiedler conducted, thousands cheered and
waved Old Glory. These were not just images of a bicentennial; they were
reminders of our birthright of freedom and of generous, fervent patriotism that
burns in America. (“Election Eve Address: A Vision for America”)
The California gubernatorial candidate for whom Harold Gray voted in 1966 went on to
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give his first Presidential Inaugural Address on what would have been the cartoonist’s 84th
birthday.
Although Reagan, who claimed to always read the comics before the rest of his
daily newspaper20, said many times that Charlie Brown was his favorite comic strip, as
President he brought to fruition the union-busting, pro-business, anti-taxation America
Harold Gray envisioned for his characters for some forty years. For the Republican
Revolution of Ronald Reagan as for disciples of today’s emergent Trumpian populism, a
model of Christian charity was always more patriotic than a New Deal for Christmas.
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See Tim Stanley’s “The Charlie Brown Cartoon that Haunted Reagan” in Catholic Herald 14 March
2019.
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CHAPTER 3
Tuskegee Machine Charity: Du Bois, Ellison, and Scientific Philanthropy
All of the developments discussed thus far—Progressive Era Philanthropy, The
Great Depression, the New Deal, the 501(c) Tax Code Revision—came about during the
Jim Crow Era. Not unlike private philanthropy’s failure to address the rise in
unemployment during the early Great Depression, the New Deal dampened but came far
short of stopping substandard housing, hunger, and unequal access to education and
medical services among Black Americans. Going even further to underscore this failure,
Ira Katznelson notes that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt “pursued a strategy of
pragmatic forgetfulness with regard to racial matters” in order to secure the votes of
Southern Democrats needed for the administration’s marquee legislation: the Social
Security Act, the National Housing Act, The Banking Act of 1935, among others (168).
No historian would deny that the New Deal made life better for many (or perhaps even
most) African Americans, but it did so for want of any substantial recognition of the ways
that Jim Crow’s preservation under the New Deal “offered the South a chance to escape its
colonized status while keeping its racial order safe” (Katznelson 152).
Scientific Philanthropy refers to the systematic approach to philanthropic
enterprise that emerged after the Civil War and increased in prominence throughout the
Progressive Era. As Jeremy Beer explains, what historians call “scientific philanthropy”
developed from a variety of sources but, primarily, came from religious leaders who,
inspired by Andrew Carnegie’s call for “discriminate giving” in “The Gospel of
Wealth”(1889), became determined to administer their charitable organizations more
judiciously:
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Just as certain religious dogmas had to be abandoned in the face of scientific
advances, leading to a more reasonable and modern Christianity, so did traditional
charity need to be reformulated in the face of what science had to say in the social
realm. Thus reform- minded religious leaders actively helped lead the movement
to replace charity with scientific philanthropy through organizations such as the
National Conference of Charities and Correction (NCCC). (The Philanthropic
Revolution 1007)
The founding of the NCCC, Robert Bremner demonstrates, began a trend in philanthropic
organizing that would ultimately result in many states adopting welfare boards to help
regulate and oversee these efforts. These “boards began the work of policing almshouses,
insane asylums, orphanages, and schools for the blind and deaf…The care of the
burdensome classes, burdensome enough in normal times, became an even more serious
problem when periods of depression vastly increased the number of people needing and
demanding assistance” (American Philanthropy 96). Bremner notably includes quotation
marks in the title of his chapter on “’Scientific Philanthropy,’” and while more idiomatic
in the time of American Philanthropy’s publication, his reference of “the burdensome
classes” reveals the extent that organizations such as the NCCC, committed to finding
more efficiency in their efforts, were still dedicated to the “moral corrective” function
performed by many benevolence organizations in the 19th Century. If practitioners of
“scientific philanthropy,” as Judith Sealander notes, believed they “should find a remedy
for a disease, rather than build a hospital to treat its victims,” these leaders also relied on
the same logic that had produced a scientific field to “expose the hereditary explanations
for human behavior” (Rosen 14). The eugenics movement, as a result of scientific
philanthropy’s drive to cure the disease of human disadvantage, latched onto efforts to
invest philanthropic dollars wisely.
The New Deal put into bureaucratic practice a view held by scientific

76

philanthropists that solving social problems was more important than simply relieving
their symptoms. In this respect, however, what was at that time called “the Negro
Problem” proved particularly incomprehensible. “The Negro Problem’s” lack of definition
came about not only because appeasement of the southern bloc was crucial to Roosevelt’s
legislative agenda but also because there was not one problem singularly identified by a
majority of white legislators that encapsulated the whole of the concept. “The Negro
Problem” was not, like unemployment or hunger, seen as just one problem, and the New
Deal’s focus became less on solving the amorphous problem than on defining what,
exactly, the problem was in the first place. As one LIFE Magazine article during the latter
Depression years reads, “Every white man knows there is a Negro Problem. But few know
the Negro” (49).
This disavowal evinces a notable problem with “The Negro Problem,” and in
particular philanthropic attempts to address it. How can one solve a problem one cannot
(or perhaps even willfully does not) understand? Rather than look at racial disadvantage
during the late Jim Crow Era as a collection of different group experiences maintained by
the larger phenomenon of US white supremacy, social scientists and policymakers
developed a nebulous catch-all phrase that meant everything and nothing all at once. “The
Negro Problem,”21 in reality, was—and is—white supremacy, and the assumption that
“The Negro Problem” cannot be solved was fueled by scientific philanthropy’s consistent
emphasis on a procedural, investment-driven approach to giving aid. To frame a human
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To be clear, in using the term throughout this chapter, I do not affirm a reading of “The Negro Problem”
as a discernible scientific phenomenon that amounts to an object of knowledge. “The Negro Problem,” I
argue instead, was an ideological construction that served as a placeholder for real action in benefit of Black
Americans. In other words, while “the Negro Problem” as a concept pervaded midcentury racial discourse in
the US and held a set of meanings in that regard, I use it here primarily as a historical construction that
matched philanthropy’s impulse to “solve” problems instead of, like charity, alleviate symptoms.
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being as a problem is always to leave open the likelihood that the problem cannot be
solved and, further, that the framer wishes the problem would go away. “What does it feel
like to be a problem?” Du Bois’s famous question from The Souls of Black Folk is
sometimes credited with popularizing “The Negro Problem” itself, though the term was
first formulated in W. Cabell Bruce’s eponymous 1891 tract. Although Du Bois was
arguably the most accomplished and widely published social scientist of his generation, he
asked his question less as a way to affirm African Americans’ status as “problems” and
more to rhetorically gesture toward the injustice that such a question even need be asked.
African American intellectuals at midcentury, closing in on the centennial of
emancipation, had a number of reasons to be suspicious of philanthropy. For one thing,
philanthropy as a phenomenon developed largely in response to black poverty in the wake
of failed Reconstruction efforts. For another, many of the pioneers of scientific
philanthropy were also committed eugenicists, and the educational programs prescribed by
philanthropists were often based on eugenic principles. Northern white philanthropy was
also often met by the same fear of “being a charity case,” which came with it a fear of
being “beholden” to a giver. Moving into the Cold War, the notion of an inherently
charitable American character was also complicated by the surviving paternalist racial
politics of that era. As Mary Dudziak writes, “The purpose of the war [WWII] would
leave its victors with new obligations. And if the war was, at least in part, a battle against
racism, then racial segregation and disenfranchisement seemed to belie the great sacrifices
the war had wrought” (Cold War Civil Rights 12). When a scientific philanthropist
committed funds to a given cause or institution, beneficiaries found themselves beholden
to their benefactors’ motives, motives which might or might not trade heavily in white
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supremacist ideology. After all, accepting charity, as we have seen, always occasions a
recognition of inequality, but not all recipients of white philanthropy thought political
equality was a particularly good idea.
The first black influencer to leverage white philanthropy at a large scale was
Booker T. Washington, whose partnerships with Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller,
and Julius Rosenwald are among the most studied in histories of American philanthropy.22
Harnessing each benefactor’s different charitable approaches, Washington was able to
build thousands of schools throughout the South and endow the Tuskegee Institute in
perpetuity. For W.E.B. Du Bois, these partnerships were problematic, because after a few
years Washington had amassed such a swell of support that white northern philanthropists
would only lend their support for various race- related betterment projects if the Tuskegee
President offered a letter of support.
I want to suggest in this chapter that two writers of different generations confront
this context through a sustained engagement with scientific philanthropy and “The Negro
Problem” at midcentury. Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952) builds on W.E.B. Du
Bois’s critique of philanthropy in Dusk of Dawn: An Autobiography of a Race Concept
(1940). Further, by populating their texts with the awkward interface between white
benefactors and their black recipients, Du Bois and Ellison both render the statistical
behemoth of “the Negro Problem” in humanistic terms which return philanthropy—a
modern bureaucratic practice thanks to the example of both scientific philanthropy and the
New Deal—to its moral, individualized rootedness in a larger tradition of charity and
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See Robert Bremner’s American Philanthropy (Chicago UP, 1966), Olivier Zunz’s Philanthropy in
America: A History (Princeton 2012), and Stephanie Deutsch’s You Need a Schoolhouse: Booker T.
Washington, Julius Rosenwald, and the Building of Schools for the Segregated South (Northwestern UP,
2015).
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voluntarism Alexis de Toqueville identified as unique to American democracy. A guiding
antagonist for both Du Bois and Ellison was, of course, Booker T. Washington.
Washington’s legacy of partnering with northern philanthropists and using his institute as
a research hub to drive charitable investment had endured into the Mid- Twentieth
Century, even though the Tuskegee Institute’s patriarch had died in 1915. Du Bois in Dusk
of Dawn called this enduring figuration The Tuskegee Machine, and this chapter will
demonstrate how Ellison similarly chooses Washington’s legacy as the fulcrum for his
ruminations on philanthropy in Invisible Man.
Du Bois’s critique does reveal the extent to which the “great tradition” of
American Philanthropy had been permeated with the ideals of scientific philanthropy by
the time he writes Souls of Black Folk and, even, remained through the late Thirties when
he sits down to write Dusk of Dawn. Ellison demonstrates his alignment with Du Bois’s
critique of the Tuskegee Machine primarily through Invisible Man’s “State College for
Negroes,” an analog to the Tuskegee Institute, which operates in the shadow of its
Founder, long dead but remembered each year by visits from philanthropic northern
trustees for Founder’s Day. Ellison finished his novel twelve years after Dusk of Dawn’s
release, but the young writer had already begun to consider philanthropy, Washington, and
“The Negro Problem” early in his career, particularly in his unpublished review of Gunnar
Myrdal’s An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. Ellison
joins Du Bois in his diagnosis that white philanthropy too heavily relied on the legacy of
Booker T. Washington to maintain that field’s moral legitimacy and continued
prominence in political discourse. By discussing Dusk of Dawn and drawing connections
between Invisible Man and Du Bois, I argue that Ellison uses Du Bois’s critique of
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philanthropy in order to mediate the conflict between white moral responsibility for black
suffering and the US’s nationally-infused acquiescence to the “great tradition” of private
charity, particularly as morphed into scientific philanthropy during the Progressive Era.
Philanthropy, Ellison’s novel suggests, simultaneously funds the invisible man’s
betterment while also contributing to his invisibility. In this way, private charity
contributes to Ellison’s stated project in the novel to deal with the complex moral
consequences of the “Negro Problem.”
What Does it Feel Like to [Solve] a Problem?
Two years after its dissolution, the New Deal Works Progress Administration’s
(WPA) attempt to document “The Negro Problem” culminated in Horace Cayton and St.
Clair Drake’s Black Metropolis. Featuring an introduction penned “with a sense of keen
pride” by Richard Wright, Cayton and Drake’s sociological history of Chicago’s
Depression Era South Side used legions of graphs and demographic statistics to account
for, among other phenomena, the effect the Second Great Migration (taking place during
the early Depression) had had on Bronzeville, the hub of black cultural expression in
Chicago. Cayton and Drake write: “With the collapse of cotton tenancy in the South, and
because of discrimination in the dispensing of relief and emergency employment,
thousands of Negroes set out for Chicago...Yet, as during the [first] Great Migration, only
the politicians really welcomed the migrants--in 1915 the Republicans; in the Thirties, the
Democrats, for by 1936 Black Metropolis was a ‘New Deal Town’” (88).
Chicago’s status as a “New Deal town” had less to do with an overflow of
affection for the Roosevelt Administration than with economic necessity. According to the
Cook County Relief Office, by “1939 four out of every ten persons on relief were
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Negroes, and five out of every ten Negro families were dependent upon some type of
government aid for their subsistence” (Black Metropolis 88).
Responding to statistical claims such as these in Black Metropolis, Richard Wright
warns in an early instance of reductio ad Hitlerum that the conditions on Chicago’s South
Side were analogous to the “very conditions of life that nurtured Hitler,” those
unacknowledged “Seed-beds of revolution” (xxiv). Cayton and Drake saw their work as
the realization of Du Boisian social analysis, a research-driven narrative of black life in a
particular place and time that took the economic and political contingencies of Bronzeville
at face value. However, Wright the novelist, a year removed from Communist Party
membership and now living in Paris, saw in Black Metropolis potential cannon fodder for
a fascistic diagnosis of social ills. Wright implies that Bigger Thomas, his protagonist in
Native Son (1940), might have been able to grow into a sort of African American Adolf
Hitler. The hopelessness perceived in Wright’s oft-noted early naturalism is here fueled by
a sobering prospect. At the end of the Great Depression, an artist’s best chance at social
impact was perhaps to describe the problem as completely as possible so as to make as
clear as possible to readers that such a condition could never actually be solved. A study
such as Black Metropolis, from this view, proves more damning to philanthropic
possibility than illuminating to its purpose. Created with the mandate of scientific
philanthropy and the New Deal that to better understand the Negro Problem is to more
likely solve it, Wright reframes the study in tragic naturalistic terms. “If, in reading my
novel, Native Son, you doubted the reality of Bigger Thomas,” he writes, “then examine
the delinquency rates cited in this book; if, in reading my autobiography, Black Boy, you
doubted the picture of family life shown there, then study the figures on family
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disorganization given here” (Black Metropolis xix). Even five years after Native Son’s
release, Bronzeville had not left the Depression behind.
Here a paradox emerges concerning the black literary response to white
philanthropy after the Depression. If Mr. Dalton in Wright’s Native Son, for example,
represents a dual commitment to liberalism and short-sighted philanthropic practice, then
the marriage of those two ideas in the New Deal would seem to mark American
Philanthropy’s failure not only to solve structural racism but also its tendency to
instrumentalize human suffering. Ostensibly, Wright in his Black Metropolis foreword
refers to his first novel’s realism in order to achieve a similar goal as philanthropic
appeals: a scientific understanding of the problem so that they might better see what needs
to be solved. After all, Black Metropolis is a landmark work of urban sociology; Native
Son was at that time the most successful novel ever published by a person of color in the
US. Considered alongside Wright’s naturalist literary representations, studies of the Negro
Problem such as Black Metropolis (1945), Wright’s own 12 Million Black Voices (1941),
or Gunnar Myrdal’s Carnegie-funded economic epic An American Dilemma: The Negro
Problem and Modern Democracy (1944) all indicate a sense that both philanthropy and
the New Deal had by midcentury not done enough to alleviate black poverty. Given the
amount of resources that had gone into better understanding “the Negro Problem” as an
American tragedy, what sort of artistic representation would bridge the gap between better
understanding the problem and determining how to address it? Whatever the prescription,
there seemed an agreement that one could not move forward without a critique of the
scientific descriptiveness of the elusive “Negro Problem.”
A young Ralph Ellison, in his unpublished review of Gunnar Myrdal’s An
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American Dilemma, sees merit in the aspiration of Myrdal’s exhaustive study but cautions
his readers of the work’s avoidance of morality. In particular, Ellison refers to the
obligation of “American social science to the Negro Problem,” which eventually acquired
a “role beneath its illusionary non-concern with values, …to reconcile the practical
morality of American capitalism with the ideal morality of the American Creed” (Review
of An American Dilemma 329). Ellison does observe, however, that Myrdal’s imperfect
study is at least not as racist as other sociological writing. Ellison here and later in the
review applies the label “vicious non-scientific nonsense” rather pointedly to the work of
Robert E. Park, founder of the Chicago School of Sociology and a colleague of
Washington at Tuskegee for a dozen years. Like Richard Wright in his introduction to
Black Metropolis, Ellison makes his own comparisons between the Negro Problem and
Nazism. Unlike Wright, however, Ellison uses the comparison to discredit the social
science he discusses. Reacting to Park’s claim that the Negro “is, so to speak, the lady
among races,” Ellison says, “Park’s descriptive metaphor is so pregnant with mixed
motives as to birth a thousand compromises and indecisions. Imagine the effect such
teachings have had upon Negro students alone! Thus what started as part of a democratic
attitude, ends not only uncomfortably close to the preachings [sic] of Sumner, but to those
of Dr. Goebbels as well” (331). Myrdal, for Ellison, not only moves beyond eugenicist
assumptions about racial biology but also recognizes the threat such ideology poses to
American democracy.
Ellison’s review of An American Dilemma also occasioned his most vivid
reflection on “the Negro Problem” as a moral dilemma, a characterization that stood in
stark contrast to social science’s empirical project. For Ellison, Myrdal’s greatest
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achievement is that he “shows…the Negro’s strongest weapon in pressing his claims: his
hold upon the moral consciousness of Northern whites” (330). Because Ellison (and Du
Bois before him) inextricably link the furthering of social science with philanthropy, his
critique of social science implies an extended concern with philanthropy’s complicity in
the transformation of the “moral consciousness of Northern whites” away from what
Ellison saw as Frederick Douglass’s unification of “the moral and political factions for the
anti-slavery struggle” (332). Ellison, nearly plagiarizing Du Bois’s Dusk of Dawn in the
process, claims that the North assailed this hold in that it “promoted Negro education in
the South; it controlled his economic and political destiny, or allowed the South to do so;
it built Booker T. Washington into a national spokesman of Negroes with the Tuskegee
Institute as his seat of power, and it organized social science as an instrumentality to
sanction its methods” (330). Following Du Bois, Ellison holds Tuskegee responsible for
instrumentalizing the moral consciousness or northern whites and, in so doing,
undercutting “the Negro’s strongest weapon” (330).
In this respect, however, Ellison’s reading of the Carnegie Foundation’s
involvement in An American Dilemma proves curious. Responding to Carnegie
Foundation chair F.P. Keppel’s foreword to the study, Ellison says, “One thing…is clear:
a need was felt for a new ideological approach to the Negro Problem” (332). Herein lies a
difficulty for Ellison: he recognizes that questions of “sincerity” at the heart of critiques of
philanthropy are inappropriate for both Marxism and New Deal liberalism because they
are unavoidably concerned with power. Ellison writes, “if there is any insincerity here, it
lies in the failure of these groups to make the best of their own interests by basing their
alliances with Negroes upon more scientific knowledge of the subtleties of negro-white
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relations” (334). A conflict emerges for Ellison. Washington has depoliticized efforts to
end “the Negro Problem” through his instrumental alliance with philanthropy and
sociology, but the most robust political responses to “the Negro Problem” for Ellison have
been from Marxists and New Deal liberals, whose actions are marred at every turn by the
need for political movements to acquire power, and thus find propagandistic use for their
engagement with black Americans. In so doing, Tuskegee Machine philanthropy, Ellison
implies, dehumanizes African Americans, but Marxists and Liberals have done similarly
by making political and propagandistic use of their own efforts. The appeal to
“insincerity,” moreover, shows that questions of moral intentionality fuel critiques of such
philanthropy. As Lionel Trilling would argue later of sincerity’s modern conceptual status,
“If sincerity has lost its former status…that is because it does not propose being true to
one’s own self as an end but only as a means” (Sincerity and Authenticity 8).
Philanthropy’s political usefulness, in other words, provides the cause for its suspicion.
The question, for the reviewer, becomes whose efforts were the least suspicious. Ellison’s
choice to focus on “social pathology” calls back to the impetus in philanthropy to “solve
disease instead of treat symptoms.” By critiquing a study set in motion by the conditions
of capitalistic philanthropy, Ellison sees himself enacting the sort of Marxist analysis23 he
sees missing in Myrdal’s study. As Kenneth Warren writes, “But the notion of the Negro
Problem as a disease itself (rather than a symptom of capitalism) also undergirds the
novelist’s critique of social science. After all, his chief suspicion of An American Dilemma
23

For further discussion of Ellison’s Marxist sympathies during his early career, see Charles “Pete” BannerHaley’s “Ralph Ellison and the Invisibility of the Black Intellectual: Historical Reflections on Invisible
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Lumpenproletariat, the Folk, and the Revolution” (African American Review 14:4, 2014)
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centers on the possibility that such a thorough study could actually be seen as ‘the
blueprint for a more effective exploitation of the South’s natural, industrial, and human
resources.’ We use the term ‘exploitation’ in both the positive and negative sense. In the
positive sense it is the key to a more democratic and fruitful usage of the South’s natural
and human resources; in the negative, it is the plan for a more efficient and subtle
manipulation of black and white relations, especially in the South” (So Black and Blue
337). Ellison sees An American Dilemma as the “most sincere” effort to understand the
Negro Problem scientifically, but it may also prove to be an effective replacement for the
sort of sociological/philanthropic partnerships he damns at the outset of the review.
Chicago School Sociology was obviously not Ellison’s only concern with such a
worry about “exploitation.” Andrew Carnegie, after all, had also provided funding for a
number of eugenics-based studies at the turn of the century through the Carnegie
Institution, a science- based arm of the Carnegie Foundation based in Washington, D.C.
The Institution sponsored Charles Benedict Davenport’s Heredity in Relation to Eugenics
(1911) and underwrote Davenport’s ERO (Eugenics Record Office) and the Station for
Experimental Evolution until as late as 1939. At that point, the Carnegie board determined
to defund the ERO when Adolf Hitler’s affection for eugenics became a clear motivator
for the Third Reich’s “final solution” (Singleton). When Ellison sees a direct line from
Robert Park to the Carnegie Foundation to Goebbels, in other words, the stakes are not
purely philosophical. Ellison worries that the scientification of black suffering that had
done much to halt any substantial progress in solving “the Negro Problem” could mutate
into a heavily-funded white fascism in the United States. He wonders why Myrdal does
not appear to share the same fear.
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Du Bois’s Socio-Moral Autobiography
Ellison was not the first to notice the fraught charity politics enacted by white
northern philanthropists toward solving the unsolvable “Negro Problem,” and the stakes
for such an argument were brought into the midcentury by the man who had spent decades
fighting to complicate the “problem” at every turn. Four years before Ellison’s review,
W.E.B. Du Bois’s Dusk of Dawn: An Autobiography of a Race Concept (1940) offered a
more sustained two- pronged reflection on philanthropy and sociology. The late
Depression years coincided with Du Bois’s retirement after five decades of theorizing
concepts that still predominate discussions of race in America: the veil, double
consciousness, the talented tenth, the emphasis on political equality over self-betterment,
and even, as Kwame Anthony Appiah has argued, identity itself.24 Dusk of Dawn certainly
chronicles the ins and outs of Du Bois’s second major career transition from the NAACP
and editing The Crisis to his latter emphasis on Pan Africanism and black solidarity that
would eventually motivate his expatriation to Ghana. However, the book also charts an
important Post-Depression critical intervention that looks backward through the early
twentieth century in order to better explain the relationship between black life and
philanthropy.
The second of Du Bois’s three autobiographies,25 Dusk of Dawn has received
significantly less attention than his somewhat more artful 1920 work Darkwater: Voices
from Beyond the Veil. Kenneth Warren, in What was African American Literature?, uses
Dusk of Dawn to illustrate that Du Bois, and other black intellectuals of the early Jim
24
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Crow Era, “posit an American ideological machine so powerful in its capacity to change
its citizens into soulless automatons that, paradoxically, its most obvious victims turn out
to hold within themselves the only hope for its redemption” (180-181). As a somber
reflection on The Souls of Black Folk, Dusk of Dawn indicates, for Warren, that “the deep
significance of Du Bois's life hinges less on his contribution to the resolution of the
problem26 than on his being part of a problem that it appears will be around for a long,
long time” (176-177). Instead of advancing his ideas or reframing them in terms of
midcentury politics, Du Bois, Warren argues, instead merely elegizes the failure of his
life’s work. Kathryn Lindberg locates Dusk of Dawn’s cyclical elegy for the “Problem’s”
persistence in Du Bois’s education in German idealism: “Wherever we arrest Du Bois's
progress toward representative status, we encounter a perpetually renewable Hegelian
formula lurking behind still potent self and social constructions” (411). Dana Williams
reflects on her experiences teaching Dusk of Dawn at Howard University after the 2014
murder of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Instead of highlighting Dusk of Dawn’s
reflective components, Williams instead draws attention to the sections where Du Bois
reveals a “path forward” through political strategies less concerned with scientifically
explaining how structural white supremacy produces systemic inequality. “What Du Bois
suggested in 1940 is no less true in 2015: the problem of the future is in charting a way
forward and not so much in identifying the reality that is” (219). In charting a way forward
for Black American liberation in 1940, Du Bois worried the movement would maintain an
over-reliance on philanthropy that, as Warren suggests, has not solved “the Problem.”
26

In Dusk of Dawn, Du Bois replaces “the problem of the color line” with the more abstract, ill-defined
“Problem” (sometimes capitalized, sometimes not) that, Du Bois believes, signifies a “race concept” more
complex than he could have imagined when he wrote The Souls of Black Folk in 1903 nor, he surmises, at
any other point in his career prior to leaving his editorial post at The Crisis.
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W.E.B. Du Bois argues that the alliance of his rival Booker T. Washington with
Northern and Midwestern philanthropists had grown to the point of profound political
control, “the Tuskegee Machine.”27 At century’s turn, Du Bois writes, “Tuskegee became
a vast information bureau and center of advice...After a time almost no Negro institution
could collect funds without the recommendation or acquiescence of Mr. Washington”
(36). Having focused more on Washington’s “general philosophy” as expressed in Up
from Slavery in 1905’s The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois thirty-five years later claims that
he chose not to include a sustained account of Washington’s philanthropic alliances
because in so doing he would have done irreparable damage to his ability to garner
finances for his own work. He also makes it clear that he was not the only prospective
grantee affected by Tuskegee. Du Bois explains the Tuskegee Machine through both his
awkward experiences with wealthy white men and his dissatisfaction with African
American institutions’ inability to sustain their own efforts to curb black poverty and
disadvantage. The Talented Tenth, for Du Bois, was not only about the accumulation of
political power but also his sense that “their knowledge of modern culture” and the
flourishing of “ethical teaching, character building, and organized charity and
neighborliness” could “guide the American Negro into a higher civilization” (101).
Interestingly, such a structure would mirror the benevolence system of aristocratic
27

I am grateful to Martyn Bone for pointing out to me that Du Bois appears not to have been the first to
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virtue- centered charity, because just as Du Bois emphasizes the need for African
Americans to take control of their own economic lives as participants in the modern
economy (and importantly not Tuskegee tradesman), he admits that if achieved, the
newfound power of the Talented Tenth would need to reinvigorate those benevolent black
institutions, such as the church, which “does immense amounts of needed works of charity
and mercy among the poor; but…lacks funds” (101).
Du Bois locates the inept moral capacity of white elites in their general failure over
time to move beyond the Tuskegee Machine model, even after Washington’s death in
1915 up until the late Depression. Furthermore, because of philanthropy’s persistent
interest in solving problems at a large scale, Du Bois’s call to move toward political
propaganda and action falls on the deaf ears of those interested in large-scale studies of
“the Negro Problem,” a locus of social analysis fueled ironically by Du Bois himself at a
time (the Progressive Era) when most philanthropists, he reminds us, found such studies to
be rather beside the point.
Du Bois devotes quite a lot of attention in Dusk of Dawn’s early chapters to his
attempts to garner funds from various charitable organizations and philanthropists. In
particular, he recounts the founding of the Slater Fund in 1882 and his hopes to secure
funding to finish his studies in Europe. Despite the young Du Bois’s obvious intellect and
promise at Harvard, more professionalized modern charity funds such as Slater, steeped in
the rhetoric of scientific philanthropy, did not recognize Du Bois as a viable investment
because aid to black education had until that point not focused on graduate study but
predominately small “missionary schools” throughout the south. The reflective social
scientist relishes his rhetorical persistence toward the “unfortunate chairman” of the fund,
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R.B. Hayes. Hayes had in November published a piece in the Boston Herald in which he
intoned that the fund had yet to receive any appeal from a black student with “talent for art
or literature or any special aptitude for study” (Dusk of Dawn 21). The Slater Board,
regrettably, had only so far heard from black “orators” who did not fit the fund’s criteria.
Du Bois found himself rejected after having “literally deluged” the chair’s office with
letters on his behalf from various Harvard officials and professors (including William
James and George Santayana). Du Bois further responded to Hayes, after receiving a letter
from the chair of “apologetic mood,” questioning the man’s honor and “described him as
nothing less than impudent and flatly accused him of bad faith” (21). This move ultimately
won the day for Du Bois, and upon receiving the funds to travel the young graduate
student indulged himself in the purchase of a $3 shirt (roughly $100 in today’s money).
To further illustrate the Tuskegee Machine’s effects on researchers, Du Bois pairs
his own accounts with the story of a driven young man named Will Benson who had made
plans to “use his father’s Alabama farm and fortune to build a Negro town and
independent economic unit in the South” (37). When Washington’s office failed to offer
their recommendation to northern philanthropists interested in helping fund the Alabama
project, Benson eventually “died of overwork, worry, and a broken heart” (37). Later,
when Du Bois appealed to Carnegie for an endowment to fund Atlanta University’s
Conference on Race Relations, he did not receive a dime in support for lack of
Washington’s endorsement. Andrew Carnegie would only consent to give to Du Bois’s
work “indirectly” through a study of “the history of economic cooperation among
Negroes” overseen by Mississippi planter and white supremacist Alfred Holt Sloan (Dusk
of Dawn 42). Feeling forced to follow the money, Du Bois chose to contribute to this
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study of a topic he had very little interest in to see if he might find some future favor with
Carnegie or other investors. Because it disagreed with Stone’s general finding that African
Americans were incapable of economic cooperation, Du Bois’s portion of the study was
never published (ibid). Du Bois’s status as a “persona non grata to powerful interests,”
(47) a status he credits solely to his beef with Booker T. Washington, eventually led him
to resign from Atlanta University so that the school would be able to raise money for its
other programs.
However much the autobiography helpfully elaborates on the Washington/Du Bois
feud on the grounds of philanthropy, though, Dusk of Dawn also marks the moment when
its author decided that desegregation was not as important to racial uplift as his employers
and comrades, the NAACP, seemed to think. In fact, the book’s most staggering
realization in relation to Washington is that Du Bois, forty years later, has yielded his
opponent’s point that political desegregation will not ultimately bring about prosperity for
Black Americans. Rather, African American capital, for Du Bois, should be consolidated
within American communities of color.
Rather than focus on statistical analysis or political arguments, Du Bois allows the
autobiographical mode to present his journey through the Tuskegee Machine. Even
th

further, the text’s literary insights, as Appiah has argued, draw from the legacy of 19
Century slave narratives. In Du Bois’s modern rendering of the slave narrative,

abolitionism has been replaced with the amorphous yet dynamic construction of “the
Negro Problem,” resulting not from a unified phenomenon like slavery—echoing Ellison’s
allusion to the moral unity of abolitionism in his review of Myrdal—but Jim Crow
America instead. After 30 years at the helm of Crisis, Du Bois still seems worried that
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something like the Tuskegee Machine will continue in the wake of the New Deal’s
stalemate with Southern lawmakers on segregation. It seemed reasonable to Du Bois that
black researchers and social entrepreneurs would return to the well of white philanthropy,
perhaps without the benefit of knowing the role northern charitable interests played in his
epochal public feud with Washington. The political stakes of that conflict were wellknown and well-heeded; philanthropy’s role remained less acknowledged at a time when
public intellectuals seemed more concerned with directing and debating tax revenue and
whether or not the US should fight Hitler in Germany.
Du Bois posits that philanthropy occupies a crucial role in the debate over racial
uplift between Du Boisian political equality and Washington’s program of gradual
economic assimilation. The fact that both Du Bois and Ellison take on philanthropy in
their respective coming-of-age texts demonstrates the persistence of scientific
philanthropy in American race relations at midcentury. Du Bois at various points even
suggests that as of 1940 any economic prosperity is so important to racial progress that he
insists on relinquishing an emphasis on political equality and desegregation in order to
comply with philanthropy’s outstretched hand, especially that of the Russell Sage and
Rosenwald Foundations from whom he accepted help even late in his career. Du Bois had
come to this conclusion in response to a very specific case which found him on the side of
white philanthropy and not desegregation. In 1931, the Rosenwald Foundation had started
to shift much of its investment from southern black education to establishing black
hospitals. Louis Wright, a prominent surgeon in Harlem and a friend of Du Bois’s, had
excoriated the foundation, insisting (in Du Bois’s words) that “what ought to be done was
to insist in season and out that Negroes be admitted to medical schools and hospital
practice without regard to color” (154). Du Bois, personally disagreeing with his friend,
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was “heart and soul with the Rosenwald Fund,” concluding that “what Negroes need is
hospital treatment now; and what Negro physicians need is hospital practice; and to meet
their present need, poor hospitals are better than none; segregated hospitals are better than
those where the Negro patients are neglected or relegated to the cellar” (154). He goes on
to say, “[Negroes] may dislike it; they may and ought to protest against it; nevertheless it
will remain for a long time their only path to health, to education, to economic survival”
(154). Du Bois ultimately sees that last point of “economic survival” as necessary for the
development of Pan African solidarity, and his transition to black separatism is occasioned
by his concession to Washington that philanthropy, while not as good as political equality,
was at least better than crippling poverty and the degradation of black health.
Du Bois later came to argue, along with his long-dead rival, that desegregation was
less important than economic prosperity and the cultivation of black institutional power.
“New, deliberate, purposeful segregation for economic defense,” Du Bois argues, blazes
the most effective trail to end segregation as of 1940, because “the segregated Negro
institutions are better organized, more intelligently planned and more efficiently
conducted, and today form in themselves the best and most compelling argument for the
ultimate abolition of the color line” (154). For want of a substantial number of black
philanthropists with the necessary capital to build these institutions, the prolific social
scientist advocates that absent of political equality, black organizers and leaders must
accept what they can from well-meaning white philanthropists, the very same foundations
which had effectively ended his early academic career by refusing to fund his research.
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Booker T. at Midcentury
Du Bois’s use of philanthropy in Dusk of Dawn foregrounds Ellison’s own
treatment of modern charity, both pointedly in his early book reviews and, later, through
the symbolic action of Invisible Man. Ellison’s treatment of philanthropy echoes Du Bois
by reinforcing Dusk of Dawn’s characterization of the Tuskegee Machine, but
philanthropy also provides a pathway to better understand Booker T. Washington’s
haunting of Invisible Man. Although Washington and Du Bois’s disagreements peaked
some thirty years prior to Dusk of Dawn’s publication, Du Bois felt the need to discuss his
former rival at the dusk of the Depression, a time when Washington’s legacy held a
particular, if unexpected, significance. By adopting The Founder as his hero, the invisible
man reflects not only Washington’s persistence in American cultural memory at
midcentury but also Washington’s place in the history of white philanthropy.

Figure 3.1: Booker T. Washington Stamp (1936)
For many white business leaders especially, Washington’s status persisted into the
midcentury as the most important black man in American history, and the middle of the
Twentieth Century had, in fact, brought about a resurgence of Booker T. Washington’s
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public memory. This manifested in a series of official honors and commemorations. In
1936, the United States Postal Service issued a stamp bearing Washington’s image,
making him the first Black American honored in such a way. It would be 27 years before
another official US postage stamp would feature an African American (Frederick
Douglass in 1963). Postmaster General John Farley, Roosevelt’s opponent in the 1936
Democratic Primary, made a visit to Tuskegee to make a speech and sell the first book of
the stamps to the Tuskegee Alumni Association. In 1940, LIFE Magazine described the
stamp as a tactic for Democrats to corner the African American vote: “Mr. Farley himself
turned up at Alabama’s Tuskegee Institute to consummate a shrewd Democratic coup.
Sold by Mr. Farley’s own hands was a new Farley-sponsored 10 cent stamp bearing the
portrait of the institute’s great founder” Farley, in his speech, called the Tuskegee founder
a “Negro Moses” and, reflecting the Atlanta Compromise’s vision of a unified south,
made bizarre comparisons between Washington’s and Confederate General Robert E.
Lee’s “refusal to accept personal gain” (“Farley Sells First B.T. Washington Stamp, Lauds
‘Negro Moses’ at Tuskegee”).
FDR himself had four years earlier visited Tuskegee and urged the students there,
and the South more broadly, to “get out of the hock of the North” and develop their own
enterprises. His speech had been the fulfillment of a personal promise to Booker T.
Washington some years before; President Emeritus R.R. Moton described the President as
“the best friend to the Negro race or any race high or low anywhere in the world” (Belair
Jr. n. pag.). The man who had kept African Americans soundly for the Republican ticket at
the turn of the century, the man who had visited the White House for dinner at the request
of Teddy Roosevelt, had become a means of infusing legitimacy into the Democratic
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Party’s brand. In addition to the stamp and visits from prominent politicians, the US Mint
in 1946 issued a commemorative 50 cent piece bearing Washington’s visage. In 1956, four
years after the publication of Invisible Man, another stamp was issued to commemorate
Washington’s centennial. According to the Booker T. Washington Society, there are
currently at least 45 elementary, middle, and high schools named for Washington, perhaps
dozens or even more having closed or merged with other schools in the 1950s as part of
integration (“About the Booker T. Washington Society”).
Washington’s commemorations continued into the WWII Era. In 1942, his
memory was again summoned with the introduction of the Tuskegee Airmen into the
European Theater. Washington and Tuskegee feature prominently in several depictions
and photo essays on the squad, particularly a LIFE Magazine piece which features a
picture of the squadron marching in front of Washington’s famous statue at Tuskegee, the
statue mentioned multiple times in Invisible Man (23 March 1942). A year later, the S.S.
Booker T. Washington was christened by the famous folk singer Marian Anderson,
marking the very first launch of an American military vessel named after an African
American. The first in a series of newly commissioned “Liberty Ships” named after
“significant African Americans,” the Booker T. Washington was an integrated ship
helmed by an African American Captain, Hugh Mulzac, a veteran mariner who had
refused to captain a segregated ship for twenty years prior to accepting his post (United
States Merchant Marines).
Three years after the ship’s launching, John Beecher, an Alabama poet and
descendent of Harriet Beecher Stowe, published a book-length profile of the ship titled All
Brave Sailors: The Story of the S.S. Booker T. Washington. Ralph Ellison reviewed
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Beecher’s memoir for the New Republic. An early glimpse of Ellison’s pluralism shines
through in the review: “the first American vessel commissioned under a Negro Master; her
crew consisted of veterans of the Spanish civil war and the labor movement, old seamen,
ship’s officers who had long been Jim Crowed out of their professions, and civilians and
refugees sent to sea by the war.” The review, simply titled “The Booker T.,” reflects the
prevailing sense that the close of the war might occasion an end to Jim Crow segregation
nationally, an aspiration that made gains with Truman’s desegregation of the military in
1948 but ultimately fell short.
“The Booker T.” provides valuable if subtle insight into the young Ellison’s feelings
about his former college’s iconic founder and the irony of an integrated ship bearing his
name. Ellison cannot help noting the cognitive dissonance in the ship’s naming: “Beecher
saw the ship (named rather ambiguously after a Negro educator who believed that Negroes
and whites should be kept ‘separate as the fingers of the hand’) as a symbol of a type of
democracy in which value rests not upon skin color but upon human quality, intelligence
and ability, and where black and white men worked and played together in harmony” (“The
Booker T.” n. pag.). Ellison’s parenthetical aside, embedded as it is in the middle of an
expression of Beecher’s idealism, signals Ellison’s caution to not go too far in accepting the
memoirist’s thesis. Just because an integrated “Liberty” ship does not sink, Ellison warns
readers, does not mean the end of legal segregation, the “possibility of racial equality minus
the process: the democratic dream presented in terms of a Liberty ship. But ships,
unfortunately, are ships and states are states, and neither can be the other” (“The Booker T.”).
With an integrated ship named for a much celebrated anti-integrationist, Ellison concludes,
the memoir proves too easily sentimental, an “embarrassment of fine weather” on “the
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rough seas of our race relations.”
The ship’s “ambiguous” naming even further emblematizes for Ellison the dangers
of an ignorant sentimentality toward race relations that does not take into account what he
calls the “ironic transvaluation” in the postbellum era from morality to capital, the
replacement of white abolitionists’ moral consciousness with the businessman’s modern
industrial progress. As Christopher Diller argues, Ellison, in “The Booker T,” posits
“sentimentality as a psychological coping mechanism that enables white Americans to live
with their ethical schizophrenia” (488).
One important driver of this sentimentality, Ellison suggests via the veneration of
the State College for Negroes trustee philanthropists in the opening third of Invisible Man,
was the sense that philanthropy had done enough to solve “the Negro Problem” and that
this success was in fact worth commemorating. Over and over again in these
commemorations, Washington is referred to simply as “the Founder.”28 The widely
commemorated first teacher of the school Ralph Ellison had as of the late Depression come
to hate,29 therefore, came to symbolize for the young writer a conflation between morality
and science. Commemorations of Washington at midcentury, taken alongside the
proliferation of sociological “Negro Problem” studies, provided the kairos for a novel
which confronts what both Du Bois and Ellison saw as a false hopefulness in scientific
philanthropy.
28

While the label of “founder” is repeatedly attached to Washington, Tuskegee University’s “History and
Mission” page explains that the school was initially funded and conceived by “George Campbell, a former
slave owner, and Lewis Adams, a former slave, tinsmith and community leader” (“History and Mission”).
Paradoxically, Tuskegee also refers to Washington as its “founder,” whereas Campbell and Adams should
merely “receive credit” for “their roles in the founding of the University” (“History and Mission”).
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For a full account of Ellison’s departure in 1936 from Tuskegee for New York, see especially Barbara
Foley’s Wrestling with the Left: The Making of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (Duke, 2010) and Arnold
Rampersad’s Ralph Ellison: A Biography (Vintage, 2007).
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Morality and “the Negro Problem”
Ellison’s path toward a moral representation of “the Negro Problem” trailed
through an artistic engagement with the scientific accounts of that “problem.” That he saw
social science’s “bland assertions” as driven by an “unscientific” bend toward problematic
cultural narratives is made clear by his essays, including the American Dilemma review.
Richard Purcell has labeled Ellison’s emerging philosophical commitments his
“democratic humanism.”30 Purcell writes, “’The Negro Problem’ was part of statesanctioned efforts to manage the political possibilities of anti-racism and Ellison was
institutionally and intellectually connected to both private and public efforts to engage
with it” (22). Ellison indicates in 1982 that 37 years earlier he had heard a “disembodied
voice” that would not let him continue to write about a stranded and existentially fraught
WWII pilot, the subject of the novel he was trying to write when the first inklings of
Invisible Man came to him. Ellison “was most annoyed to have [his] efforts interrupted by
an ironic, down-home voice that struck [him] as being as irreverent as a honky-tonk
trumpet blasting through a performance, say, of Britten’s War Requiem.” The voice, Ellison
continues, “seemed to tease me with allusions to that pseudoscientific sociological concept
which held that most Afro-American difficulties sprang from our ‘high visibility’; a phrase
as double-dealing and insidious as its more recent oxymoronic cousins, ‘benign neglect’
and ‘reverse discrimination,’ both of which translate ‘Keep those Negroes running--but in
their same old place’” (“Introduction to the Thirtieth Anniversary Edition of Invisible Man
482). Ellison’s “ironic” vision, in other words, blinded him with a “teasing allusion” to
(pseudo)science, a sense that the instrumentality of scientific accounts of “the Negro
30

See Purcell’s Race, Ralph Ellison, and Cold War Intellectual Culture (Palgrave, 2013), in which Purcell
provides an intellectual history of Ellison continued engagement with what Purcell calls the “figura of a
‘negro problem’” throughout the cold war.
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Problem” did not solve the problem (as is their stated intention) as much as perpetuate it.
Whereas Ellison’s erstwhile mentor Richard Wright adhered more closely to a
sociological account of African American suffering, Ellison here finds empirical research
lacking “complex human emotions” in its descriptive banality, what he calls sociologists’
“bland assertions.”
Ellison’s commitment, therefore, lies not in figuring blackness as a mark of one’s
subjective suffering at the hands of unjust institutions (Bigger Thomas) but rather a “black
humanity” that he seeks out in forming, as Ellison wrote to his longtime friend Kenneth
Burke, “An esthetic [sic] which restores to man his full complexity” (84).31 To artistically
represent “the Negro Problem” is to reveal its moral dimension, that is, to recognize that
the sociologists’ analyses that predominated much of the funded writing on the topic in the
1940s did not, as Ellison writes in the fifties, “accept the challenge of reducing the reality
in which they exist to living form” (728). Alongside the scientifically resonant accounts of
black suffering he encountered at midcentury, the question for Ellison became how to
complicate those accounts in moral terms. While he grants that the novel was a primarily
social medium, he sees the future of democratic humanism as only advancing in a more
sustained account of individual suffering made possible by the novel. To this end, in his
review of Invisible Man for The Crisis, Henry Winslow reads a fairly straightforward
philosophical goal into Ellison’s first novel: “Devoid of focus, but epic in purpose and
written in a highly charged poetic prose, [the novel] argues the recognition of the
31

I have lifted this conversation fragment, only accessible in full at the Kenneth Burke papers at Penn
State’s Special Collections Library, from Bryan Crable’s very detailed monograph Ralph Ellison and
Kenneth Burke: At the Roots of the Racial Divide (U Virginia Press, 2012). For Burke’s most detailed
reading of Invisible Man, see his essay “Ralph Ellison’s Trueblooded Bildungsroman” in Invisible Man: A
Casebook (ed. John S. Callahan, Oxford UP, 2004). Crable’s third chapter, “From Acceptance to Rejection:
Invisible Man” provides an account of Ellison’s quite intentional attempt to move past Wright’s vision of
blackness as “sociologically determined,” but it also discusses Burke’s reading of the novel’s indebtedness
to Dostoevsky as mirroring the rhetorical theorist’s mantra “Purpose to passion to perception” (82).
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individual apart from sociological design and ethnocentric morality. As such, it is tragic—
its tragedy being that of a sensitive human being rebelling against idols while in search of
himself” (397). Just as Winslow criticizes the first-time novelist for his lack of focus, he
points to an important conflict in the novel that informs Ellison’s uses of philanthropy.
Winslow sees the key tension in the novel being between social science and morality, and
nothing illustrates this tension more directly than philanthropy.
By virtue of attending a fictional analog of the Tuskegee Institute, populated as it
is with calculating Presidents and northern philanthropists, in Invisible Man the unnamed
narrator’s (hereafter “IM”) invisibility is partly a product of his status as a recipient of
scientific philanthropy. After IM is awarded his calf-skin briefcase from the violent
charity of the white leaders in his hometown, the first third of the novel emerges not only a
depiction of IM’s origins in the Jim Crow South but as a fictional rumination on the
Tuskegee Machine’s hold over northern philanthropy. It is easy to ignore Ellison’s
apparent insistences that the novel’s “State College for Negroes” should not be read as a
representation of Tuskegee, because despite the author’s attempts to separate The Founder
from Booker T. Washington, the “State College” campus mirrors Tuskegee in many
respects. As Arnold Rampersad writes in his biography of Ellison, “The State College for
Negroes is based on Tuskegee institute…The two schools share wisteria and
mockingbirds, a statue of the founder with a crouching slave; they have quasi- military
traditions, a regimented chapel life, and a colored Veterans Hospital…Rich white trustees
descend annually from the North on the trembling campus” (4437). Barbara Foley, in her
forensic history of Ellison’s Invisible Man manuscripts, reproduces a list in Ellison’s notes
on the “State College” which include, “Fire at Tuskegee,” “Park,” “Washington’s grave,”
“Joke about statue” (Wrestling with the Left 160). The reference to Robert Park, in
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particular, evokes the concerns Ellison registers in his early critiques of sociology,
particularly his review of Myrdal’s An American Dilemma.
By problematizing socio-scientific accounts of “the Negro Problem,” Ellison links
his novel about black invisibility with a key assumption in scientific philanthropy, that one
can only solve a social problem with the blessing of research. Within the context of
modern charity, the anxiety around instrumental reasoning as a barrier to human freedom
emerges in Invisible Man as an important antagonist against both the celebration of
Booker T. Washington at midcentury and the continued reliance on scientific philanthropy
his legacy affirms. Ellison was, as Richard Purcell32 and others have noted, deeply
interested in “the Negro Problem” concept itself.33 However, while Purcell focuses on the
writer’s Cold War engagement with the Negro Problem, particularly in light of his
responses to liberal contemporaries like Lionel Trilling or Irving Howe, I would argue that
Ellison’s predilections on philanthropy complicate Invisible Man’s engagement with the
moral stakes of what Purcell, echoing Erich Auerbach, calls the “figura of the Negro
Problem” (26). Rather than fitting easily into a unified politico-moral project, Invisible
Man’s charity politics trade on the conditions of what I have called modern charity, a
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See Chapter 1, “Figura of a Negro Problem,” in Purcell’s Race, Ralph Ellison, and American Cold War
Intellectual Culture. (Palgrave Macmillan 2013).
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Probably the author’s most straightforward discussion occurs in “Beating that Boy,” Ellison’s 1945
review of the collection A Primer for White Folks, edited by Bucklin Moon. Ellison opens that essay by
saying that “the Negro Problem phrase,” echoing his nautical metaphors in “The Booker T,” “rotates like a
gyroscope of irony of which the Negro maintains a hazardous stability as the sea-tossed ship of his emotions
whirls him willy-nilly along: lunging him toward the shoals of bitter rejection (of the ideology that makes
him the sole sacrifice of America’s tragedy); now away toward the mine-strewn shores of hopelessness (that
despite the war, democracy is still discussed on an infantile level and himself in pre-adult terms); now
smashing him flush against waves of anger that threaten to burst his seams in revolt (that his condition is so
outrageously flagrant); now teetering him clear on a brief, calm, sunlit swell of self-amusement (that he must
cling to the convoy though he doubts its direction); now knocking him erect, like a whale on its tail, before
plunging again into the still dark night of the one lone ‘rational’ thing, the pounding irrational sea.”
(“Beating That Boy” 145)
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cultural narrative that, as I argue in the introduction, exists in the interstices of midcentury
American political life between conservatives’ critiques of the New Deal and liberals’
faith in acting on the statistical findings of social research.
Philanthropic Vision, Invisible Man
The philanthropic investment in southern black education even into the Thirties
was largely channeled through the Tuskegee Machine. In the novel, State College for
Negroes President Dr. Bledsoe symbolizes the machine through his fierce protection of the
college’s philanthropic gifts. His letters to white trustees in New York upon IM’s
departure mirror the same problems Du Bois elucidates in Dusk of Dawn between
prospective social entrepreneurs and their inability to find philanthropic support without a
vote of confidence from Tuskegee. Barbara Foley writes that Ellison crafts Bledsoe as
a composite of Robert Russa Moton, Washington’s successor at Tuskegee from
1915- 1935; Frederick D. Patterson, president during Ellison’s last year; the
nameless college president in Jay Saunders Redding’s No Day of Triumph (1942);
and Ellison’s own earlier profile in “Burr Bullet-Head”: “College President might
be a study in humiliation and spite, [of] masochism which becomes sadistic in
relation to students, Negroes.” (Wrestling with the Left 161)
In Invisible Man, Bledsoe writes to Mr. Emerson, a trustee in New York, following the
narrator’s failure to return Mr. Norton to campus unharmed:
it is to the best interests of the great work which we are dedicated to perform, that
he continue undisturbed in these vain hopes [to return to the school] while
remaining as far as possible from our midst. This case represents, my dear Mr.
Emerson, one of the rare, delicate instances in which one for whom we held great
expectations has gone grievously astray, and who in his fall threatens to upset
certain delicate relationships between certain interested individuals and the
school…I beg of you, sir, to help him continue in the directions of that promise
which, like the horizon, recedes ever brightly and distantly beyond the hopeful
traveler. (191)
“Delicate” and “rare,” IM must remain “as far as possible” from the school’s campus
because he “threatens to upset certain delicate relationships” (191). Having emphasized
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the rarity of IM’s actions (never referred to directly), Bledsoe uses the letter to not only
warn his funders of IM’s transgressions but also assure the reader that the “great work”
will continue so long as this statistical outlier does not return to the school. Bledsoe,
therefore, not only represents some malevolent force meant to expel IM from the school to
avoid further contamination.
The president’s letter writing embodies the practices of the Tuskegee Machine
itself. Philanthropy, for IM, becomes not only the source of his thwarting (his failure to
protect Norton from Trueblood or The Golden Day) but also the institution that fuels his
suffering, both at the hands of the white town leaders of the Battle Royal and the violent
neglect of Bledsoe’s hold on philanthropic funds, which keep him always “running.”34
Despite IM’s willingness, as John S. Wright contends, “to do the bidding of such false
god’s as the white millionaire philanthropist Mr. Norton,” the narrator has not met the
expectations of Norton’s “self-anointed appeaser…A. Hebert Bledsoe” (Shadowing Ralph
Ellison 109).
By failing in his responsibility to protect Mr. Norton, the narrator has failed to
protect the university’s funding, and as he reflects during the chapel scene, “any act that
endangered the continuity of the dream was an act of treason” (145). In the novel, the
punishment for such an act is the same punishment Du Bois received for his critiques of
Washington earlier in the century, a career-stifling loss in support from northern white
philanthropists. The novel, in this way, parallels Ellison’s lamentation in his review of An
American Dilemma for the erosion of African American’s hold on the “moral
consciousness of Northern Whites.”
34

Ellison foreshadows the Emerson letter at the end of Chapter 1, when IM dreams of receiving “an
engraved document containing a short message in letters of gold” (33). His grandfather tells him to read it
“Out loud!”: “’To Whom It May Concern,’ I intoned. ‘Keep this Nigger-Boy Running’” (33).
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When Ellison introduces the reader to his Southern campus, he frames it not in the
terms of Washingtonian vocational training or the quasi-liberal arts college Tuskegee had
become but, rather, in the image of philanthropists visiting on Founder’s Day:
The grass did grow and the green leaves appeared on the trees and filled the
avenues with shadow and shade as sure as the millionaires descended from the
North on Founders’ Day each spring. And how they arrived! Came smiling,
inspecting, encouraging, conversing in whispers, speechmaking into the wide-open
ears of our black and yellow faces--and each leaving a sizable check as he
departed. I’m convinced it was the product of a subtle magic, the alchemy of
moonlight; the school a flower-studded wasteland, the rocks sunken, the dry winds
hidden, the lost crickets chirping to yellow butterflies.
And oh, oh, oh, those multimillionaires! (36-7)
An interesting merger appears here between the pastoral, bucolic bliss of the Tuskegee
south with the “subtle magic” and “alchemy of moonlight” involved in the millionaires
descending on the college. The satirical edge, of course, involves the coming of the rites of
spring, echoing, as Alan Nadel has suggested, the modern waste land of T.S. Eliot
(Invisible Criticism 61). Ellison juxtaposes the “inspecting” politeness of the
philanthropist with the beauty of the spring. They are like animals of mysterious power
who only come once a year, a creature who at once “smiles” and “inspects” those he
(always “he”) finds. Ellison’s catalog further juxtaposes the investing science of
philanthropy with the fertile land that has turned into a modern wasteland of “rocks
sunken” and “lost crickets” (37). In so doing, the passage orders the natural world--the
grass growing and the leaves appearing--“just as sure as” the multimillionaires’ appearing
each year. The school’s financial support from northern philanthropists, as it ever was for
Washington, can be relied upon “just as sure as” the changing of the seasons.
The chapel scene later reinforces the opening’s presentation of the philanthropists
as life- bringing philanthropy-as-ritual. The scene suggests that philanthropy modernizes
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traditional Christian charity as an engine for the enduring legacy of the philanthropist
himself:
Here upon this stage the black rite of Horatio Alger was performed to God’s own
acting script, with millionaires come down to portray themselves; not merely
acting out the myth of their goodness, and wealth and success and power and
benevolence and cardboard masks, but themselves these virtues concretely! Not
the wafer and the wine, but the flesh and the blood, vibrant and alive, and vibrant
even when stopped, ancient and withered. (and who, in face of this, would not
believe? Could even doubt?) (111)
Notably, the novel never depicts the trustees themselves meeting in the boardroom, where
allocations are decided upon and investments determined. Ellison, instead, chooses to
focus on the chapel service, where the questions of devotion and responsibility are
translated into the ideal of obedience. The philanthropists literally preside over a
congregation of their beneficiaries, a scene that on the surface simply ritualizes their
power over the students. And yet, the passage’s Eucharistic allusions draw attention to the
chapel service as not merely symbolic but a material confirmation of the students’
compliance with the Founders’ program. If it were mere ritual—“the wafer and the
wine”—then students could just go through the motions of the annual ritual and be done
with it, the voluntary belief of Christmas and Easter churchgoers. However, Ellison’s
narrator makes it clear that these students must perceive of the philanthropists as “these
virtues concretely” or face what the college president Bledsoe fears most, a catastrophic
loss of philanthropic funds. As the narrator and his classmates move toward the service,
“where the visitors [trustees] waited,” he says, “we were moving not in the mood of
worship but of judgment; as though even here in the filtering dusk…but focused shortrayed upon our place of convergence; and we drifting forward with rigid motions, limbs
stiff and voices now silent, as though on exhibit even in the dark, and the moon a white
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man’s bloodshot eye” (110). “Just as sure as” the philanthropist’s return each spring, the
students move “not in the mood of worship” but instead the empirical “judgement” of the
“white man’s bloodshot eye” (ibid).
Anticipating his later meeting with Bledsoe about the incident with Norton, the
narrator moves “more rigid than all the others with a sense of judgment” (110). Upon
entering the chapel, his classmates move “with faces frozen in solemn masks, and I seem
to hear already the voices mechanically raised in the songs the visitors love. (Loved?
Demanded. Sung? An ultimatum accepted and ritualized, an allegiance recited for the
peace it imparted, and for that perhaps loved. Loved as the defeated come to love the
symbols of their conquerors” (111). “Mechanically,” the students enter the chapel under
“a white man’s bloodshot eye” then sing spirituals as a ritualized “ultimatum” from their
trustees. The narrator and his classmates sing songs about freedom at the urging of their
“conquerors.” Remembering earlier the spectacle of students entering the chapel, IM
remembers how they “drilled four-abreast down the smooth asphalt and pivoted and
entered the chapel on Sundays, our uniforms pressed, shoes shined, minds laced up, eyes
blind like those of robots to visitors and officials on the low, white-washed reviewing
stand” (36). By presenting the language of coercive social control—“conquerors,”
“ultimatum,” “mechanically,” “drilled,” “minds laced up”—alongside the worship
service’s ritualized virtues—“love,” “peace,” “solemnity”—the scene evinces the infusion
in philanthropic logic of charity as virtue alongside charity, as Brannon Costello has
argued, as racialized social practice.35 If the individual exchanges between Norton and IM

35

Costello argues in Plantation Airs: Racial Paternalism and the Transformations of Class in Southern
Fiction that paternalism not only persists as a range of unemancipatory “racialized social practices”
between unequal agents but also reflects the status-granting consumptive practices of the Southern
Aristocracy. For Costello, presentations of racial paternalism from southern whites include anything from
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earlier in the novel position Ellison’s narrator as a mindful negotiator of philanthropic
discernment, the chapel illustrates the campus’s recurring ritualization of the Tuskegee
Machine.
Yet the chapel’s philanthropy-as-ritual does not for Ellison amount to blind
obedience to the trustees themselves. After all, the trustees do not even hold the pulpit
during the service; that task is left to Reverend Barbee. The visiting old minister from
Chicago stirs the crowd with his remembrances of the Founder, for a moment seeming to
move the compliance of the students toward a sense of solidarity with the dream of which
they are all a part. The man stirs the crowd by telling of the Founder, “this living parable
of proven glory and humble nobility” (120). This drives the students, contra their earlier
“mechanical” hymns, to sing “music sincerely felt, not rendered for the guests, but for
themselves; a song of hope and exaltation” (134). And yet even here Ellison reinforces
philanthropy’s predominance in the chapel. Toward, IM says, “renewing the dream in our
hearts,” Barbee repeatedly highlights the Founder’s heroic fundraising efforts, fusing them
with the hagiography of the Founder’s own suffering while traveling “across the Black
Sea of prejudice” (120). He tells the crowd of “those days of ceaseless travel” in which
“the Founder was building the dream not only here in this then barren valley, but hither
and yonder throughout the land,” “Rendering unto Caesar that which was Caesar’s, Yes;
but steadfastly seeking for you that bright horizon which you now enjoy…” (120).

ostentatiously overtipping an black waiter to Flem Snopes selling a fancy hat to an African American boy
for ten cents in Faulkner’s The Mansion, ultimately amount to the passing of what Pierre Bourdieu called
“symbolic capital” (Plantation Airs 6). I want to argue that Costello’s more avowedly situated reading of
paternalism in southern literature can be applied to other forms of ruralized (or at any rate nonmetropolitan) instances of paternalism such as those found in the opening third of Invisible Man, widely
believed to be situated in Oklahoma (Ellison’s home state) and Alabama (site of the Tuskegee institute)
respectively. However, rather than focus on how paternalism simply hindered the freedom and flourishing
of infantilized subjects, as is the goal in much ideology critique or studies of racialized subjectivity, I think
it is also important to pay attention to paternalism as a status-granting human relation.
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Integrating both mosaic and Christological imagery throughout his sermon, Barbee even
proclaims Bledsoe as the Founder’s living reincarnation, “For in a sense he [The Founder]
was, if not in the flesh, in the spirit. And in a sense in the flesh too. For has not your
present leader become his living agent, his physical presence?…How can I convey to you
how well he has kept his pledge…how conscientious has been his stewardship?” (132).
Upon the end of his speech Barbee, revealed to be a blind man, “flounders upon Dr.
Bledsoe’s legs” en route to his seat from the pulpit and must be lifted into his seat by the
trustees. After memorializing his long-dead friend, the Founder, Barbee ultimately must
also rely on the vision of the college’s current funders in order to even take his seat.
By invoking the “the black rite of Horatio Alger” earlier in the passage, Ellison
even further ironizes Booker T. Washington’s own emphasis on individual industry and
responsibility. While the Tuskegee students certainly work very hard toward the promise
of a raised station— IM’s devout adherence to the Tuskegee mindset early in the novel
certainly exemplifies this—not one of these students would have this opportunity if not for
the continuous and copious stream of philanthropic funds. Just as Ellison cautioned
readers away from Beecher’s idealistic desegregation narrative in “The Booker T,”
through Barbee’s speech, the novelist renders the students’ stirring emotions as unearned,
the result of a manipulative “subtle magic, an alchemy of moonlight” which maintains the
Tuskegee Machine’s hold on southern black education. When combined with the
awkwardness between IM and Norton in the car ride to Trueblood’s and the Golden Day
and, later, IM’s conversation with Mr. Emerson in New York,36 the chapel scene, like the
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For an extended reading of this conversation, see Michael Trask’s Camp Sites: Sex, Politics, and
Academic Style in Postwar America (Stanford 2013), p. 44-50. Trask reads the awkwardness between IM
and Emerson the Younger as a “shoddy version of camp…that can’t laugh at itself” (50). IM’s inability to
understand that Emerson is flirting with him, for Trask, evinces “a slavish gullibility that Ellison traces,
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calf-skin briefcase and college scholarship IM earns at the end of the Battle Royal, brings
into focus the novel’s uses of white paternalism. However, while the chapel scene evokes
paternalism through the trustees as a collective philanthropic body, Ellison personalizes
this relationship most poignantly through IM’s interactions with the trustee Norton.
IM’s most direct engagement with Tuskegee Machine philanthropy comes in his
fraught day driving Mr. Norton off the campus ground and into the surrounding rural
community. The narrator introduces us to the trustee through a catalog of features and
predilections:
A face pink like St. Nicholas’, topped with a shock of silk white hair. And easy,
informal manner, even with me. A Bostonian, smoker of cigars, teller of polite
Negro stories, shrewd banker, skilled scientist, director, philanthropist, forty years
a bearer of the white man’s burden, and for sixty a symbol of the Great Traditions.
(37)
Not insignificantly, Ellison here characterizes Norton as an amalgamation of modern
charity, highlighted by the visage of Santa Claus alongside his “shrewd” financial
investment, “skilled” science, and philanthropy. Mr. Norton emblematizes Ellison’s
treatment of the well-meaning philanthropist as a bastion of scientific philanthropy who
survives into the midcentury as a symptom of modern charity’s persistence. During the
philanthropist’s time in IM’s care, he and Norton drive off-campus to the old slave quarter
sections of town and, eventually, onto the property of John Trueblood and later the Golden
Day bordello. The drive represents an important change of scenery from the campus, the
trustees’ domain, to the surrounding area, a space not curated by Bledsoe’s stewardship of
the Tuskegee Machine. Riché Richardson has argued that the drive off campus draws
attention to the “rural geography” of Tuskegee’s instrumentalization of the black male
body which was most poignantly exemplified by the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study,
counterintuitively though not uniquely, through a homophobic stencil” (ibid.).

112

an act of medical violence payed for with philanthropic investment (120). By driving Mr.
Norton off campus, IM ferries a man committed to solving “the Negro Problem” by
investing in southern black education to a place which exists fundamentally off his map.
How would one, for example, socio-scientifically explain the plight of John Trueblood?
Norton, throughout their car ride, lectures IM in a way that weds the rhetoric of
“legacy” and “memorial” in philanthropic giving with the social engineering calculations
of scientific philanthropy. And yet, faced with a situation such as Trueblood’s, even after
Trueblood expresses that he has already received so much aid, Norton reverts to an act of
individual charity, which as I define in the introduction, is always antithetical to
philanthropy because charity is not interested in solving social problems but, instead,
alleviating their symptoms. Norton gives this monetary gift, I argue, in part because
Trueblood’s tale discredits philanthropy’s ability to socially engineer the incestuous
sharecropper out of his adverse situation. After hearing Trueblood’s story of incest and
violence, Norton chooses to, “between trembling fingers,” extend a $100 bill to the farmer
and says, “Please take this and buy the children some toys for me” (69). This bequest
fulfills the narrator’s description of Norton as a “small silken-haired, white-suited St.
Nicholas” (107). Santa Claus, of course, symbolically opposes Booker T. Washington’s
social project of industrious self-improvement, and yet clearly the actual Tuskegee
Institute, still up and running today as Tuskegee University, would not have survived if not
for the likes of Norton and the other trustees. Ellison places the philanthropist in a position
that ironically mirrors his actual role at the college. Giving the money to Trueblood not
only marks his inability to solve this individual family’s problem but also marks a sizable
kink in the legitimating operation of Norton’s “legacy” narrative. The college donor and

113

trustee’s philanthropic gains have not extended, as he had assumed, beyond the campus,
and proof of his positive impact has been made suspect by Trueblood’s testimony.
Norton’s only recourse, failing to find evidence of his legacy in Trueblood’s gruesome
narrative, is to offer toys to the children.
Other readings of Norton’s encounter with Trueblood have underscored how the
sharecropper provides satiety for unconscious desires. Alan Nadel, for example, argues
that Norton identifies with Trueblood’s incestuous yearning for his own daughter:
The detailed account of Trueblood’s incest shocks Norton, who has unconsciously
harbored incestuous desires for his own daughter. Seeing that the farmer has
actually acted out Norton’s deepest fantasies, Norton rewards the man with a $100
bill and then lapses into semiconsciousness, his face chalk white. (Invisible
Criticism 94).
Nadel’s argument, directing our attention particularly to Norton’s curiously post-orgasmic
visage, reinforces a perspective offered in 1968 by Peter Hays, who argues that Norton
invests in the college as “a form of propitiation, a method of assuaging the guilt he feels
because of desiring his own daughter” (“The Incest Theme in Invisible Man” 336).37
Norton certainly makes his fixation with his daughter clear during his early conversation
with IM, during which he says, “She was too pure for life…The best medical science in
the world could not save her…I have never recovered. I have never forgiven myself.
Everything I’ve done since her passing has been a monument to her memory” (43). By
having Norton encounter Trueblood so soon after speaking effusively about his own
daughter makes the connection seem inevitable.
Less interested in the idea that Norton subconsciously wanted to have sex with his
daughter before her death, John S. Wright finds a different source for the philanthropist’s
37

See also Hortense Spillers’ “The Permanent Obliquity of an In(pha)llibly Straight: In the Time of the
Daughters and the Fathers” in Changing Our Own Words: Essays on Criticism, Theory, and Writing by
Black Women (Ed. Cheryl Wall, Rutgers UP 1989).
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sense of guilt, one more closely tied to philanthropy: “The moneyed northerners…, in the
person of Norton, atone for betraying Trueblood’s ancestral Reconstruction dream of forty
acres and a mule by converting the reprobate farmer’s sexual misfortune into a hundreddollar scapegoat ritual” (115). Echoing what he calls earlier the “feudel largesse” of IM’s
scholarship, Wright adds further, “As Trueblood’s perverse mishap confirms the power of
the Southerners to reenslave him, it confirms the impotence, conversely, of Northern
liberalism to free him. For, the first fruit Norton will see of his investments in the
Founder’s effort to transform ‘barren clay to fertile soil’ is Trueblood’s harvest of sexual
sin” (116). When Wright refers to the “impotence” of “Northern liberalism” to free Jim
Trueblood, he evokes a concept of “Nortonism” coined by Kenneth Burke in his many
conversations with Ellison. Kenneth Warren defines “Nortonism” this way: “the social
disease exemplified in the novel by the hapless white benefactor, Mr. Norton, as the
tendency of allies to project their individual pathologies onto blacks under the guise of
helping them” (So Black and Blue 31). Certainly, Norton’s $100 gift to Trueblood to buy
“toys for the children” does not help Trueblood directly, but locating the bequest as a
transactional assuaging of white guilt, given the novel’s larger engagement with IM’s
many violent white benefactors, strikes me as more in keeping with Invisible Man’s scope
and ambition.
In addition to the Norton’s $100 gift to Jim Trueblood, a couple of other aspects in
his narrative point to philanthropy. For one thing, the sharecropper tells his entire story in
response to Norton’s asking, “How are you faring now?” and then suggesting, “Perhaps I
could help” (52). This implies that Norton is eager to meet and speak with Trueblood,
hoping his wife and daughter might “know anything about the age and history of the
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place” (48), so he can gather relevant information. Norton’s approach with Trueblood
mirrors that of a philanthropist, trying to understand the plight of a potential mendicant
before investing. At various points in his story, Trueblood also reiterates just how much
help he has received from white people after the incident. He begins his story by saying to
Norton, “We ain’t doing so bad, suh. ‘Fore they hear ‘bout what happen to us out here I
couldn’t git no help from nobody. Now lotta folks is curious and goes outta they way to
help” (52). He says later that he “Got more work now than [he] ever did have before” after
a group of researchers from “the big school way cross the State” came to interview him
for a study (53). As his story comes to a conclusion, Trueblood restates, “I went to see the
white folks then and they gave me help…I done the worse thing a man could ever do to
his family and instead of chasin’ me out of the country, they gimme more help than they
ever give any other colored man, no matter how good…he was” (67). The help
Trueblood’s family has found has come, then, from a variety of sources, including those
obviously entertained by his story (the sheriff department, for example), but also social
researchers and a number of others for less-clear reasons. Whatever the reason for
Norton’s clear pervasive focus on his daughter’s memory (for example, that grieving
parents often dwell on remembrances of their dead children), it seems unlikely that so
many other people would give money to Trueblood because they wanted to have sex with
their daughters too.
The help Trueblood has received has also, noticeably, neither come from Bledsoe
nor any representative from The State College for Negroes. Despite Trueblood’s prior
work singing for the school’s “special white guests” (likely potentially donors), the
“biggity school folks” apparently offered him $100 to leave the area and never come back.
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The $100 dollars the college offered Trueblood is, tellingly, equal to what Norton gifts
him at the end of their exchange, implying that the northerner also feels some kind of
responsibility for the farmer’s ill-treatment from the school. The $100 gift, in view of
Ellison’s repetition of the amount, indicates the results of a competition between the State
College for Negroes as an institution, the narrator who had spent the afternoon working so
hard to make a good impression with Norton, and Jim Trueblood, the man who had
“brought disgrace upon the black community” (46). IM exclaims later, “You no-good
bastard! You get the hundred-dollar bill! (69). The entire situation creates an economics of
scarcity that pits three different black men in competition with one another, just like Du
Bois and his contemporaries when they attempted to make good impressions with the
Carnegie, Russell Sage, or Rosenwald Foundation only to be thwarted by Booker T.
Washington and Tuskegee.
This act of individual charitable giving from a philanthropist like Norton also
indicates philanthropy’s inability, for Ellison, to escape the moral demands of personal
responsibility. While Ellison problematizes philanthropy at various points in the novel, he
does so in service of his larger critique of the Tuskegee Machine’s use of social science to
instrumentalize the “moral consciousness of northern whites.” Norton, the “skilled
scientist” with a “face pink like St.Nicholas,” emerges as one of those well-meaning
northern race allies whose moral consciousness, as we have seen in both his Myrdal
review and “Beating that Boy,” Ellison argues was lost to philanthropy and the Tuskegee
Machine after the abolition of slavery. Invisible Man’s charity politics, though, exist not
only in Ellison’s more overt depictions of philanthropic donations but also in the
narrator’s negotiation of his own possible benefits from charitable giving.
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IM preoccupies himself with this possibility in his interactions with Norton to the
point of perpetuating his subservience in order to get ahead. It is notable, for example, that
the narrator goes on to reassure Norton that should he fail to succeed in life, it will in no
way be the philanthropist’s fault. In response, Norton deploys the language of investment
so common in philanthropy in order to explain IM’s role in his legacy. He says to the
student:
You are important because if you fail I have failed by one individual, one defective
cog; it didn’t matter so much before, but now I’m growing old and it has become
very important...Through you and your fellow students I become, let’s say, three
hundred teachers, seven hundred trained mechanics, eight hundred skilled farmers,
and so on. That way I can observe in terms of living personalities to what extent
my money, my time and my hopes have been fruitfully invested. I also construct a
living memorial to my daughter. Understand? I can see the fruits produced by the
land that your great Founder has transformed from barren clay to fertile soil. (45
emphasis Ellison’s)
Norton, in explaining himself, vacillates between an account of his daughter’s “living
memorial” and other more quantifiable success indicators--number of employed
graduates--being the main reasons for his philanthropy. Here, hope even becomes a
capitalized investment that operates alongside money and time. Because he grasps his role
in this scenario, IM continues to ask Norton for clarification on his points to ensure he
perfectly matches the philanthropist’s expectations; Ellison’s narrator wants to appear
more as “fertile soil” than “barren clay.” He wants to be seen as worth Norton’s
investment.
In illustrating the awkwardness between Norton and IM, Ellison marks a
misunderstanding between benefactor and mendicant. Norton is unable to see IM as much
more than proof of his philanthropic impact. One could easily dismiss this lack of
congruence as just a man of means trying to seem more magnanimous to a
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captive/captivated audience. After explaining to IM his indebtedness to Emerson’s thought
and it being his “destiny” to give money to the school, Norton quite casually lights a
cigarette and changes the subject. And yet, this ease of transition juxtaposes the
philanthropist’s status alongside that of his young driver, who does nothing with such ease
throughout the entire novel except, perhaps, eat yams on a Harlem sidewalk. This shift
from his speechmaking even further indicates Norton’s ultimate disinterestedness in IM
beyond the extent to which the student evidences the trustee’s philanthropic goals. Norton,
despite his later defense of IM to Bledsoe, does not appear to care about IM’s welfare on a
personal level, at least not enough to recognize him on the train platform at the end of the
novel. This fact does less to paint Norton as a moral hypocrite than place him as a
symbolic stand-in for philanthropy’s tendency to focus on statistical significance. Before
even beginning his speech, Norton remarks on the “good timber” he sees as they drive just
a mile off campus, ignoring the oxen team IM thinks should garner more interest (41).
Even when Norton attempts to “open his heart” by talking about his daughter’s death, IM
indicates that the trustee does so “no longer seeming to see me, …speaking to himself
alone” (42). All of this comes after IM asks the Bostonian why he had become interested
in the school in the first place. Norton fails to justify to IM his moral reasoning for
donating money to the college and serving on the board, a failure underscored by Ellison
by supplying the wealthy man with repetitious and imprecise dialogue. Ellison here forces
the philanthropist to account for his reasons individually. This demonstrates how, for
Ellison, philanthropy’s institutional framework does not allow for personal considerations
beyond the individual as evidence of a problem. Norton defines success as what can be
observed “in terms of living personalities to what extent my money, my time, my hopes
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have been fruitfully invested” (45).
Rather than allow IM’s needs and desires to come from himself, he is instead
forced to conform to the Tuskegee Machine’s deterministic program of success. IM, in
other words, cannot articulate the “problem” because that has already been done on his
behalf. Just as Tuskegee Machine philanthropists, Du Bois tells us, decided the fate of
young black idealists’ social projects, IM’s identity is similarly determined for him.
Norton, in the end, only extends his legacy and memorializes his daughter to the degree
that Bledsoe’s students are successful, which ties his entire legacy to the outcome of his
philanthropic investment. While such a practice importantly resulted in the continued
funding of schools, including Tuskegee and so many others, Ellison worries that such a
practice robs recipients of their individual ability to express an experience that does not
conform to the expectations of white funders. Du Bois ends Dusk of Dawn by conceding
the necessity to cultivate sustained relationships with philanthropists; Ellison worries that
to do so instrumentalizes black experience beyond a possibility for self- determination.
Conclusion: Exodus Politics, Invisible Charity, and the Raft of Hope
While Tuskegee Machine philanthropy permeates much of the novel’s opening
third, Booker T. Washington’s legacy also finds its way into the most directly charitable
relationship in the entire novel. After the surrealistic disaster of IM’s short time at the
Liberty Paints factory, Mary Rambo invites Ellison’s narrator to convalesce in her Harlem
home and manages to offer him charity without eventually worsening the protagonist’s
situation. But even in Mary’s case, where her life experiences would seem closer to IM’s
than his other would-be benefactors, she still demonstrates a general ignorance toward
IM’s situation, the circumstances of his fraught journey to Harlem. However, Mary’s
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ignorance comes with mixed motivations, as we learn when a disheveled and barely
conscious IM agrees to go with Mary and she says, “It ain’t costing you a penny and I
don’t want to git in your business” (252-3). Mary’s investment in IM from the outset
separates her actions from the problem-solving stakes of philanthropy and, instead, returns
charity to the sphere of moral obligation, made even more apparent when she says,
“Everybody has to be trouble to somebody” (254 emphasis Ellison’s). Mary’s charity rings
a bit more hopeful in part also because it avoids the instrumental paternalism inherent in
Invisible Man’s other charity enactors. In caring for Ellison’s narrator during the period of
the novel between IM’s paint factory accident and his recruitment to work for The
Brotherhood, Mary’s charity appears to offer a restive stopover on the narrator’s journey.
Of course, Mary’s role in the novel does not come without its own baggage,
especially considering the copious archives available from Ellison’s six years writing
Invisible Man. The novel’s final draft does not include an excised chapter38 that increases
Mary’s role to, as Shanna Greene Benjamin writes, “a vessel of black folk wisdom” and
“the impetus behind Invisible Man’s escape” (123). Benjamin adds that Mary’s “ingenuity
and folk wisdom [facilitates] Invisible Man’s emergence above ground” (123). Given the
draft chapter’s removal, Mary could be seen as a silenced feminine presence in Ellison’s
novel, relegated to the domestic sphere and destined by virtue of gendered expectation to
care for whatever afflicted man darkens her doorstep. However, I would argue that Ellison
ultimately positions Mary not so much as a flat placeholder for the multifarious and often
fraught history of charity and philanthropy as being exclusively “women's work.” Rather,
ultimately Mary’s commitment to black masculine leadership provides final push for the
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invisible man to go underground. She lectures him at the breakfast table one morning
(apparently one among many):
It’s you young folks what’s going to make the changes..Y’all’s the ones. You got
to lead and you got to fight and move us all on up a little higher. And I tell you
something else, it’s the ones from the South that’s got to do it, them what knows
the fire and ain’t forgot how it burns. Up her too many fogits. They finds a place
for theyselves and forgits the ones on the bottom. Oh, heap of them talks about
doing things, but they done really forgot. No, it’s you young ones what has to
remember and take the lead. (255)
Reflecting on Mary’s urging IM to be a “credit to the race,” he says, “It was a most
painful position, for at the same time, Mary reminded me constantly that something was
expected of me, some act of leadership, some newsworthy achievement; and I was torn
between resenting her for it and loving her for the nebulous hope she kept alive” (258).
This “nebulous hope” is characterized by the tradition of black male leadership
Robert J. Patterson calls “exodus politics,” that idealistically molded the narrative of the
long Civil Rights Movement while continually, and unhelpfully, placing its hopes in a
“Moses figure” who might lead African Americans out of the Egypt of the U.S.’s
originary racist hierarchy. Such an emphasis, among other things, Patterson writes,
“tended to champion male leadership, to promote models of leadership that diminish the
significance of mass mobilization, [and] to conceptualize racial rights as disconnected
from gender and sexual rights (3). Ellison’s narrator recognizes the Washingtonian
hopefulness in Mary’s diatribes, a “nebulous” hopefulness for a messianic figure to lead a
perceived unified community of 12 million black voices.
Parallel to Patterson’s critique of this model, Ellison recognizes the need for a
more complex conception of the path to civil rights within the context of a pluralistic
American democracy. Mary Rambo represents a necessary moment in IM’s development,
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but in the end the narrator recognizes that her urging for his leadership, and her undivided
devotion and encouragement toward him, could only end in the same cycle of aspiration
and defeat that had followed him throughout the novel. The Invisible Man, after all, runs
toward Mary’s house after throwing a spear at Ras the Destroyer (formerly “The
Exhorter”) during the riot but decides, upon further thought, that he cannot quite carry it
out. He says, “And now I realized that I couldn’t return to Mary’s, or to any part of my old
life. I could approach it only from the outside, and I had been as invisible to Mary as I had
been to the Brotherhood” (571). This is not a resignation on the narrator’s part; instead, he
offers a lamentation for the emancipatory necessity of Mary’s charity, tied to a reverence
for Washington, that is just too close in proximity to the instrumental control of Tuskegee
Machine philanthropy. Ellison, here and elsewhere, underscores the intersectional
paradoxes of modern charity within the confines of American racial discourse. For IM to
return to Mary’s home would have meant avoiding his future on “the lower frequencies”
where he will seek out “a possibility that even an invisible man has a socially responsible
role to play” (581).
Ellison and Du Bois both highlight philanthropy’s tendency to act as an unhelpful
placeholder for any forms of public aid, such as need-based New Deal relief programs.
For Du Bois, philanthropic giving might have done far better work if not for the Tuskegee
Machine, which for philanthropists of the early 20th Century offered that very powerful
trope of individual race relations that still persists a century later. Booker T. Washington,
and his successors Moton and Patterson, could be every Northern philanthropist’s one
black friend, proof that they were both not as prejudiced and far more generous than their
southern counterparts.
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Reflecting on his indebtedness to Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry
Finn, Ellison famously says in an introduction to Invisible Man that a novel holds the
potential to “be fashioned as a raft of hope, perception and entertainment that might help
keep us afloat as we [try] to negotiate the snags and whirlpools that mark our nation’s
vacillating course toward and away from the democratic ideal” (“Introduction to the
Thirtieth-Anniversary Edition of Invisible Man 487). I have tried to suggest in this chapter
that while Invisible Man certainly critiques certain facets of charity and philanthropy, the
novel allows room for the possibility of a hopeful, however imperfect, charity politics. No
matter what aspects of the narrator’s identity are fractured by his encounters with the pain
inflicted by his benefactors, he still feels the need for responsibility of some kind. Charity
and philanthropy become for Ellison a democratic “human [value] which can endure by
confronting change” (“That Same Pain, That Same Pleasure: An Interview” 79). Simply
because Ellison’s novel critiques certain risks involved in charity and philanthropy does
not mean these practices should (even if one assumes they could) be eradicated. However,
they might “endure by confronting change.” Ellison is unable to envision precisely what
that change might look like. He instead leaves his readers to find scraps for a raft of hope
toward some right relation between democracy, charity, and philanthropy.
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CHAPTER 4
Grotesque Charity and the Politics of Innocence:
O’Connor’s The Violent Bear It Away
“Yet from the days of John the Baptist until now, the Kingdom of the heavens has
been violently assailed, and the violent seize it.”
– The Gospel of Matthew39
Why would a writer such as Flannery O’Connor, so orthodox in her private commitment to
Christian charity, advocate publicly for such a violent method of storytelling? This
question has permeated O’Connor criticism for the last fifty years, organizing scholars of
the Georgia writer’s work into various sects. Theologically-oriented scholars40 have
argued that O’Connor’s violence reveals humanity’s inherent violence and sinfulness; the
horrific deaths at so many of her stories’endings become symbolic moments of potential
revelation and salvation. Historicist readers41 see O’Connor as a product of the early
postwar era, steeped in Cold War paranoia and the New Criticism she inherited at the
Iowa Writers Workshop. Feminist scholars42 have read O’Connor’s violent stories, often
featuring dead or maimed women and girls, as either a problematic disavowal of female
agency or an empowering symbolic critique of misogyny. Philosophical and Narrative-
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minded critics43 tend to focus on O’Connor’s violence as a natural outpouring of her
commitment to the grotesque (stemming from the noted influence of Edgar Allan Poe and
Nathanael West on her work). In short, despite her strong identity as a Catholic writer,
Flannery O’Connor’s writing, at every turn, resists the label “charitable.”
Perhaps the most damning critique of O’Connor’s violent approach came from her
frequent correspondent and fellow novelist John Hawkes. In his 1962 essay “Flannery
O’Connor’s Devil,” Hawkes accuses O’Connor of working across her stated purposes,
even describing her narrator as “demonic”: “A good many readers would mistake
O’Connor’s belief in the Holy for its opposite, in the same way that many readers might
be misled into thinking of Nathanael West as a Christian manqué. The point is that in the
most vigorously moral of writers the actual creation of fiction seems often to depend on
immoral impulse” (398). This “immoral impulse,” Hawkes argues, “transforms the
writer’s objective Catholic knowledge of the devil into an authorial attitude in itself some
measure diabolical” (401). Here, Hawkes appeals to another great tension in O’Connor
criticism regarding how seriously to take her Christianity as a lens through which to read
her fiction. As Carol Shloss has written, O’Connor failed in her stated mission as a
Catholic writer because, rhetorically, “we cannot infer anagogical meaning in a text unless
we are accustomed to reading such signs in fiction and have the information to do so” (3).
Readers have trouble seeing the action of charity in O’Connor’s devil, Hawkes and Shloss
claim, because we do not know enough to get the joke, and as any comedian will tell you,
explaining a joke has a tendency to ruin it. In view of these critiques, O’Connor’s work is,
at best, rhetorically ineffective and, at worst, demonic. Does Flannery O’Connor’s use of
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the grotesque, therefore, obscure the expression of God’s love she sought to somehow
inspire through her fiction?
I want to suggest that charity, the quality understandably seen as lacking in
Flannery O’Connor’s fiction by John Hawkes and many others, actually provides an
important way to better understand her work. Fiction need not itself be charitable, after all,
in order to concern itself with the idea of charity, and in fact O’Connor’s most sustained
social critiques often come in the form of defending charity against the encroachment of
modernity. In this chapter, more specifically, I argue that Flannery O’Connor’s later work
critiques constructions of innocence and instrumental reasoning in de-personalized forms
of aid which indicated what she called the terror of “governing by tenderness.” Worthiness
and unworthiness, in O’Connor’s economy, become part and parcel with “need-based” aid
in ways that worked against her Christian views of poverty. In the first half of this chapter,
I will focus on how O’Connor’s grotesque and anti- compassionate writing anticipates
anthropologist Miriam Ticktin’s recent interrogation of “innocence” as a problematic
moral and political category. In the second part of the chapter, I will demonstrate how
O’Connor grafts this concern for innocence onto a critique of instrumental reason that
reveals the tension between private charity and state-based aid. O’Connor’s final
completed novel, The Violent Bear it Away (1960), provides her most sustained
engagement with charity, and read alongside her nonfictional writing from the period, the
novel’s charity politics manifest in more complicated ways than both theological and antitheological readings of O’Connor have previously suggested.
That a Catholic writer wrote and cared a great deal about Christian charity in the
Mid- Twentieth Century US is, of course, not particularly revelatory. Reading O’Connor’s
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treatment of charity, however, does go a bit further toward claiming a multifaceted
understanding of Christian charity as a force in the US during the Cold War. Catholicism,
particularly later through the example of John F. Kennedy, was fused with the Democratic
party’s continued commitment to tax-funded aid against threats from the emerging
Neoconservative movement of William F. Buckley (also a prominent Catholic) and, later,
Barry Goldwater. Paul Elie, in The Life You Save May Be Your Own: An American
Pilgrimage, has written of Flannery O’Connor as one in a quartet of Catholic writers who
all came to prominence at roughly the same time: Thomas Merton, Walker Percy, Dorothy
Day, and O’Connor. Elie writes, “Taken together, their stories are told as episodes in a
recent chapter of American religious history, in which four Catholics of rare sophistication
overcame the narrowness of the Church and the suspicions of the culture to achieve a
distinctly American Catholic outlook” (41). If these writers were distinctly Catholic,
however, they were not distinct in their conceptions of charity.
To midcentury cultural critics, Dorothy Day especially had become a bit of a
curiosity. As a young Marxist, Day had distinguished herself as a journalist and supporter
of labor movements. She was first jailed in 1917 while picketing the White House as a
suffragette. She had spent the 1920s in the Village, writing for The Masses and The Call
and befriending writers like Malcolm Cowley, Eugene O’Neill, and John Dos Passos,
among others. By the time she published her memoir, The Long Loneliness, in 1952, she
had been a Catholic for twenty years. For most of that time, Day published the Catholic
Worker newspaper, served food and coffee to lines of poor workers, and housed those
with nowhere else to go. These acts of mercy, as Day often repeats, fulfilled the dictum of
Saint John of the Cross, who once said, “Where there is no love, put love, and you will
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find love.”
Dwight MacDonald writes that as of 1952, “The Catholic Workers are no longer
quite as active in public affairs as they once were, and the circulation of their paper has
shown a corresponding slump. It is nevertheless still fairly high—fifty-eight thousand,
which is about equal to the combined circulations of the Nation and the New Republic”
(46). The drop in readership almost certainly came as a result of both the Workers’
continued communist sympathies at the onset of the Cold War and, for that matter, their
pacifist opposition to American participation in any war. During World War II, Day drew
attention to Japanese Internment and condemned the dropping of atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. In a piece from 1952 titled “No Party Line,” Day tries to
demonstrate the Workers’ nonpartisanship:
We have gone to Protestant meetings to listen to Thomas Sugrue and I have
written favorably of him in the Commonweal; I have spoken at Carnegie Hall
against the Smith and McCarron acts, with Communists and fellow travellors [sic];
others of us have walked on picket lines protesting the payment of income tax and
lastly there have been four days of picketing the Spanish consulate in New York in
protest against the executions of the five Spanish trade unionists… On this last
picket line, a young Negro girl, commenting on The Catholic Worker, said to a
fellow radical, “These Catholic Workers will demonstrate with anybody.” Perhaps
it was meant as an insult (we Catholics are very sensitive to insult) but one could
also understand it to mean, in St. Paul’s words, we were trying to be all things to
all men. (1,7)
Dorothy Day’s Catholicism was clearly not the artful traditionalism of an Evelyn Waugh
or Graham Greene, nor did it project the newly found acceptance of Catholics into
mainstream America exemplified by Cardinal Francis Joseph Spellman or Bishop Fulton
Sheen, whose ABC television program Life is Worth Living, as Christopher Owen Lynch
writes, “constructed his television message to alleviate tensions” “between the [US]
Catholic subculture…and American Protestantism” (2). At a time when Catholics were

129

toeing the Cold War line in order to assimilate to US popular culture, Dorothy Day
remained steadfast both in daily acts of charity toward the poor and her nonviolent
rejection of American empire.
Flannery O’Connor was not this sort of Catholic. While many of her fellow white
southern writers—particularly Robert Penn Warren, Eudora Welty, and her friend Maryat
Lee—engaged with midcentury social movements, O’Connor did not fight for civil rights
or, really, any political cause. Worried, for example, by the Vatican II challenges to the
Latin mass, the Georgia author wrote to her friend Betty Hester in 1959, “I am one of the
laymen who RESIST the congregation yapping out the mass in English & my reason
besides a neurotic fear of change, anxiety and laziness is that I do not like the raw sound
of the human voice in unison unless it is under the discipline of music” (The Habit of
Being 356). The subject of numerous biographies44 a Library of America induction, a US
postage stamp, and a dedicated scholarly journal in continuous print since 1971, Flannery
O’Connor is the most celebrated and studied American Catholic Writer of the 20th
Century, and all of this despite having only published fiction over a span of 13 years. The
plot points are familiar to many. An early and promising MFA recipient from the Iowa
Writers Workshop, Flannery O’Connor contracted lupus (the disease which had also killed
her father) and was forced in 1951 to live with her Mother Regina at Andalusia, the family
dairy farm in Milledgeville, Georgia. There Flannery raised peacocks, wrote for two hours
each morning in her room, and attended daily mass until her death in 1964 at the age of
39. Due to the diligence of her literary executors Sally and Robert Fitzgerald and her
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publisher Robert Giroux, O’Connor’s short career resulted in what one mentor of mine
called an “industrial-strength hagiography” substantial enough to fuel, for one example, a
book such as Daniel Moran’s Creating Flannery O’Connor, a 264 page monograph
dedicated solely to explaining the writer’s steady accumulation of cultural capital over
half a century. O’Connor wrote short book reviews for the Diocese newspaper, spent her
days writing violent and comical stories, and avoided political discussions with her
friends. O’Connor’s Christian orthodoxy, unlike Dorothy Day, did not motivate her to
participate in civil disobedience, advocate nonviolence, or spend her days giving coffee
and bread to the poor.
Perhaps more surprising is that O’Connor unabashedly proclaimed the truth of
Christianity as oppositional to a midcentury development Amy Hungerford has called
“postmodern belief,” the “belief without meaning [which] becomes both a way to maintain
religious belief rather than critique its institutions and a way to buttress the authority of the
literature that seeks to imagine such belief” (Postmodern Belief xiii). Of O’Connor,
Hungerford says in passing that the writer’s adherence to New Criticism while also an
Orthodox Christian makes her a willing participant in an “uncritical” literature
“liberated…from doctrine” in favor of a belief in Literature’s separateness from mass
culture (ibid 16-17). Undoubtedly, Hungerford’s literary history of religion’s influence on
writing since 1960 resists a tendency in the secularization thesis to ignore persistent
patterns of religion in the Twentieth Century US. However, as Thomas Haddox has argued
of Christian authors, “to take Christian orthodoxy seriously means to entertain (if not
necessarily to accept) the primacy of truth over desire, utility, and custom, and to remain
open to the content as well as the forms of Christian belief” (Hard Sayings 4). By writing
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artfully about charity, as O’Connor does, the author claims a space in the midcentury US
that simultaneously critiques institutional answers to addressing poverty while willingly
participating in those same institutions, namely the church. If Dorothy Day found a source
for her activism and charitable work in a synthesis of Catholic social teaching and Marxist
critique, O’Connor foregrounded her view of charity, informed as it was by a rich
engagement in the Western history of ideas, always first and foremost with the church.
Grotesque Charity
In 1960, a group of nuns from Atlanta’s Our Lady of Perpetual Help Free Cancer
Home wrote to Flannery O’Connor, nearby in Milledgeville, to ask if she would consider
writing a novel about a young girl, recently deceased, named Mary Ann. After an initial
balk at this request—“A novel, I thought. Horrors.”—O’Connor eventually persuaded the
sisters that they had better write a nonfictional account of Mary Ann’s life themselves.45
The celebrated novelist would eventually agree to edit the book, help secure a publisher,
and compose a preface. Introducing A Memoir of Mary Ann, O’Connor writes, “It is
always difficult to get across to people who are not professional writers that a talent to
write does not mean a talent to write anything at all. I did not wish to imbibe Mary Ann’s
atmosphere. I was not capable of writing her story” (“Preface to A Memoir of Mary Ann”
213). She elaborates: “Although I heard from Sister Evangelist that they were about it, I
felt that a few attempts to capture Mary Ann in writing would lead them to think better of
the project…[T]hey were busy nurses and had their hands full following a strenuous
vocation” (“Preface to A Memoir of Mary Ann” 222).
O’Connor considered herself a talented writer mostly incapable of performing the
45
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“strenuous vocation” of charitable work. The Sisters, however, believed that O’Connor’s
work somehow combined the same grotesque imagery and moral quandaries of charity
embodied by Mary Ann’s nine years living with a terminal illness at Our Lady of
Perpetual Help. Where O’Connor saw herself as incapable of “imbibing” Mary Ann’s
atmosphere, her readers to that point in 1960 could just as easily have seen her as imbibing
very little else. She wrote of adult children taken ill after exploiting their parents’
caretaking, a polish war refugee killed under the watch of the Georgia woman in whose
care he has been placed, and children killed by the neglect of inattentive social workers
and the whim of nihilistic escaped convicts. When faced with the fact of Mary Ann’s
death and the desire to convey it, the question for O’Connor becomes not whether these
acts can be written effectively but what constraints bring about these difficulties in the
first place. Her preface to A Memoir of Mary Ann provided for O’Connor an opportunity
to reflect on why, exactly, her stories tend toward her characteristic mixture of violence
and comedy.
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Free Cancer Home was founded by Rose Hawthorne
Lathrop, then daughter of Nathaniel Hawthorne renamed Mother Mary Alphonsa after
taking her sacred vows.46 For O’Connor, Mary Ann “stands not only for herself but for all
the other examples of human imperfection and grotesquerie which the Sisters of Rose
Hawthorne’s order spend their lives caring for” (CW 831). She goes on to say, “This
action by which charity grows invisibly among us, entwining the living and the dead, is
called the Church of the Communion of Saints. It is a communion created upon human
imperfection, created from what we make of our grotesque state” (ibid.). By weaving
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together imperfection, charity, and the “grotesquerie” of the cancer home, O’Connor here
draws connections between her work and that of the Sisters in the same way her preface
seeks to explain the relationship between Mother Alphonsa’s charitable work and her
father, Nathaniel Hawthorne’s, writing. The question becomes how to bridge the Sisters’
real-life charitable vocation, caring for terminal cancer patients without seeking a cure for
their disease, and that of Flannery O’Connor, who wrote stories in which characters live,
die, and suffer at her choosing. Remembering John Hawkes’ critique of O’Connor’s
“demonic presence,” just how far is the gap between responding to human suffering with
love and creating a fictional “grotesquerie” of characters who suffer and then, more often
than not, die a horrible death?
Flannery O’Connor’s answer to this question involved deploying a writing style
bereft of compassion, tenderness, and innocence so that their absence would be impossible
to ignore. All of these concepts, for O’Connor, were indelibly linked with a sentimental
tradition in American letters that she sought to avoid at all costs, but her aesthetic
commitment to reveal “human imperfection” and “our grotesque state” extended also to
her critique of modernity itself.
O’Connor’s appeal to charity’s action “invisibly among us” comes in response to
the preface’s most infamous passage:
One of the tendencies of our age is to use the suffering of children to discredit the
goodness of God, and once you have discredited his goodness, you are done with
him...Ivan Karamazov cannot believe, as long as one child is in torment; Camus’
hero cannot accept the divinity of Christ, because of the massacre of the innocents.
In this popular piety, we mark our gain in sensibility and our loss in vision. If other
ages felt less, they saw more, even though they saw with the blind, prophetical,
unsentimental eye of acceptance, which is to say, of faith. In the absence of this
faith now we govern by tenderness. It is tenderness which, long since cut off from
the person of Christ, is wrapped in theory. When tenderness is detached from the
source of tenderness, its logical outcome is terror. It ends in forced-labor camps
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and in the fumes of the gas chamber. (Collected Works 830)
Deriding what she calls “governing by tenderness,” O’Connor characterizes modernity as
a terrorizing banalization of charity. “Tenderness” for O’Connor provides a vehicle to
explain the combination of sentimentalism, “popular piety,” and the version of Jesus
Christ “wrapped in theory” that all, in O’Connor’s estimation, obscure a writer’s vision,
their very ability to tell truth without reliance on a socio-scientific explanation for that
truth. The word she liked to use for her faith in “blind truth” was mystery. O’Connor’s
mention of blindness harkens back to Hazel Motes’s self-blinding near the end of Wise
Blood, her first novel. Relating “governing by tenderness” to Haze’s quest for meaning
outside the church of his elders, Susan Edmunds writes that “For O’Connor, the modern
and the sentimental came together most clearly in the ameliorative state agendas of the
twentieth century. From her religious vantage point, state-sponsored attempts to improve
the human condition were just bigger, more powerful versions of [Hazel Motes’] Church
without Christ” (Grotesque Relations 182). I will say more below about O’Connor’s
engagement with tax- funded aid in The Violent Bear it Away as oppositional to charity,
but I would disagree with Edmunds that O’Connor’s “governing by tenderness” amounts
to a thoroughgoing critique of the welfare state. In a preface concerned primarily with
understanding how charity’s grotesque possibilities somehow exist both in the cancer
home and O’Connor’s stories, the author seems overall more concerned with how a
writerly commitment to “compassion” stifles the critical potential of fiction. O’Connor
may very well have believed, as the end of the passage indicates, that the holocaust
happened due to an absence of faith in Jesus Christ or, as Edmunds argues, a belief in the
government as ultimate arbiter of care harm’s a writer’s sense of reality.
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Importantly, however, O’Connor also constructs the “govern by tenderness”
passage as a response to the fictional Ivan Karamazov and Jean-Baptiste Clamence’s
unbelief in God due to “the suffering of children.”In particular, Camus’s hero in The Fall
uses the biblical Massacre of the Innocents47 as the primary reason for his atheism. A
loving God, Clemence reasons, would not have done such a thing. If “governing by
tenderness” is the result of using the suffering of children to “discredit the goodness of
God,” and in turn governing by tenderness somehow leads to the terror experienced during
the Holocaust, how does all of this come about due to an aversion to children suffering?
Joshua Pederson has argued that O’Connor’s apparent defense of the suffering of dying
children simply comes as a result of Christianity’s belief in redemptive violence. He
writes, “O’Connor’s deep understanding of orthodox Christian scripture and theology—
and more specifically, ‘objective’ atonement—allows her to accept the death of children
as a mysterious but crucial part of the divine plan” (The Forsaken Son 43). After
conveying O’Connor’s own sense that any “legitimate” critic will need to read the preface
to A Memoir of Mary Ann “even and particularly” in order to write about her work,
Pederson writes: “The importance of this meditation on the death of a child becomes
apparent when one reflects on just how frequently children die in her fiction” (ibid. 41). In
service of his larger argument, that a “child murder as atonement motif” pervades 20th
Century American literature in order to legitimize and maintain the US’s larger belief in
the myth of redemptive violence, Pederson concludes that because O’Connor’s religion
requires sacrificial death for eternal atonement, she kills an awful lot of children in her
stories to get that point across to her readers.
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I would agree with Joshua Pederson, and Gary Ciuba and Marshall Bruce Gentry
before him,48 that O’Connor’s use of violence often stems from an attempt to convey the
incarnational suffering of Jesus on the cross in a manner intended to induce shock in her
readers. We need look no further than, as I discuss below, Bishop in The Violent Bear it
Away, but also Mary Fortune Pitts in “A View of the Woods,” Norton from “The Lame
Shall Enter First,” and Harry (aka “Bevel”) Ashfield from “The River” to see the validity
in Pederson’s argument. However, even though all of these characters are children when
they die, just as Mary Ann was a child when she died at Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Cancer Home, O’Connor’s grotesque death scenes are not as ageist as Pederson, for one,
seems to think. The grandmother at the end of “A Good Man is Hard to Find,” for
example, or Mrs. May, gored by a bull at the end of “Greenleaf,” would disagree. I want
to suggest, instead, that O’Connor’s dead children evince a deeper engagement with a
concept, often tied to children, that is crucial to understanding both her treatment of
modern charity in The Violent Bear it Away and the relationship between the grotesque
and “governing by tenderness”: innocence.
Innocence in The Violent Bear it Away
Flannery O’Connor saw innocence as problematically tied to sentiment and,
further, drew upon that connection as a way to further explain what she means by
“governing by tenderness”:
sentimentality is an excess, a distortion of sentiment usually in the direction of an
overemphasis on innocence, and…innocence, whenever it is overemphasized in
the ordinary human condition, tends by some natural law to become its opposite.
We lost our innocence in the Fall, and our return to it is through the Redemption
which was brought about by Christ’s death and by our slow participation in it.
48
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Sentimentality is a skipping of this process in its concrete reality and an early
arrival at a mock state of innocence, which strongly suggests its opposite. (“The
Church and the Fiction Writer” 148)
In this view, sentimentalism not only obscures human weakness but also indicates a
“mock state of innocence, which strongly suggests its opposite.” For O’Connor, then, the
harmful amalgam of charity and innocence reveals the extent to which poverty and human
suffering had become inundated with a modern belief in the power of social engineering to
replace caritas as the ascendant cultural ethic of care.
In “Some Aspects of the Grotesque in Southern Fiction,” written and delivered
within a year of both her preface to A Memoir of Mary Ann and the publication of The
Violent Bear it Away, O’Connor extends her critique of sentimentality as an amoral extension of
what she calls “hazy compassion”:

in this country, the general reader has managed to connect the grotesque with the
sentimental, for whenever he [sic] speaks of it favorably, he seems to associate it
with the writer’s compassion…The kind of hazy compassion now demanded of the
writer now makes it difficult for him to be anti-anything. Certainly when the
grotesque is used in a legitimate way, the intellectual and moral judgments implicit
in it will have the ascendancy over feeling. (CW 817)
Echoing here James Baldwin’s worry that sentimentalism signals “a secret and violent
inhumanity, the mask of cruelty,” O’Connor finds in the grotesque an antidote for the type
of writerly “compassion” which obscures what she saw as the realism of “human
weakness” (“Everybody’s Protest Novel” 14). Interestingly, in a recorded version of her
speech, O’Connor revises this portion in order to elaborate on what she means by a
“writer’s compassion.” She says, sarcastically, to a group of writing students at Wesleyan
College in Macon, Georgia: “If you write about freaks, you do so out of compassion. It’s
considered an absolute necessity that writers these days have a certain amount of
compassion. Compassion is a word that sounds good in anybody’s mouth” (“Flannery
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O’Connor reads ‘Some Aspects of the Grotesque in Southern Fiction’ (c. 1960)”). She
concludes, “It’s a quality that nobody can put his finger on in any exact critical sense, and
so the word is always safe for anybody to use” (ibid.). Compassion, in O’Connor’s
rendering, implies treating one’s characters with a certain amount of dignity, not, as in her
early stories, allowing some bible salesman to steal your disabled heroine’s wooden leg or
having a Polish holocaust refugee crushed under the weight of a tractor on the Georgia
farm where he has been placed. To write about a “freak” using a certain amount of
“compassion” means labeling that freak innocent, and the “overemphasis” on this
innocence, O’Connor suggests, leads to a problematic sentimentalism that “suggests its
opposite.” Innocence, then, becomes one “intellectual and moral judgment” O’Connor’s
grotesque style allows to ascend “over feeling” (CW 817).
Political anthropologist Miriam Ticktin, who primarily studies patterns of
humanitarian aid for refugees in Europe,49 has argued recently that “ideas and images of
innocence—and the moral imperative they engender—have a long history of actually
hurting those they intend to help” (“A World Without Innocence” 577). For Ticktin,
innocence is not problematic simply because it belittles or infantilizes the one labeled
innocent. Ticktin argues, rather, that innocence “helps distinguish morally acceptable
forms of knowledge, action, and experience, and these are inevitably tied to one’s being in
the world. That is, innocence is defined not simply by a period of life called ‘childhood’ or
by outside standards such as age but by…class, gender, and racial background, among
other positionalities, histories, and experiences” (580). Ultimately, innocence

49

See especially her Casualties of Care: Immigration and the Politics of Humanitarianism in France (UC
Press 2011) and In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care (edited with Ilana Feldman,
Duke 2010). Ticktin is currently expanding her essay “A World Without Innocence” (American Ethnologist
44:4) into a short book project.

139

problematically legitimizes and perpetuates an unending search for purity:
Insofar as there is no pure state of innocence—the concept derives from an
imaginary or mythical past, and it enables us to imagine that we can be the authors
of our future—a politics based on innocence requires not only the search for but
also the production of innocent victims, since the “pure” victim is a placeholder,
always just out of reach. (583)
To care for these “innocent victims,” finally “Innocence is part of a conceptual apparatus
that demarcates human kinds, purporting to value the most naive, the most inactive, the
most childlike, while simultaneously setting up another class of people on whom these
innocents must depend” (582).
One important engine for innocence, in Ticktin’s critique, is pity. She writes,
echoing Luc Boltanski,50 “pity sets up two classes of people, the fortunate and the
unfortunate, where the unfortunate are often regarded as victims” (582). Pity, like
tenderness, compassion, or even sentiment; would relegate one of O’Connor’s “freaks” to
a space of victimhood that strips them of an opportunity for equality with the one who
feels pity for them. O’Connor’s critique of “hazy compassion,” in this way, signifies the
same problematic condition as pity, because both sentiments relegate their object to a state
of innocence that “acts as the boundary for liberal ideas of personhood, where this
constituent outside is simultaneously idealized and denigrated” (Ticktin 579). Susan
Edmunds relates this configuration back to charity:
Like a number of other prominent religious thinkers of her time, O’Connor
associates the welfare state’s secular project of social amelioration with a
corruption of charity’s biblical meaning. This corruption—or, as she believed,
sentimentalization—of the concept springs from the false positing of human
innocence, a refusal of the necessity of human suffering, and a consequent faith in
the duty and power of human beings to perfect themselves” (Grotesque Relations
183).
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Rather than identifying suffering as a “necessity” in O’Connor, as Edmunds does, I want
to draw attention to the premise about innocence this necessity indicates, one Joshua
Pederson similarly makes by connecting “objective atonement” with the number of
children characters who die in O’Connor’s fiction.
O’Connor relates to Ticktin’s claim that innocence operates primarily by parsing
“different kinds of suffering, qualifying them; it provides a moral and cultural frame by
which to judge them. Differently stated, innocence inserts hierarchy into the concept of
suffering. Suffering could be understood in other ways—perhaps as more wide ranging—
without innocence” (587). O’Connor would argue that charity, as a response to inevitable
human suffering, is one “perhaps more wide ranging” version of suffering Ticktin sees
stifled by standards of liberal personhood. Ticktin maintains that by underscoring
innocence “it is not [her] goal to recuperate a normative liberal idea of humanity as
composed of rational, autonomous, agentive beings, I do want to mark this as the opposite
of such a normative humanity, one that leaves no space for other ways of being in the
world” (579). One such “other way of being in the world” would be to avoid sentiments—
hazy compassion, uncharitable tenderness—in such a way that draws attention to the ways
in which innocence creates pitied victims instead of fellow humans with potential we may
not recognize. To show hazy compassion toward a “freak” because they are a “freak” is to
imbue in them with a purity that labels them a victim of simply being who they are. When
O’Connor shows the suffering of grotesque characters, she draws attention to just how
uncharitable innocence can be.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------O’Connor published her second novel, The Violent Bear it Away, in 1960. The
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novel tells of backwoods prophet Mason “Old Man” Tarwater, George “The
Schoolteacher” Rayber (his liberal intellectual nephew), Francis Tarwater (Mason and
Rayber’s teenage nephew), Bernice “The Welfare Woman” Bishop (Rayber’s wife, an
apparent social worker), and Bishop (Bernice and Rayber’s young son, who has an
undisclosed intellectual disability resembling Downs Syndrome). The grotesque form
often resists an easily discerned allegorical reading, but when considering charity in The
Violent Bear it Away, it is tempting to read the novel in allegorical terms. George Rayber,
that epitome of the Flannery O’Connor failed and petulant liberal man, projects the cold,
scientifically inflected behaviorism of B.F. Skinner, fused with the clinical hope of
someone like Fredric Wertham, the New York therapist who in 1954 had simultaneously
argued for the morally corrupting influence of comic books and the adverse psychological
effects of school segregation. It is Rayber’s actions—or more importantly, his narrated
intentions— which often garner the most ire from readers, leading Harold Bloom to
conclude, for example, that the caricatured schoolteacher is the only feature of
O’Connor’s novel keeping it from being the greatest American novel of the 20th Century
(8). Rayber seems an analytical foil to Old Man Tarwater’s supposed fundamentalism, but
importantly O’Connor renders their respective pieties as both insidious and irreconcilable.
If the novel’s ideological stakes lie somewhere in the space between Rayber’s liberalism
and Mason’s prophetic conservatism, O’Connor paints the novel’s two minors, Francis
and Bishop, as the victims of this rift.
O’Connor often embeds Rayber and the Old Man’s reasons for their own version
of charity as a subtext in her narration, tied now in the novel’s middle and third section
alternately to Francis’s and Rayber’s consciousness. For example, just as Rayber is about
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to exclaim to Old Man Tarwater that “As a gesture of human dignity” young Bishop will
not be baptized, O’Connor interjects Francis’s perception of this message, that “the boy
heard [Rayber’s] voice turn low with a kind of subdued intensity, a passion equal and
opposite to the old man’s” (34). Rayber’s “equal and opposite” passions are, of course,
fleshed out in the novel’s middle third, as it becomes increasingly obvious that his main
reason in wanting to educate Young Francis is to prove his Uncle wrong in his faith and,
even further, in his tendency to kidnap his nephews in order to instill that faith.
This particular tension—between Rayber’s confluence of protecting Bishop’s
dignity with proving his uncle wrong—is further magnified when Rayber follows Francis
to a church meeting and becomes captivated by the sermon of the young preacher Lucette
Carmody, a child of American missionaries on furlough from Africa and visiting
congregations to ask for money. In retelling the nativity, Lucette preaches that Jesus has
come into the world “warmed by the breath of an ox” and “You and I know…what the
world hoped then. The world hoped old Herod would slay the right child, the world hoped
old Herod wouldn’t waste those children, but he wasted them. He didn’t get the right one.
Jesus grew up and raised the dead” (132). The child preacher uses the Massacre of the
Innocents to illustrate the failure of “the world’s” hopes to kill Jesus. Herod, in this case,
represents “the world,” linking Mason Tarwater’s own railing against Rayber’s wife,
Bernice “the welfare woman” Bishop (so named after a Herod), with Lucette’s homiletics.
The cruel machinations of the state, killing all children to kill one (The Christ),
underscores Mason’s fears that Rayber and Bernice would have turned Francis into some
statistic. This bit prompts Rayber to feel “his spirit born aloft. But not those dead! he
cried, not the innocent children, not you, not me when I was a child, not Bishop, not
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Frank! and he had a vision of himself moving like an avenging angel through the world,
gathering up all the children that the Lord, not Herod, had slain” (132). Particularly when
taken alongside his relationship with Bernice Bishop, Rayber clearly blames God instead
of the state for the Massacre of the Innocents. Lucette, by contrast, preaches a free will
theology of state responsibility for a “waste” of human life instead of Rayber’s
deterministic insistence that it is God’s fault for not saving them. He envisions himself
“gathering up all the children that the Lord, not Herod, had slain” (132). As John F.
Desmond writes, “Rayber blames Jesus, not Herod, for the murder of the Innocents, just as
he blames God for Bishop and Mason for his own and young Tarwater’s lost ‘innocence’
and exploitation by belief” (49).
But here again in The Violent Bear it Away, O’Connor’s use of narrative
perspective turns an otherwise simple binary—in this scene, between exploitation and
dignity—on its head. Everything the reader knows in the scene comes from a narrator
oriented primarily to Rayber’s consciousness. Reflecting on Lucette’s sermon on the other
side of the storefront church’s window:
To Rayber, she [Lucette] was like one of those birds blinded to make it sing more
sweetly. Her voice had the tone of a glass bell. His pity encompassed all exploited
children—himself when he was a child, [Francis] exploited by the old man, this
child exploited by parents, Bishop exploited by the very fact he was alive. (131)
Rayber’s pity for Lucette is peculiar, especially since the remainder of the passage shows
him relating her own experience to him. His inability to empathize with her,
paradoxically, comes from an overwhelming reliving of his own past. As Ticktin suggests
about pity, Rayber’s feelings about Lucette force him to immediately see her as an
unfortunate victim of her parent’s exploitation. But strangely, the scene calls for “pity” as
Rayber relives his own past experiences with Mason, and as Lucette begins to preach, “A
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deep shock went through him. He was certain that the child had looked directly into his
heart and seen his pity. He felt that some mysterious connection was established between
them (131). Notably, Rayber’s fuming over Lucette occurs as she tries to preach to him
and those gathered about the gospel. He imagines that he might be able to help her, in
other words, as he prooftexts what she is trying to say to him against the memory of his
own traumatic childhood. To Rayber, Lucette’s parents exploit their daughter as a shill for
their own misguided mission, just as Mason had hidden Francis, and Rayber before him,
away in Powderhead ostensibly so he would have someone to whom he could prophesy.
As framed, the scene draws Rayber’s pity for both Lucette and Francis in terms of
his own victimization; and his own past suffering, in his logic, makes him best suited to
cure them. However, just as he damns the Carmody family for exploiting Lucette, Rayber
inflates his own perceived ability to help children like her. The narrator says, “Rayber saw
himself fleeing with the child to some enclosed garden where he would teach her the truth,
where he would gather all the exploited children of the world and let the sunshine flood
their minds” (133). As readers, we know such a project for Rayber would be fruitless
based on his own inability to teach Francis “the truth.” The novel makes clear, here as
elsewhere, that the schoolteacher’s desire to cure innocent children is always already
framed by his own experience. Wrenched from his own messianic fantasy, Rayber finds
himself taken aback when Lucette chooses to speak to him directly, saying “I see a
damned soul before my eye! I see a dead man Jesus hasn’t raised. His head is in the
window but his ear is deaf to the Holy Word!…Be Saved in the Lord’s fire or perish in
your own!” (135) In response to her addressing him directly, Rayber simply turns off his
hearing aid, bringing about “A silent dark relief [that] enclosed him like shelter after a
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tormenting wind” (135). Leaving the tabernacle, Rayber “wanted nothing but to get back
home and sink into his own bed, whether [Francis] returned or not” (135). With his pity
spent for the night and not rewarded with acceptable feedback from its object, Rayber
finds himself no longer consumed with the desire to save Francis from his ignorance.
Rayber does not even care that his nephew, having also suffered Lucette’s preaching, now
for the first time seems expectant of a connection with his only living uncle. Francis’s
face, upon his return from the tabernacle, was “drained but expectant, lingered a moment
at the threshold of [Rayber’s] door as if waiting for an invitation to enter” (137). Rayber
repeatedly thwarts his own fantasy of preventing another Massacre of the Innocents by his
unwillingness to actually listen to what the “innocents” might have to say for themselves.
Rayber, at one point reflecting on Francis’s affliction, “wondered if the boy were capable
of the steadiness of pity” (10).
The Lucette Carmody incident marks the limits of how far Rayber is willing to go
to address Francis’s innocence, revealing pity’s inadequacy when compared to charity. By
“wondering if the boy were capable of the steadiness of pity,” Rayber further identifies
himself not only as more knowledgeable than Francis but also more capable to recognize
when someone meets the qualifications of innocence and earns his pity. By ignoring
Francis after they return from Lucette’s sermon, Rayber also shows his preference for
thought over action. Kate Beeson has noticed that O’Connor’s short stories often feature
characters overwhelmed with thoughts of pity. This preoccupation with thought promotes
a recognition of praxis in the reader that O’Connor saw as oppositional to compassion
(Beeson 2). Just as a grotesque story devoid of charity draws attention to its absence,
Flannery O’Connor often highlights the inaction of her characters most devoted to concern
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for the poor, downtrodden, and innocent.
“Not Charity or Anything Like It!”: Instrumental Reason as Uncharity
I have argued that that notions of victimization and innocence, in part, fuel The
Violent Bear it Away’s engagement with modern charity. In particular, I have tried to draw
connections between innocence, charity, and O’Connor’s essays on the grotesque and her
approach to writing. Before turning to the novel’s treatment of public aid as an opposing
yet complicated force to charity, I will now draw on another facet of the novel’s charity
politics. In addition to the banalization of charity O’Connor identifies in problematic
sentiments like innocence, her worries about “governing by tenderness” are manifest in a
critique of the inherent goodness of scientific knowledge and instrumental reason. As I
discuss in the introduction, instrumental reason is one of Charles Taylor’s “malaises of
modernity” that frame the writers’ in this dissertation’s treatment of private charity as
opposition to their modern context. Taylor summarizes instrumental reasoning this way:
Once society no longer has a sacred structure, once social arrangements and modes
of action are no longer grounded in the order of things or the will of God, they are
in a sense up for grabs. They can be redesigned with their consequences for the
happiness and well- being of individuals as our goal. The yardstick that henceforth
applies is that of instrumental reason. Similarly, once the creatures that surround us
lose the significance that accrued to their place in the chain of being, they are open
to being treated as raw materials or instruments for our projects…We can think of
the way much of our social planning, in crucial areas like risk assessment, is
dominated by forms of cost-benefit analysis that involve grotesque calculations,
putting dollar assessments on human lives. (The Ethics of Authenticity 5-6)
Taken in view of charity as O’Connor theorizes it, the ”grotesque calculations” brought
about in instrumental reason prove to be just as dehumanizing as the “hierarchies of
suffering” involved in innocence. Instead of the more amorphous measure of one’s
“suffering,” a person’s suffering is instead quantified and addressed based on an
impersonal calculation. Just as she identifies innocence as a problematic sentiment, for
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O’Connor instrumental reason is nearly always wielded by the liberal “governors of
tenderness” she excoriates in the Memoir of Mary Ann preface.
Many O’Connor scholars claim, and indeed O’Connor herself argued, that the
most important and climactic scene in the The Violent Bear it Away comes when Francis
drowns Bishop, ostensibly mirroring the symbolic act of baptizing him. However, when
paying attention to the novel’s treatment of instrumental reasoning, I would argue Rayber
and Mason’s inciting misunderstanding about charity becomes just as important. As an
inciting incident, everything else in the novel flows from an argument that became the
impetus for Mason kidnapping Francis in the first place. Old Man Tarwater takes the boy
in response to what he perceives as his nephew Rayber’s false charity:
[Mason] had lived for three months in the nephew’s house on what he had thought
at the time was Charity but what he said he had found out was not Charity or
anything like it. All the time he had lived there, the nephew had secretly been
making a study of him. The nephew, who had taken him in under the name of
Charity, had at the same time been creeping into his soul by the back door, asking
him questions that meant more than one thing, planting traps around the house and
watching him fall into them, and finally coming up with a written study of him for
a schoolteacher magazine. The stench of his behaviour [sic] had reached heaven
and the Lord Himself had rescued the old man. (4)
Later, Tarwater elaborates to Francis that “I saved you to be free, your own self!…and not
a piece of information inside his head! If you were living with him, you’d be information
right now, you’d be inside his head” (16). This “false charity” occurrence does just as
much symbolic lifting in the novel as Bishop’s murder-baptism. The incident underscores
not only the dueling prophesies of Mason Tarwater and George Rayber; it introduces the
concepts and ideological disconnects that will condition Francis’s own time in Rayber’s
home, his murdering Bishop, his vision of the loaves and fishes at Powderhead, and his
succumbing to the call to be a prophet.
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The problem with Old Man Tarwater and Rayber’s charity disconnect, at least
from the old man’s perspective, had partly to do with expectations. The narrator, oriented
to Mason’s thoughts, says, “The old man had not known when he went there to live that
every living thing that passed through the nephew’s eyes into his head was turned by his
brain into a book or a paper or a chart” (19). Rayber had interviewed the old man many
times about his being a prophet. The old man had perceived Rayber’s interest as that of a
disciple hoping to become a prophet himself, but the nephew’s interest is revealed to be
primarily descriptive, Rayber’s attempt to represent his uncle nonfictionally as a “dying
form of human” in a schoolteacher magazine. O’Connor goes on to write, “The old man
had thought this interest in his forebears would bear fruit, but what it bore, what it bore,
stench and shame, were dead words. What it bore was a dry and seedless fruit, incapable
even of rotting, dead from the beginning” (19). After fulminating about this line for a
time, OMT reassures Francis, “Here I sit. And there you sit. In freedom. Not inside
anybody’s head!” (20). When the old man becomes an object of scientific study instead of
a recipient of sincere charity, questions of dignity and suffering again are pitted against
instrumental reasoning.
Charity would apparently in the Old Man’s eyes have been, at a minimum, sincere
and unscientific. This raises the question of what would amount to a legitimate charitable
relationship between Rayber and his Uncle. Old Man Tarwater’s disgust with his
nephew’s academic writing is fueled by a sort of fear that this act will somehow trap him
in Rayber’s “head” and, thereby, grant the nephew control over the Uncle. We know this
because O’Connor’s third-person limited narrator grants the reader access to Tarwater’s
perspective of this initial account of the “not Charity or anything like it” problem.
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“Creeping into his soul by the back door,” Old Man Tarwater sees Rayber’s non-charity as
problematic not because Rayber has ulterior motives for housing his prophetic uncle but
because the schoolteacher’s program is filled with coercive contingencies. In other words,
it is not Rayber’s desire for prestige among his peers that provides the bugbear for
O’Connor in her account of Rayber and Old Man Tarwater’s charitable disconnect.
Rather, the fact that Rayber’s actions toward his uncle, with their “setting traps around the
house and watching him fall into them” and “asking him questions that meant more than
one thing” (4), instrumentalizes their charitable relationship, an act that in the old
prophet’s eyes can only be remedied by excising his young nephew from the
schoolteacher and raising Francis “up to justify his Redemption” (5).
In Mason’s eyes, Francis, as an orphan adopted by Rayber and his wife Bernice,
falls under the same strictures of charity he accuses the schoolteacher of violating. Not
understanding that Francis’s adoption involved a legal transaction whereby Rayber and
Bernice were granted parental rights, Mason abducts Francis in order to spare him from
becoming trapped in Rayber’s head, but also in response again to what he sees as “false
charity.” Gary Ciuba has described the abduction as Mason fulfilling a missional duty not
only to evangelize but also replicate the same coercive control he critiques in Rayber
under a different ideological framework:
O’Connor’s missionaries fail to the extent that they brazenly pursue power under
their own roofs and forego genuine benevolence. Clinging to their home rule, they
take their possessions to heart or seek to dominate to their invasive guests by
imposing on them a benignly inadequate ideology to explain away their trespasses.
O’Connor’s fiction tests the deep-down goodness of her seemingly admirable dogooders in order to expose the self-protection, self-satisfaction, and selfaggrandizement that militate against the politics of friendship. (234-5)
Old Man Tarwater spends the majority of the book’s opening third trying to convince
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Francis that abducting him was the right thing to do and, in fact, he had saved him from a
terrible fate in the home of “the schoolteacher” and “The Welfare Woman.”
Old Man Tarwater’s sense of Charity (always capitalized in the novel) is further
tested when he goes to town to his lawyer “to try to get the property unentailed so that it
would skip the schoolteacher and go to [Francis] Tarwater” (26). OMT explains to one
lawyer, “I thought I was finished, old and sick and about to die and no money, nothing,
and I accepted his hospitality because he was my closest blood connection and you could
have called it his duty to take me, only I thought it was Charity, I thought…” (29). The
lawyer simply responds, “I can’t help what you thought or did or what your connection
thought or did…I am only a lawyer” (29). Repeatedly, as we will see in his treatment of
social workers, Mason rejects the binding authority of modern institutions in order to put
forth his own orthodox sense of right and wrong. He finds it confusing that the legal realm
does not follow the same standards as his reading of the biblical text, and this fact fuels his
continued refusal to accept that his nephew’s false charity does not fall under the rule of
law. This disunity in the novel illustrates further a separation of politics from morality that
Old Man Tarwater does not share.
Uncharitable Aid: O’Connor’s Welfare Reform
In addition to the conceptual critiques of innocence and instrumental reason,
O’Connor’s novel, like Little Orphan Annie, also frames its action during the fundamental
changes to charitable structures occurring at midcentury. This is particularly manifest in
Mason Tarwater’s critiques of Rayber. O’Connor frames the synchronic narrative time of
The Violent Bear it Away with a diachronic historical time that fuses Biblical history with
US history, and notably in a way that avoids acknowledging the legitimacy of a welfare
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state. This becomes a key point to Old Man Tarwater as he emphasizes what is at stake in
his kidnapping young Francis away from the “schoolteacher.”51 O’Connor writes, “His
Uncle had taught [Francis] Figures, Reading, Writing, and History beginning with Adam
expelled from the garden and going down on through the presidents to Herbert Hoover
and on in speculation toward the Second Coming and the Day of Judgment” (4). Setting
relevant historical time as beginning with Adam and entering “speculation” after the
Hoover Administration, Old Man Tarwater juxtaposes the gravity of Biblical history with
the onset of the Great Depression. Herbert Hoover forward is simply “speculation toward
the Second Coming and the Day of Judgment,” the time between the one- term
philanthropist president and the apocalypse only mattering in so far as it prepares one for
the former. Mason’s fusion of biblical and US history has the effect of merging the two in
his pupil’s consciousness, a merger that demonstrates the intuitive blending of morality
and politics in the prophet and, in turn, his sense of charity. After having Mason as a
teacher, Francis has no reason to separate politics from religious moral commitment; for
him, American history is Biblical History is American history. Additionally, the New Deal
never happened.
Mason Tarwater’s status as an anti-welfare ascetic aligns him with at least one
midcentury prophet critical of public aid. Importantly, O’Connor was not the only
prominent female Catholic writer, nor the only anti-welfare ascetic, who questioned the
value of tax-funded public aid. Dorothy Day, for one, was very much against public aid
and often paired her scenes of poverty in The Long Loneliness with critiques against the
perceived indignity of welfare workers and governmental relief. Her abiding rebellion
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against state involvement in the Catholic Worker came to a head each April when she
refused to register the Worker as a nonprofit and, as such, faced repeated prosecution for
tax evasion. At points, she also excoriates public aid not so much on principle but for the
indignity with which she saw publicly-funded operations often carried out. Ultimately at
stake for Day was a conception of human suffering apart from that which was read by
relief offices and social welfare programs, but it was not only state aid’s instrumentalism
that bothered her:
I felt that the Church was the church of the poor, that St. Patrick’s had been built
from the pennies of servant girls, that it cared for the emigrant, it established
hospitals, orphanages, day nurseries, houses of the Good Shepherd, homes for the
aged, but at the same time, I felt that it did not set its face against a social order
which made so much charity in the present sense of the word necessary. I felt that
charity was a word to choke over. Who wanted charity? And it was not just human
pride but a strong sense of man’s dignity and worth, and what was due to him in
justice that made me resent, rather than feel proud of so mighty a sum total of
Catholic institutions. Besides, more and more they were taking help from the state,
and in taking from the state, they had to render to the state. They came under the
head of Community Chest and discriminatory charity, centralizing and
departmentalizing, involving themselves with bureaus, buildings, red tape,
legislation, at the expense of human values. (The Long Loneliness 150-151)
Though her advocacy against nonprofit status for her organization was fierce and
persistent, Day also attempted to project a sense of grace toward the state. In the span of 8
years, the State of New York had labeled her a slum lord for over-occupying the Catholic
Worker house with homeless men and women, evicted her group (for a cash settlement)
from their house on Chrystie Street for subway construction, and jailed her for refusing to
participate in air raid drills as an act of anti-war resistance (“On Pilgrimage – 1959”).
Trying to show more direct consideration for the importance of public aid, she ends one
1959 column this way:
I hope I do not sound bitter when I talk about the treatment of people on relief. It
all comes down to the attitude and the behavior of each individual employed by the
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city. Courtesy and respect for the poor, just because they are poor, seeing Christ in
each one, “inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these, ye have done it unto
me,” may sound easy, but of course it is not. We each one offend by impatience
seven times daily. We have to be forgiven seventy times seven, each one of us, at
the Catholic Worker family as well as in each individual family. The beginnings of
peace are at home, in one’s own heart. … One does not work for 26 years in the
Catholic Worker family and not realize this. But we also know, as St. John of the
Cross told us, that where there is no love, put love, and you will find love; and
where love is, God is, and true joy. (“On Pilgrimage – September 1959” 7)
Day and The Catholic Worker’s anti-statist charity politics, as a result, were not only
sourced from her theo-political commitments but the very practical consequences that
came from the group’s refusal to register as a nonprofit.
In addition to his obsessing over Rayber’s false sense of charity, Mason also finds
fault with Rayber’s choice for a wife, particularly due to her occupation. Bernice Bishop,
most frequently referred to in the novel as the “welfare woman,” only really appears in the
novel tangentially, through the fleeting memories of the narrator’s associated characters.
However, Mason repeatedly fixates on her liberal tempting of his nephew. Bernice’s
symbology ironically fuses biblical allusion and instrumental aid, through both
O’Connor’s naming and the welfare woman’s mysterious decision to abandon her son
Bishop upon learning he is intellectually disabled. For Old Man Tarwater, Bernice serves
both as an explanation for Rayber’s temptation away from the faith of his childhood and
toward the cold science of the state and a target of his scorn. Given The Violent Bear It
Away’s sustained engagement with modern charity, Bernice Bishop certainly does more
than merely that.
Bernice’s vaguely implied occupation as a social worker also aligns with the
stereotypical association of that profession with women at midcentury. In the early 1950s,
when O’Connor began writing this novel, Social Work had begun to find professional

154

legitimacy in the US. The Council on Social Work Education was founded in 1952, and
the National Association of Social Workers first met three years later. The profession most
readily associated with Jane Addams and Eleanor Roosevelt in the first half of the century
had also maintained its liberal, progressive image. Social workers, after all, tended to
advocate strongly for public funding for health and human services, and fiscal
conservatism threatened this practice. Ironically, it was actually the Eisenhower
Administration that established the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1953
(the same year the 501(c)3 nonprofit status was established) (Tannenbaum and Reisch).
Bernice, the “welfare woman’s” actual name, also derives from the Greek word
Βερνίκη (“Berniké”), meaning “victorious.” Biblically, Bernice was the daughter of
Salomé and King Herod the Great. According to the Book of Acts, Bernice was also a
particularly incestuous figure, having married her uncle (King Herod of Chalcis) and later
“lived incestuously” with her brother Herod Agrippa (Strong’s Biblical Concordance). It
is perhaps for this reason that Old Man Tarwater, steeped as he is in the finer points of
Biblical begets, finds her to possess “the most idiotic name in the language” and laughs on
command each time he or anyone else mentions it(78). Even further, the Herods held a
viceroy’s control over Jews in Roman-occupied Judea, and Bernice represents for Mason
her role as accomplice to the state against religious interest. Given the novel’s repeated
ovations to young Bishop’s “innocence,” Bernice’s Biblical lineage is even more
instructive. O’Connor names a woman who abandons her intellectually disabled son after
the daughter of Herod the Great, the king in the Biblical text who orders the “Massacre of
the Innocents” intended to kill the prophesied Christ child.
This question of worthiness I discussed in the Lucette Carmody scene appears
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again with Bernice Bishop’s absence from the lives of both her nephew and son. However,
unlike Rayber’s fantasy of rescuing Lucette, “the welfare woman’s” only sustained scene
in the novel comes early when she and Rayber come to Powderhead to excise Francis
from Mason’s control. O’Connor’s narrator, working at this point in the novel from the
vantage of Old Man Tarwater’s experience, says that the old man would tell
how the two of them, the nephew and the welfare-woman (whose very name was
comical—Bernice Bishop) had scuttled off, making a disappearing rattle in the
corn, and how the welfare-woman had screamed, “Why didn’t you tell me? You
knew he was crazy!” and how when they came out of the corn on the other side, he
had noted from the upstairs window where he had run that she had her arm around
the nephew and was holding him up while he hopped into the woods. Later, he
learned that he had married her though she was twice his age and he could only
possibly get one child out of her. She had never let him come back again. (9)
Violence scares off the welfare woman, and their recourse after failing to adopt Francis is
for the school teacher and the new dealer to marry and have their own child, a plan which
yields their intellectually disabled son Bishop whom Rayber repeatedly in the novel refers
to as “useless.” Of course, “welfare woman” in the 1950s was more or less a placeholder
for any governmental aid worker, whether a social worker or some other agency
representative. The suspicions surrounding these figures, particularly during the
Depression, stemmed often from the suspicion that the collection of family information
could lead to some kind of coercive governmental intervention or even, not insignificantly
in the historical 1950s Tennessee of O’Connor’s setting, the taking of one’s land in the
name of a TVA project. One thinks of Ulysses Everette McGill and company’s race to
find the treasure map in the house doomed to be flooded by the TVA in Joel and Ethan
Coen’s O Brother Where Art Thou?.
For Old Man Tarwater, this scene provides further evidence not only of his liberal
nephew’s lack of manliness--he needs a woman to hold him up after being shot--but also
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her coercive control over him. O’Connor writes, “[Bernice] had only to let out her breath
slowly as if she were releasing the last patience on earth and [Rayber] lifted his foot and
planted it on the step and the old man shot him in the leg” (7). The passage ends, after all,
“She had never let him come back again” after she blames Rayber for not telling her that
the old man “was crazy!” This vignette emphasizes that the welfare-woman not only
wishes to flee the scene after OMT shoots Rayber; she also adduces the Old Man’s
craziness as reason enough to not have gone in the first place. The trip is a failure not only
because it ends in violence but because Rayber fails, from her perspective, to give an
accurate picture of their likelihood for success.
The Mason-oriented narrator also says that Bernice left the scene “like a peahen
upset on the next” (6). O’Connor of course raised and opined on the significance of
peacocks,52 and such a comparison with a peahen as disheveled and in-passing as this
might have had a more imagistic import to the writer. However, it’s telling that by
marking the welfare woman as the female peacock, O’Connor paints her only woman
character’s project as antithetical to the christological symbology attributed to male
peacocks and their colorful plumage. O’Connor’s brief ornithological simile, in this way,
serves primarily as a means to explain Rayber’s subservience to liberal social institutions.
His wife, symbolically, is the same species as Christ but not the ideal expression with a
fan of blue and green plumage.
O’Connor reinforces this connection between Rayber, Bernice, and the
government later when a truancy officer comes by the Powderhead house to check in on
young Francis. After Mason tells Francis to fake having an intellectual disability, the
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narrator (echoing the Old Man’s sense of ideological superiority) says, “If the
schoolteacher had got hold of him, right now he would have been in school, one among
many, indistinguishable from the herd, and in the schoolteacher’s head, he would be laid
out in parts and numbers” (18). This, of course, underscores the novel’s ideological
juxtaposition of Rayber’s instrumentalism and Mason’s prophetic imagination. Mason’s
anxiety that Francis would have been “laid out in parts and numbers” under Rayber’s care
seems overstated here early in the novel. However, O’Connor later makes clear that the
Uncle’s worry is well-founded. Through Rayber’s attempts to “reform” Francis, we know
that these suspicions are not entirely misplaced, because Rayber proves himself so preoccupied, as we have seen, with pitying Francis’s “innocence” that he has no chance of
actually developing a loving, restorative, or well-balanced relationship with his orphan
nephew.
O’Connor’s narrator repeatedly draws Bernice as coercive, but importantly the
little we do know about her comes from Mason and Rayber’s narrative perspective.
Rayber thinks about the Welfare Woman most straightforwardly in the car after “leaving
Frank to his meditations” at the lodge, and in this scene another motive to her absence
emerges:
He [Rayber] seldom thought of her anymore. She would not divorce him for fear
she would be given custody of the child and she was now as far away as she could
get, in Japan, in some welfare capacity. He was aware of his good fortune in
getting rid of her. It was she who had prevented his going back and getting
Tarwater away from the old man. She would have been glad enough to have had
him if she had not seen him that day when they went to Powderhead to face the old
man down…It was not simply that the child was dirty, thin, and grey; it was that
its expression had no more changed when the gun went off than the old man’s had.
This had affected her deeply. (180)
O’Connor uses this scene to unsentimentalize the seemingly heroic act of going to rescue
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the child from the backwards hillbilly uncle. “She had had the sense seeing the child in the
door, that if it had known that at that moment all its future advantages were being stolen
from it, its expression would not have altered a jot” (181). Success indicators, marks of
worthiness for aid, become, again, the main justification for their action. It makes no sense
for The Welfare Woman to save Francis because his facial expression evidences his lack
of future prospects. But it is not only Francis’s lack of future success indicators that repel
Bernice. One also finds through this scene a quickening toward the logical conclusion of
poverty as pathology, one O’Connor underscores repeatedly throughout her corpus. It is
hardly fulfilling, as many caregivers will tell you, to help someone who has no redeeming
qualities. O’Connor even further applies pressure to an empirical form of sympathy that
relies on one’s reaction to a suffering entity. Baby Bishop is “the opposite of everything
appealing,” and Bernice’s aversion to the boy’s ugliness draws attention to her inadequate
“temperament and training,” which also make her unable to remain a parent to Bishop.
Parenting or adopting a child becomes a matter of choice, the same as taking on a client as
a social worker.
In spite of all this, hidden in Bernice’s apparent coercion and instrumental
disappointment over her and Rayber’s inability to retrieve Francis from Powderhead,
O’Connor uses the novel’s gendered narrative perspective to resist an easy critique of state
aid. Running counter to both Rayber and Mason’s sense of the Welfare Woman, a closer
look reveals that her absence ultimately results not from her abandonment, as Mason
believed, but from domestic violence. Rayber reflects that he threw Bernice across the
room on their last meeting, implying that she not so much ran out of ambition toward the
next charity case but, rather, her own safety. O’Connor ultimately crafts Bernice along the
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symbolic axis of a results-driven, morally self- righteous social worker. But the writer
often noted for her cruelty toward female characters53 presents Bernice always as
narratively constructed by the male characters. That is, while playing on the stereotype of
the busy-body, man-hating social worker, O’Connor also draws attention to the fact that
Bernice’s story, scarce as it is in the novel, is always told from the purview of distraught
male characters. While Francis, Rayber, and the Old Man haggle over their respective
theologies throughout the novel, it is worth mentioning that Bernice is at least presumably
off helping someone in Japan. To put it bluntly, Bernice ostensibly contributes to the
public good while Francis and Rayber cannot figure out whether or not they want to kill a
boy with Downs Syndrome. Although subtle, O’Connor leaves room in her critique for a
preference for the Welfare Woman over “the schoolteacher.”
Conclusion
The Violent Bear it Away does not so much repeat a trend in O’Connor’s fiction
toward violent revelation as it realizes a measured hopefulness toward charitable action.
The grotesque mode offered a way for her to find the ascendancy of morality over empty,
“unearned” feeling. Notably the novel’s violent revelation does not come when Francis
murders Bishop but instead at the end after Francis returns to Powderhead to find his
Uncle Mason buried after all and, after refusing to accept any food from Rayber or eat
anything of substance for the majority of the novel, he suddenly finds himself hungry:
The boy remained standing there, his still eyes reflecting the field [Buford
Munson] had crossed. It seemed to him no longer empty but peopled with a
multitude. Everywhere, he saw dim figures seated on the slope and as he gazed he
saw that from a single basket the throng was being fed. His eyes searched the
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crowd for a long time as if he could not find the one he was looking for. Then he
saw him. The old man was lowering himself to the ground. When he was down
and his bulk had settled, he leaned forward, his face turned toward the basket,
impatiently following its progress toward him. The boy too leaned forward, aware
at least of the object of his hunger, aware that it was the same as the old man’s and
that nothing on earth would fill him. The hunger was so great that he could have
eaten all the loaves and fishes after they were multiplied. (241)
For O’Connor, neither the pastoral nor the domestic in themselves provide an ideal
environment for the action of charity. There is no Catholic Worker house of hospitality in
the city where Rayber lives; the pastoral realm of Powderhead does not ultimately provide
all that Francis or the Munson’s needs. The perceived therapeutic benefit of each domain
(Mason takes Francis to Powderhead to cure him of the city’s ills, Rayber thinks Francis
can flourish in his home under his care) is not as important as Mason or Rayber’s
intentions. Jon Lance Bacon locates the edge of O’Connor’s subversive vision in the space
between the pastoral and the domestic. That is, while the persistent demands of charity
continually invade O’Connor’s domestic spaces, the “escape to the green world” (to use
Frank Kermode’s old Shakespearean trope) back to the pastoral Southern spaces
continually underscores her protagonists’ Jonah-like inability to escape the demands of the
other. As Toni Morrison has argued recently, O’Connor’s white characters frequently find
themselves reasserting their own dominance through othering their southern black
counterparts.54
Francis’s prophetic vision of Mason and the gathered multitude sharing in the feast
of multiplied loaves and fishes further parallels the novel’s treatment of modern charity.
Earlier, when Mason trudges around the city from lawyer to lawyer seeking legal recourse
for Rayber’s false charity, Francis wants to greet everyone along the way and offer his
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presence to them for a moment. While Rayber frets over protecting Bishop’s “dignity” by
keeping Francis from baptizing him, Francis takes a moment to tie the boy’s shoes at the
hotel. Whereas Ruby Turpin’s famous vision of ascension to heaven, in O’Connor’s
“Revelation,” leads her to conclude “the bottom rung will be on top,” Francis’s vision
notably excludes Rayber while Mason is allowed to feast.
In the biblical context of Jesus’s multiplying the loaves and fishes, the act comes in
response to his disciples wanting to send away the multitude so that the rabbi’s cohort will
not be seen as unjustly stingy. By returning to the city, Francis takes up the disciple’s
(rather than the prophet’s) lesson that one cannot expect to go on preaching when his
audience is hungry. In the context of the “violent bear it away” passage in the Gospel of
Matthew, Jesus has just sent his disciples to feed the poor and heal the sick, not preach as
John the Baptist had in his mission to “prepare the way” for the coming messiah.55 In this
chapter, these connections have all centered between about 1952 (when the novel is set)
and 1960 (when O’Connor published The Violent Bear it Away). Importantly, this period
marked the climax of what Jonathan Levy has called the breakdown of the US fiscal
triangle, which came as a result of the 1953 tax code revisions. Under the new 501(c)
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designations, church-based and para-church charities were now more than ever compelled
to exist under the auspices of the federal government, allowing private businesses to use
charitable contributions as tax write-offs while placing more tax incentives for religious
participation and donations.
Undoubtedly, these developments benefited untold multitudes of recipients, both at
home and abroad, but as O’Connor demonstrates, both the dawn of the US semiwelfare
state and the corporatization of charity demanded more efficiency and regulation, more
instrumental evaluation of who was the most worthy of aid. Within this context, O’Connor
clung to her critique of modern charity as if the import of her fiction, particular her later
work, was dependent upon it. However, O’Connor moves toward a recognition that to
critique what she saw as a banalization of charity in modernity is not to replace it with
something else. Rather, O’Connor appeared to place her hope in the possibility to restore
charity’s place in an originary narrative of a society that lived by faith and accepted that
there was no innocent person under God. While O’Connor’s belief may seem
straightforward in this regard, her respect for the complex nature and unavoidable
paradoxes presented by charity, as we have seen was anything but simplistic or easily
understood. As she once wrote to a friend, “there was a man by here the other day… much
interested in Dorothy Day, only he couldn’t see he said why she fed endless lines of
endless bums for whom there was no hope, she’d never see any results from that, said he.
The only conclusion we came to about this was that Charity was not understandable.
Strange people turn up.”56

56

“Letter to Sally and Robert Fitzgerald, 7 May 1953”
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